Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2011

Religion, Science, and the Conscious Self: Bio-Psychological
Explanation and the Debate Between Dualism and Naturalism
Paul J. Voelker
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Voelker, Paul J., "Religion, Science, and the Conscious Self: Bio-Psychological Explanation and the Debate
Between Dualism and Naturalism" (2011). Dissertations. 242.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/242

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2011 Paul J. Voelker

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND THE CONSCIOUS SELF:
BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION AND THE DEBATE BETWEEN
DUALISM AND NATURALISM

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN THEOLOGY

BY
PAUL J. VOELKER
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MAY 2011

Copyright by Paul J. Voelker, 2011
All rights reserved.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people helped to make this dissertation project a concrete reality. First, and
foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. John McCarthy. John’s breadth and depth
of knowledge made for years of stimulating, challenging conversation, and I am grateful
for his constant support. Dr. Michael Schuck also provided for much good conversation
during my time at Loyola, and I am grateful to Mike for taking time from a hectic
schedule to serve on my dissertation committee. Dr. J.D. Trout graciously agreed to serve
on both my comprehensive exam committee and my dissertation committee, and I am the
better for it. J.D.’s own research provided an excellent model of how to do
interdisciplinary, naturalistic philosophy.
I am grateful to a number of my fellow grad students for help and support,
especially Denise Starkey, Emily Reimer-Barry, and Ana Bedard. Catherine Wolf and
Marianne Wolfe were a constant source of administrative help. I am grateful to the
Graduate School at Loyola University Chicago for funding for an Advanced Dissertation
Fellowship that enabled the completion of this project.
Friends and family were also a constant source of encouragement. In Chicago,
many thanks to Adam Shames, Andy Weiss, and members of the Voelker and Fuerst
clans, especially Heidi and Frank Hutton and Kate and Dave May. My late uncle and
aunt, Werner and Marie Fuerst, were an unfailing source of hospitality during my time in
Chicago; they are missed. I feel that my gang of friends from high school—the
iii

Westsylvanians—all contributed to this project in one way or another; special thanks go
to Jeff Frank and John Christodouleas. Thanks also to Jim, Julie, and Anna Voelker.
Thanks in particular to Jim, my brother and actuary extraordinaire, for constant support
and encouragement. Last but not least, thanks to my parents, Jacob and Rosemary
Voelker, for being the first and best educators in my life. It is to them that this
dissertation is dedicated.

iv

For my parents, Jacob and Rosemary Voelker

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iii

ABSTRACT

ix

INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER ONE: NATURALISM, DUALISM, AND BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE CONSCIOUS SELF
Dualism and Religion
Varieties of Religious Dualism
Naturalism and Identity Theory: An Overview of the Argument of Chapter One
Scientific Constraints and the Mind-Body Problem
Explaining Consciousness: The Contemporary Mind-Body Problem as a Problem
of Vertical Integration
The Mind-Body Problem and the Quest for Vertical Integration
Positions in the Philosophy of Mind in Light of the Issue of Vertical Integration
Identity Theory: A Phenomenally Realist, Pluralist, Neurophilosophical Version
Dualism and Consciousness
Thomas Nagel: “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?”
Saul Kripke and A Posteriori Necessity
Joseph Levine and the Explanatory Gap
Frank Jackson and the Knowledge Argument
David Chalmers and the Hard Problem
Dualism in Question
The Incomplete Concepts Strategy
Subjectivity Naturalized: Neurophilosophical Identity Theory and Phenomenal
Realism
Naturalism and Phenomenal Realism
Subjectivity and Naturalism: Leaving Out ‘What It Is Like’?
Consciousness and the Brain: Explaining the Intuition of Distinctness
Naturalism and Qualia
Paul Churchland’s Neurophilosophical Model of Qualia
Naturalistic Anti-Reductionism: Functionalism and the Autonomy of Psychology
Functionalism, Multiple Realizability, and the Autonomy of Psychology
Multiple Realizability Critiqued
Vertical Integration: Beyond Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism
The Co-Evolution of Psychology and Neuroscience: Reduction and Elimination
Beyond Autonomy and Reduction
Explanatory Pluralism and Co-Evolution
Identity Theory and Explanation
Conclusion

vi

6
6
8
12
13
16
17
18
20
23
23
24
27
29
31
34
35
42
43
47
50
53
55
59
60
61
66
66
68
71
73
77

CHAPTER TWO: TOWARD A NATURALISTIC, BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXPLANATION OF DUALISM
Naturalism and the Ubiquity of Dualism
Principled Humanist Objections to a Naturalistic,Bio-Psychological Explanation
of Dualism
Natural Sources of the Dualist Self: Toward a Bio-Psychological Explanation of
Dualism
Toward a Bio-Psychological Explanation of Dualism:Insights from Neuroscience
and Neurophilosophy
Defining the Problem of the Conscious Self
An Evolutionary Account of the Conscious Self: Antonio Damasio
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism I: Selves as Transparent Phenomenal
Self Models: Thomas Metzinger
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism II: Thomas Metzinger and Olaf Blanke
on Out-of-Body Experiences
Toward a Bio-Psychological Explanation of Dualism: Insights from Cognitive
Science
Introducing Cognitive Science
Folk Psychology: Agency Detection and Theory of Mind
Folk Knowledge and Religious Belief: Introducing the Cognitive Science
of Religion
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism III: Paul Bloom and Jesse Bering on
Folk Psychology and Dualism
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism IV: From Dualism to Theism:
Over-Attribution of Agency and Design
Conclusion
CHAPTER THREE: BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION AND THE
TRUTH OF RELIGIOUS DUALISM
Recap: Why Mind-Brain Science Matters for the Study of Religion
Dualism and Classical Theism
Emergentism and Theism: Philip Clayton
Clayton’s Account of the Relationship between Theology and Neuroscience
Clayton’s Account of Emergentism
Clayton’s Move from Emergentism to Dualist Theism
Experiential Religious Dualism: B. Alan Wallace
Wallace’s Negative Arguments about Naturalism and a Naturalistic
Explanation of Consciousness
Wallace’s Case for Buddhist Religious Dualism
CHAPTER FOUR: SHIFTING THE RELIGION AND SCIENCE
CONVERSATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF MORALITY
AND ITS IMPACT ON METAETHICS AND RELIGION
Recap of the Dissertation Argument

vii

78
78
79
85
86
88
89
95
102
112
113
118
124
126
143
152

154
154
157
167
169
170
179
185
188
192

210
210

The Implications of the Naturalistic Conclusions of this Dissertation for the
Religion and Science Dialogue
Points of Intersection between Religion and Science: Metaphysics and Morals
Mind Science, Metaethics and Religion I: Divine Command Ethics and the
Origins of Moral Judgment
Religion and Morality
Religion, Morality, and the Moral-Conventional Distinction
The Origin of the Moral-Conventional Distinction
The Affective Origins of Morality: Psychopaths and the Moral-Conventional
Distinction
The Affective Origins of Morality: The Moral Psychology of Disgust
Commonsense Moral Objectivism and the Relationship of Religion and
Morality
Mind Science, Metaethics, and Religion II: Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene
on the Relationship between Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgment
Emotion, Post-Hoc Reasoning, and Morality: Joshua Greene’s Critique of
Rationalist Deontology
Emotion and Reason in Jonathan Haidt’s Social-Intuitionist Account of Moral
Judgment
The Biological and Cultural Origins of Moral Intuitions
Mind Science, Metaethics, and Religion III: The Implications of Scientific Moral
Psychology for Normative Ethics and Religious Practices
Scientific Moral Psychology, Virtue Ethics, and Issues of Normative Moral
Evaluation
A Fruitful Approach to Religion and Science: The Buddhism-Mind Science
Dialogue on Meditation, Affective Style, and Emotion
Conclusion

213
216
221
221
223
229
229
232
237
247
249
256
260
263
264
267
275

CONCLUSION

278

BIBLIOGRAPHY

282

VITA

299

viii

ABSTRACT
This dissertation approaches metaphysical and metaethical questions concerning
the nature of the human person, the existence and nature of God, and the nature of moral
judgment through contemporary neuroscience, cognitive science, scientific moral
psychology, and analytic philosophy of mind. Contrary to proposals that seek a
harmonious integration of “religion and science” this dissertation argues that
contemporary bio-psychological sciences give one ample reason to be skeptical of many
of the metaphysical and metaethical claims embedded in religious traditions like
Christianity and Buddhism. The first three chapters of the dissertation focus on the
metaphysical issue of mind-body dualism, while the fourth chapter addresses closely
related metaethical issues concerning the nature and origin of moral judgment.
Chapter One calls into question the truth of dualism and defends a version of
psychoneural identity theory as the most adequate solution to the mind-body problem. If
dualism is not true, why is it so ubiquitous across cultures? Drawing on research in both
neuroscience and cognitive science, Chapter Two offers a naturalistic, bio-psychological
explanation of dualism. Chapter Three applies the conclusions of the first two chapters to
religious and theological concerns. The link between mind-body dualism and theism is
highlighted, and it is argued that the collapse of mind-body dualism renders many
versions of theism problematic. Philip Clayton’s attempt to integrate an emergentist
doctrine of the human person with a dualist doctrine of God is critiqued, as is B. Alan
ix

Wallace’s more experiential defense of religious dualism from a Buddhist perspective.
Along with a commitment to dualism, many religious traditions understand moral
judgment as something objectively grounded in divine commands and/or reason. Chapter
Four argues that research in scientific moral psychology implicating the emotions in
moral judgment raises significant questions for theological and reason-based accounts of
moral judgment.

x

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is concerned with interdisciplinary work at the interface of
religion and science, interdisciplinary work at the interface of mind and brain, and their
mutual relationship. While questions concerning “religion and science” and questions
concerning “mind and brain” are typically pursued independently of one another, the
issue of the relationship between these two domains of interdisciplinary inquiry becomes
increasingly hard to avoid. Contemporary cognitive science, neuroscience, and
philosophy of mind do not merely form topics that can be “related to” or “integrated
with” some religious tradition. Rather, contemporary bio-psychological science and
philosophy have the potential to radically reconfigure human self-understanding, and
along with it, the ways in which religion, science, and their respective claims are
understood—or so it will be argued.
Contrary to proposals that seek a harmonious integration of “religion and
science,” this dissertation argues that the contemporary bio-psychological sciences give
one ample reason to be skeptical of many of the metaphysical and metaethical claims
embedded in religious traditions. Many religious traditions presume a commitment to
fairly robust versions of metaphysical dualism, while contemporary mind science not
only gives one every reason to think that the mind is the brain, it also has begun to offer
compelling bio-psychological explanations for the ubiquity of God and soul concepts
across cultures. Along with a commitment to metaphysical dualism, many religious
1
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traditions also tend to understand morality as rooted in divine commands or as grounded
in an objective transcendent realm that exists independently of human minds. The mind
sciences—especially contemporary moral psychology—also give one reason for
skepticism about these claims, as the centrality of emotion in moral judgment has been
highlighted.
This dissertation pursues both metaphysics and morals as interesting points of
intersection between religion and science. The first three chapters focus on the
metaphysical intersection, in particular, the mind-body or brain-consciousness problem.
The guiding question for the first three chapters is the following: How does contemporary
work in the mind sciences impact the mind-body problem, and how does this impact
upon religious claims? The fourth and final chapter shifts the religion and science
conversation from metaphysics to morals, specifically the question of how work in
contemporary scientific moral psychology impacts metaethical questions about the
origins of morality and how this impacts both normative ethics and religion.
Chapter One first establishes the link between religion and dualism across a wide
range of positions in both the Christian and Buddhist traditions. It then goes on to address
issues concerning the impact of science on the mind-body problem. In assessing the
impact of the bio-psychological sciences on the mind-body problem, Chapter One
presents the mind-body or brain-consciousness problem as a problem of vertical
integration between various explanatory levels—phenomenal, psychological, and
neurological. The central question it pursues is whether contemporary cognitive science
and neuroscience are in a position to explain something like phenomenal consciousness,
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or if there are principled reasons to be skeptical about a scientific, especially brain-based,
account of consciousness and the conscious self. A number of prominent analytic
philosophers of mind—Thomas Nagel, Saul Kripke, Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson, and
David Chalmers—have defended property dualist positions on consciousness and thus
voiced skepticism about the possibility of brain-based explanations of consciousness.
Even more naturalistically oriented philosophers like (early) Hilary Putnam and Jerry
Fodor have defended the autonomy of psychology from lower level neuroscientific
explanations. Dualist and functionalist arguments present the strongest objections to biopsychological explanations of consciousness and identity theories of mind. Chapter One
criticizes dualist and functionalist arguments and defends an account of bio-psychological
explanation and a version of mind-brain identity theory that responds to the worries of
both dualists and functionalists.
If dualism is not true, why is it so ubiquitous across cultures? Chapter Two offers
a naturalistic, bio-psychological explanation of dualism. Here too, one encounters
principled objections to such an explanatory strategy. Just as dualists and functionalists
object to bio-psychological explanations of consciousness, humanist scholars object to
attempts to offer a scientific account of religious phenomena like dualist beliefs and
experiences. It is argued that such principled distinctions between the humanities and the
sciences are themselves rooted in a residual dualism, and one that is no longer tenable
given the conclusions of Chapter One. Having blocked principled humanist objections,
the remaining sections offer a bio-psychological explanation of dualism. Building on the
insights of Chapter One, Chapter Two first sketches an account of the conscious self and
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draws on the work of neurophilosopher Thomas Metzinger and the neuroscientists Antti
Revonsuo and Olaf Blanke to explain two potent sources of dualism: ordinary “out-ofbrain” experiences and more extraordinary out-of-body experiences. The chapter then
turns to psychological explanations of dualism, drawing particularly on the work of Paul
Bloom and Jesse Bering. It is then shown how intuitive dualism combines with a
tendency to over-attribute agency and design to generate other immaterial mind concepts
like God concepts.
Chapter One calls into question the truth of dualism, while Chapter Two explains
the ubiquity of such dualism. Chapter Three applies these conclusions directly to
religious concerns. The link between dualism and theism is first addressed.
Contemporary classical theists see claims about God and the soul as intimately related.
As a result, they have attempted to defend substance dualism as a doctrine about the
human person. For classical theists, substance dualism not only affects Christian views on
the afterlife, it also has bearing on fundamental issues concerning the existence and
nature of God. It is argued that substance dualists are fundamentally right about the link
between dualism and theism but wrong to think that substance dualism can be saved as a
doctrine about the human person. The remainder of Chapter Three focuses on attempts to
integrate dualist religious views with mind science. Philip Clayton’s attempt to integrate
an emergentist doctrine of the human person with a dualist doctrine of God is first
addressed. Clayton’s version of emergentism is critiqued as a version of property
dualism, as is his attempt to move from a downwardly dependent account of human
minds to a divine mind that is not downwardly dependent. The chapter concludes with a
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consideration of B. Alan Wallace’s more experientially focused defense of religious
dualism from a Buddhist perspective. Both Wallace’s account of consciousness and his
attempts to ground religion universal experience are critiqued.
Chapter Four then surveys the conclusions of the dissertation thus far and their
bearing on issues concerning the relationship of religion and science. It is argued that
claims about dualism are an area of conflict between religion and science, and this
conflict is not favorable to traditional religious positions. It is argued that conflict need
not be a conversation stopper, nor does it rule out other areas of intersection between
religion and science. Chapter Four explores one of these other areas of intersection,
moving from issues of metaphysics to morals. The final chapter focuses on the
implications of the mind sciences for metaethical questions concerning the nature and
origin of moral judgment and the bearing of this on both normative ethics and religion.

CHAPTER ONE
NATURALISM, DUALISM, AND BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE CONSCIOUS SELF
This chapter first establishes the link between mind-body dualism and religion. It
then goes on to show why such dualism has become problematic on scientific grounds
and argues that psychoneural identity theory provides the plausible solution to the mindbody or consciousness-brain problem in light of both established scientific conclusions
and ongoing scientific research on consciousness.
Dualism and Religion
The concern of this section is simply to point to a link between mind-body
dualism and religious traditions like Christianity and Buddhism. Dualist assumptions
have a long history in both traditions, and these dualist positions continue to be defended
by a number of contemporary theologians and religious thinkers. Such dualist claims are
intimately linked to beliefs about the origin, transformation, and destiny of human beings,
and, indeed, the entire cosmos. As such, they are hardly tangential claims.
While there are very important differences between religious dualists, they
typically share a commitment to two metaphysical theses regarding the relationship of
consciousness to the brain. The first thesis, we can call the Correlation Claim (CC):
Conscious mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical (e.g., neurological)
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properties. Thus the relationship between consciousness and the brain can only be
understood in terms of correlation and not identity.
The correlation claim is a claim that all dualists will share. Property dualists
typically hold either the position that (1) consciousness is dependent upon the brain (e.g.,
emergentism), or (2) consciousness and the brain are lawfully correlated (e.g.,
panpsychism). 1 Substance dualists—those who defend the notion of a soul—hold that
this correlation involves no downward dependence; the soul must be directly created by
God. Religious dualists can be substance dualists or property dualists about human
minds; however, religious dualists—even if they are property dualists and acknowledge
the downward dependency of the human mind on the brain—are committed to a more
robust metaphysical thesis about consciousness and the brain. This is the claim that there
are actual (as opposed to merely possible) cases where consciousness or the conscious
self exists without any ties to a nervous system or indeed any physical substrate. We can
call this the No Neural Correlates Claim (NNCC): Consciousness or the conscious self is
capable of existing without any neural or physical correlates (e.g., the post-mortem soul,
God, substrate consciousness).
The remainder of this section cites specific examples of religious dualism. The
purpose is to demonstrate that all of these representatives hold both CC and NNCC and
also to demarcate important differences between various dualist positions. Religious
dualism is not a marginal or idiosyncratic position, nor is it limited to doctrines about the
human person and claims about ‘the soul’ in the Christian tradition. Theism itself is often
1

Non-religious defenders of property dualism typically only entertain mind and brain coming apart
in possible worlds and not the actual world.
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articulated in dualist terms. As the remainder of this section will illustrate, this
commitment to theistic dualism is found not only within classical Christian theism but
also in revisionist forms of theism, such as the process panentheism of Philip Clayton.
Further, dualism about consciousness is present within versions of Buddhism that eschew
a substance ontology of God and the soul.
Varieties of Religious Dualism
Perhaps the most obvious example of religious dualism comes from within
classical Christian theism. Within classical Christian theism, God is understood
straightforwardly as an immaterial person. Richard Swinburne captures this
understanding well when he defines God as “[a] person without a body (i.e. a spirit)
present everywhere, the creator and sustainer of the universe….” 2 Alvin Plantinga nicely
spells out some of the implications of this understanding of God: “Given Christian
theism, we know that it is at any rate possible that there be immaterial thinking things,
since God Himself is such a thing.” 3 As Plantinga’s quote illustrates, the notion of God as
an immaterial person relates intimately to the notion of human beings possessing an
immaterial soul along the lines described in the Catechism of the Catholic Church:
The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by
God… and that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the
body at death, and it will be united with the body in the final resurrection. 4

2

Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 2.

3

Alvin Plantinga, "Materialism and Christian Belief," in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter
van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 100.
4

Catechism of the Catholic Church, #366.
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Of course, a significant number of Christian philosophers and theologians reject
the notion of the soul. As Dean Zimmerman writes:
Christianity is often thought to require a dualistic conception of human
persons, according to which each of us has (or perhaps simply is) an
immaterial soul that survives death and awaits reunion with the body at a
general resurrection….For several decades, however philosophers and
theologians have been questioning the inevitability of Christian opposition
to materialism. Indeed, at present there seem to be more Christian
philosophers [and theologians] defending materialism (as a theory about
human persons, not about the deity) than dualism—at least in print. 5
Notice, however, in Zimmerman’s quote that “materialism” is embraced as a local
doctrine about human minds, the notion of God as an immaterial person remains strong in
such position. This revisionist stance certainly takes much more of a naturalistic
perspective than does classical theism; however, its embrace of theism still places it
firmly within a dualistic framework. At least one case of an immaterial mind remains
within these revisionist forms of theism. The fundamentally dualist nature of these
revisionist forms of theism can be seen in the writings of Philip Clayton. 6 Clayton
repudiates both classical theism and substance dualism in favor of process panentheism
and emergentism, but the notion of God as immaterial mind floating free from any
physical substrate remains strong.
While this position [theistic emergentism] affirms that all mental
phenomena in the empirical world are dependent on a biological substrate,
it postulates that transcendent mind is not downwardly dependent in this
way. This fact accounts for the ineliminable element of dualism in the
5

Dean Zimmerman, "Three Introductory Questions," in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter van
Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2.
6

Clayton’s views about theism are hardly idiosyncratic; indeed, they are representative of the
views of the majority of Christian theologians interested in religion and science: Ian Barbour, John
Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, Nancey Murphy, John Haught, and Gregory Peterson all defend similar
positions.
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theistic hypothesis.…[T]his move forces the chain of explanation beyond
the framework that one otherwise uses to explain mental properties, in so
far as it imagines a mind that is distinct in essence from the natural order
taken as a whole. 7 (Emphasis added.)
Christian religious dualists thus differ sharply over the issue of dualism as a
doctrine about human persons and the implications of that understanding for their
doctrine of God.
There are also important interreligious differences between religious dualists over
exactly what kind of immaterial minds are thought to exist. Notions of immaterial mind
and consciousness also figure prominently in a tradition like Buddhism that lacks both
the notion of God and a substantial soul. This can be seen in the recent writings of the
fourteenth Dalai Lama and his English translator, B. Alan Wallace. 8 Wallace, in
particular, has highlighted the important role immaterial consciousness plays within
Tibetan Buddhism in his recent works on Buddhism and contemporary mind science.
Wallace writes:
Buddhist contemplatives claim that with the achievement of a highly
advanced degree of Samadhi[sustained attention] known as samatha, or
meditative quiescence, one gains experiential access to the relative ground
state of consciousness known in the Great Perfection (Dzogchen) school
of Tibetan Buddhism as the “substrate consciousness” (alayavijnana).
This, they claim, is the individual stream of consciousness from which the
psyche and all the physical senses emerge. According to their findings, the
psyche is conditioned by the body and its physical interaction with the
environment, but it emerges from the substrate consciousness.… In the
course of a human life, these mental events are conditioned by the brain
7

Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 183-184.
8

Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality; B.
Alan Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000); Contemplative Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
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and environment, but they emerge from and dissolve back into the
substrate consciousness. Likewise, these mental events influence the brain,
body, and the physical environment, but they do not transform into those
physical phenomena. In short, from this Buddhist perspective, the “hard
problem” of how the brain produces subjective mental experience is a
false problem, for such experience actually arise from the substrate
consciousness. 9 (Emphasis in original.)
The general nature of religious dualism has been spelled out in terms of CC and
NNCC and specific versions religious dualism have been cited. The remaining chapters
of this dissertation will show how problematic such claims have become in light of
contemporary mind science.
When one reads contemporary scientific and philosophical literature on the
conscious self one cannot but be stuck by its distance from the metaphysical and
methodological commitments of even the most scientifically informed religious dualists.
Bio-psychological explanations of the conscious self are being actively pursued, and most
of these research programs are guided by the assumption that mind can be identified with
the brain. Mind scientists are well aware of the metaphysical implications of their work
and don’t hesitate to point them out (much to the irritation of the philosophers and
theologians who disagree with them). 10 Part of the burden of this chapter is to show that
this tension is real by investigating the tenability of identity theory in philosophy of mind.
Scientists and philosophers working at the mind-brain, psychology-neuroscience
interface are not captive to the “ideologies” of materialism, reductionism, and scientism.

9

B. Alan Wallace, Contemplative Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 15-17.

10

Francis Crick, for example, entitles the final chapter of his book on consciousness “Dr. Crick’s
Sunday Morning Service.” See Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the
Soul (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 255-263.
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Rather work in this area gives us every reason to think that the mind is the brain. This
work stands in substantial tension with dualist understandings of the conscious self as it
calls into question the mildly dualist Correlation Claim (CC) and the strongly dualist No
Neural Correlates Claim (NNCC).
Naturalism and Identity Theory:
An Overview of the Argument of Chapter One
This chapter points to the significant pressures the scientific study of mind puts
upon religious dualism. It addresses the mind-body problem and defends a biopsychological, specifically neurophilosophical, form of identity theory. Its goal is neither
definitive proof of mind-brain identity or definitive disproof of dualism. It rather seeks to
establish the fundamental plausibility of mind-brain identity theory as the most relatively
adequate position in comparison to other understandings of the mind-brain relation.
The argument of the chapter unfolds in the following manner. It begins with the
presentation of the mind-body or brain-consciousness problem in light of the issue of biopsychological explanation and outlines the five canonical positions in the philosophy of
mind taken in response to the mind-body problem. In light of this background, this
chapter then stakes out its own position on the issue, defending a neurophilosophical
form of identity theory. Identity theory, however, has fallen upon some tough times in
recent analytic philosophy of mind. This chapter first states major contemporary dualist
objections to physicalist understandings of consciousness. Dualism is then critiqued in
light of a naturalistic account of subjectivity.
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However, there have also been pitched battles between physicalists in the
contemporary philosophy of mind, particularly over the issue of “reductive” versus “nonreductive” forms of physicalism. It is argued that much of this debate is rooted in
understandings of explanation and intertheoretic reduction no longer tenable in the
philosophy of psychology, biology, and neuroscience. A new understanding of identity
theory is articulated in light of the notions of mechanistic explanation and explanatory
pluralism.
Scientific Constraints and the Mind-Body Problem
With characteristic bluntness, John Searle opens a book on the mind-body
problem with the following statement:
The famous mind-body problem, the source of so much controversy over
the past two millennia, has a simple solution. This solution has been
available to any educated person since serious work began on the brain
nearly a century ago, and, in a sense, we all know it to be true. Here it is:
Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the
brain and are themselves features of the brain. To distinguish this view
from the many others in the field, I call it “biological naturalism.” Mental
events and processes are as much part of our biological natural history as
digestion, mitosis, meiosis, or enzyme secretion. 11
This dissertation defends a specific approach to the mind-body problem, a version of
identity theory not unlike Searle’s biological naturalism. Searle’s remark is rooted in an
understanding of how significantly modern science has reshaped our worldview and our
philosophical options. Even prior to the advent of “serious” neuroscience in the twentieth
century, scientific advances placed significant constraints on philosophical theorizing.

11

John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 1.
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Identity theory becomes a compelling position when one considers three such constraints:
call these the physics constraint, the biology constraint, and the neuroscience constraint.
The first constraint, highly significant for the issue of mental causation, we can
call the physics constraint. It seems an obvious empirical fact about the world that the
conscious self has physical effects in the world (e.g., I go to the refrigerator to get a drink
because I am thirsty). Now, physics places important constraints upon our thinking about
such activities. Physics operates under conservation laws and the notion that every
physical effect has a physical cause (the causal closure of the physical). If the mind is
non-physical, one runs into massive difficulties in trying to account for mental causation.
As Owen Flanagan writes:
[T]he principle of conservation of energy requires that the total amount of
energy in the universe remain constant, even as it is continually transferred
and transformed in and among the myriad systems of causal relations.…In
order…for physical energy to increase in any system, it has to have been
transferred from some other physical system….If we accept the principle
of the conversation of energy we seem committed either to denying that
the nonphysical mind exists, or to denying that it could cause anything to
happen, or to making very implausible ad hoc adjustments in our
physics. 12
The physics constraint has been operative since Descartes, and it is significant that most
defenders of dualism defend epiphenomenalism rather than interactionist dualism. 13
Next, consider the biology constraint. Evolution is a process operating on
physical systems; that the human mind is also a physical system makes perfect sense in
an evolutionary framework. As Paul Churchland writes:
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[T]he important point about the standard evolutionary story is that the
human species and all of its features are the wholly physical outcome of a
purely physical process. Like all but the simplest of organisms, we have a
nervous system. And for the same reason: a nervous system permits the
discriminative guidance of behavior. But a nervous system is just an active
matrix of cells, and a cell is just an active matrix of molecules. We are
notable only in that our nervous system is more complex and powerful
than those of our fellow creatures. Our inner nature differs from that of
simpler creatures in degree, but not in kind.
If this is the correct account of our origins, then there seems
neither need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical substances or properties into
our theoretical account of ourselves. We are creatures of matter. And we
should learn to live with that fact. 14
Finally consider the mind-brain correlations and dependencies described by the
contemporary neurosciences. As Patricia Churchland notes:
The degeneration of cognitive function in various dementias such as
Alzheimer’s disease is closely tied to the degeneration of neurons. The
loss of specific functions such as the capacity to feel fear or see visual
motion are closely tied to defects in highly specific brain structures in both
animals and humans. The shift from being awake to being asleep is
characterized by highly specific changes in patters of neuronal activity in
inter-connected regions. The adaptation of eye movements when reversing
spectacles are worn is explained by highly predictable modifications in
very specific and coordinated regions of the cerebellum and brainstem
….One of the most metaphysically profound discoveries in this century
showed that a human’s mental life is disconnected if the two hemispheres
of his brain are disconnected….In careful postoperative studies of the
capacities of “the split-brain” subjects, Roger Sperry, Joseph Bogen, and
their colleagues found that each hemisphere could have perceptual
experiences or make movement decisions independently of the
other….These remarkable results demonstrate that the unity of mental life
is dependent on the anatomical connections in the brain itself. This seems
reasonable enough on the hypothesis that mental life is activity in the
brain. 15
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However, in spite of the explosive growth of the neurosciences in the past century, much
work in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind doubts that the brain will have
anything significant to tell us about the nature of mind. To understand why this is the
case, it is necessary to examine the contemporary mind-body problem in some detail.
Explaining Consciousness: The Contemporary Mind-Body Problem
as a Problem of Vertical Integration
The mind-body problem is an ancient problem, receiving one of its early
articulations in Plato’s Phaedo. However, the terms and precise nature of the mind-body
problem have changed dramatically as a result of the history of philosophy and the
history of science. The modern mind-body problem arises from the birth of a new physics
in the seventeenth century and receives its classic articulation in Descartes and his early
modern contemporaries. Mental causation is the major focus within the modern
articulation of the mind-body problem. Mental and physical realms are assumed to be
separate, and questions are then raised as to whether and how two such distinct realms
could interact with one another.
While mental causation looms large in the current debate, the contemporary
mind-body—or, more accurately the brain-consciousness—problem focuses on issues of
consciousness and its explanation. In the words of Colin McGinn, it focuses on questions
of how soggy gray matter gives rise to technicolor phenomenology. 16 The contemporary
mind-brain problem is framed not just by considerations concerning modern physics and
evolutionary biology, but also by the explosive growth of the sciences of the mind and
16
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brain within the twentieth century, and by the question of whether a science of
consciousness is in fact possible at all.
The Mind-Body Problem and the Quest for Vertical Integration
The contemporary mind-body problem is perhaps most fruitfully presented as a
problem of bio-psychological explanation concerning the relationship between
phenomenal consciousness/common sense psychology, scientific psychology, and
neuroscience. 17 It is thus intimately related to what has been called the “interface
problem” in the philosophy of psychology, the problem of how our common sense or folk
psychology (here specifically phenomenal consciousness) interfaces with explanations
given by scientific psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and other levels in the
explanatory hierarchy. 18 As I am presenting it, the contemporary mind-brain problem is a
problem concerning the possibility of “vertical integration” or “reflective equilibrium”
between phenomenal consciousness, cognitive science, and neuroscience. 19 The
neurophilosophical form of identity theory defended in this dissertation is optimistic
about the possibility of genuinely explanatory interdisciplinary bridges being built
between first-person phenomenology, scientific psychology, and neuroscience, and about
the ontological explanation of the conscious self in terms of the brain. However, many
17
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doubt the possibility of a bio-psychological explanation of consciousness and thus the
plausibility of any sort of identity theory of mind. Identity theory has fallen upon tough
times, and there has been an eclipse of the brain in much recent analytic philosophy of
mind.
Positions in the Philosophy of Mind in Light of the
Issue of Vertical Integration
There are typically five canonical positions stated in relationship to the mindbody problem: substance dualism, property dualism, functionalism, identity theory
(reductive materialism) and eliminative materialism. 20 All of these positions understand
the relationship between phenomenal consciousness, scientific psychology, and
neuroscience quite differently. An important issue here concerns the criteria by which
consciousness is explained. Identity theory is frequently referred to as reductive
physicalism, reflecting the fact that identity theory quickly became linked with treatments
of intertheoretic reduction in the philosophy of science, specifically Ernest Nagel’s model
of intertheoretic reduction. 21 Drawing upon a deductive-nomological (D-N)
understanding of scientific explanation, Nagel understood reduction as a relationship
between theories (where theories are understood as sets of laws), and argued that
reduction should be understood as a deduction of the reduced theory from the reducing
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theory. The notion of reduction as deduction and deductive criteria of explanation have
framed much of the discussion in contemporary philosophy of mind.
Substance dualism, property dualism, and functionalism are strong anti-reductive
positions and each position in its own way denies that the brain will tell us anything very
interesting about the mind. Dualism in principle denies the possibility of vertical
integration of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive science, and neuroscience because
consciousness just isn’t physical. Interactionist substance dualism denies that
consciousness and free will can be explained in naturalistic terms; being non-physical
they exist outside the causal nexus described by the natural sciences. Interactionist
emergentism also places principled limits on the explanatory power of lower level
sciences. All forms of interactionism are also premised on a denial of the notion of the
causal closure of the physical world or attempt to circumvent the principle. The form of
property dualism advocated by most contemporary philosophers maintains that conscious
mental properties (qualia) escape the net of lower level functional and physical
explanation. Many of the most prominent arguments for dualism today rely on deductive
criteria of explanation. It is precisely the failure to be able to deduce consciousness from
the physical facts that leads these thinkers to dualist conclusions.
There are also questions raised about vertical integration from within physicalism.
As it developed historically, identity theory envisions a smooth Nagel-reduction of
common sense psychology and scientific psychology to neuroscience. Functionalism and
eliminativism both call into question this understanding of the relationship between
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mental states and brain states, and in doing so, also understand the interdisciplinary
interface between psychology and neuroscience quite differently.
Functionalism is the most common form of non-reductive physicalism. For
functionalists, the essence of a mental state is its causal role linking perceptual inputs,
other mental states, and behavioral outputs. According to the functionalist these abstract
mental states can be realized in any number of physical systems; mental states are
multiply realizable. The implication of this is the autonomy of psychology from lower
level neuroscience. For functionalists, the wildly disjunctive nature of mind to brain
mappings also rules out deductive entailment.
Identity theory and eliminativism are typically the understandings of mind that
take the brain most seriously. Both theories, however, understand vertical integration or
reflective equilibrium in terms of reduction. Identity theory is frequently seen as
synonymous with reductive materialism or physicalism. The theory anticipates
neuroscience smoothly reducing common sense and scientific psychology. Eliminativism
is skeptical about a smooth reduction and anticipates a wholesale elimination of common
sense psychology and scientific psychology by a matured neuroscience.
Identity Theory: A Phenomenally Realist, Pluralist, Neurophilosophical Version
All of the positions surveyed above are problematic. This chapter defends a
phenomenally realist, pluralist, neurophilosophical form of identity theory. Originally
developed by Paul and Patricia Churchland, 22 neurophilosophy is a particular form of
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naturalism that seeks to bring the resources of neuroscience to bear on traditional
philosophical issues.
[T]he nature of the mind (including the nature of memory and learning,
consciousness, and free will) have traditionally been subjects within the
purview of philosophy. Philosophers, by tradition, have wrestled with
these topics and the work continues. Neurophilosophy arises out of the
recognition that at long last, the brain sciences and their adjunct
technology are sufficiently advanced that real progress can be made in
understanding the mind-brain. More brashly, it predicts that philosophy of
mind conducted with no understanding of neurons and the brain is likely
to be sterile. Neurophilosophy, as a result, focuses on problems at the
intersection of a greening neuroscience and a graying philosophy. 23
The Churchlands are known not only for the advocacy of neurophilosophy, but
also for their defense of eliminative materialism. Neurophilosophy and eliminativism
have been linked in the minds of many, but the two theses are distinct. This chapter
endorses neurophilosophy but not the eliminativist understanding of vertical integration.
It will show that one can take the brain seriously without eliminating higher-level mind
science and common sense psychology from one’s explanatory framework. This chapter
also endorses a version of identity theory, but not the form of reductionism with which
identity theory is usually associated. The success of neurophilosophy as a program, of
course, depends on the neurosciences having a certain degree of explanatory power and
for these explanations to be able to yield ontological conclusions. As noted above,
dualists and functionalists offer principled objections about the explanatory and
ontological implications of the neurosciences.
This chapter thus begins by discussing these dualist and functionalist concerns.
It is argued that while neither dualist nor functionalist arguments are compelling, both
23
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theories contain important insights. Dualism is correct to stress the subjectivity of
consciousness; however, it is argued that naturalism is better positioned to account for
subjectivity than dualism. The form of identity theory defended thus embraces
phenomenal realism.
Phenomenal realism or Inflationism is the view that consciousness is a
substantial property that cannot be conceptually reduced or otherwise
philosophically reduced in non-phenomenal terms….According to most
contemporary inflationists, consciousness plays a causal role and its nature
may be found empirically as the sciences of consciousness advance.
Inflationism is compatible with the empirical scientific reduction of
consciousness to neurological or computational properties of the brain….
Inflationism accepts the Hard Problem but aims for an empirical solution
to it. 24
The form of identity theory defended is also pluralist in its understanding of
explanation. Functionalism is correct to stress the importance of higher-level cognitive
science in the explanation of consciousness, but is wrong in its conclusions about the
autonomy of psychology based on multiple realizability arguments. Recent debates
between advocates of “reductive” and “non-reductive” physicalism tend to pit
psychology and neuroscience against one another in a zero-sum game. The pluralist
stance is an attempt to move beyond debates concerning non-reductive and reductive
forms of physicalism. This pluralist stance draws upon models of mechanistic
explanation and explanatory pluralism in recent philosophy of psychology and
philosophy of neuroscience, and argues that the project of vertical integration need not be
exclusively understood in reductionist or eliminativist terms.
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Dualism and Consciousness
Dualists argue that consciousness cannot be explained by lower level cognitive
science and neuroscience because consciousness just isn’t physical. Religious dualists
typically regard the entire conscious self as beyond the functional-physical explanatory
framework of the sciences. Within contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, the debate
focuses more narrowly on the issue of phenomenal consciousness and subjective qualities
of experience or qualia. This section provides an overview of the major anti-reductionist
arguments based on consciousness in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind.
Thomas Nagel: “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”
Thomas Nagel was one of the first to draw anti-reductionist, anti-physicalist (but
not pro-dualist) conclusions based on consciousness. The terms in which Nagel posed the
mind-body problem in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” echo through later treatments of the
issue. For Nagel, it is consciousness that makes the mind-body problem really
intractable. 25 According to Nagel, “the fact that an organism has conscious experience at
all means, basically that there is something it is like to be that organism.” 26 Now
according to Nagel, if naturalism is to be defended, phenomenal consciousness must also
be given a physical account. Nagel argues that this is impossible, however, due to the fact
that “every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected to a single point of view, and
it seems inevitable that an objective physical theory will abandon that point of view.” 27
25
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All of this has implications for the mind-body problem, for it is a mystery “how the true
character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operations of that organism.” 28
Phenomenal consciousness simply does not fit typical patterns of reduction in the
sciences:
We appear to be faced with a general difficulty about psychophysical
reduction. In other areas, the process of reduction is a move in the
direction of greater objectivity, toward a more accurate view of the real
nature of things. This is accomplished by reducing our dependence on
individual or species-specific points of view toward the object of
investigation….Experience itself, however, does not seem to fit the
pattern. The idea of moving from appearance to reality seems to make no
sense here. 29
Saul Kripke and A Posteriori Necessity
Work in modal logic by Saul Kripke also challenged the analogy between mindbrain identity and other scientifically discovered identities. 30 Early identity theorists
argued that psycho-neural identity was similar to others empirically discovered scientific
identities like heat = mean molecular kinetic energy or water = H2O. As these identities
are discovered a posteriori, these thinkers also argued that these identities were
contingent. Significantly, Kripke argued that if identity claims were true at all, they were
true in all possible worlds. Regardless if the claim is discovered empirically or not, if it is
an identity claim, it holds of necessity. Scientific identities, while discovered a posteriori,
like heat = mean molecular kinetic energy or water = H2O were thus necessary claims.
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Kripke realized that such empirically discovered scientific identities certainly
don’t seem necessary, however. Kripke argued that in cases of genuine identity the
appearance of contingency could be explained away. Kripke’s strategy for doing this
again trades on an appearance/reality distinction. The appearance of contingency with
scientifically established identities occurs in virtue of the fact that the everyday terms
involved in such identities (e.g., water, heat) have their references picked out by
contingent properties (i.e., their appearances). 31 With everyday terms like heat or water
reference is fixed by these contingent surface properties rather than the actual nature of
the everyday term. Thus water is identified as “the odorless, colorless stuff that falls from
the sky” or heat is identified as “the stuff that causes heat sensations.” The relationship
between water and “the odorless, colorless stuff that falls from the sky” or heat and “the
stuff that causes heat sensations” is contingent, and it is precisely because these
properties fix reference that an illusion of contingency is generated. The contingency lies
not with the nature of water (H2O) but with surface properties that human beings use to
pick out water. Once appearance (the odorless, colorless stuff that falls from the sky) is
distinguished from reality (H2O) the appearance of contingency can be explained away. 32
Kripke’s insights into the logic of identity had important implications for the
mind-body problem, for he argued that there was a profound difference between identity
statements like Heat = mean molecular kinetic energy and Pain = c-fibers firing. With
purported mind-brain identities, Kripke argued, the strategy of explaining away the
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contingency used with other scientific identities is not available. We explain away the
contingency with other scientific identities by making a distinction between the way heat
appears to us and the phenomena itself. Heat appears to us as “the stuff that causes heat
sensations” but it is really the motion of molecules. An appearance-reality distinction is
not available, in the case of mind-brain identities because the appearance is the reality.
“The experience has to be this experience, and I cannot say that it is contingent property
of the pain I now have that it is a pain.” 33 The sensation of pain counts as pain itself and
it seems that pain can come apart from c-fibers firing. According to Kripke, the challenge
for physicalists is thus quite steep:
The identity theorist who holds that pain is the brain state, also has to hold
that it necessarily is a brain state….He has to hold that we are under some
illusion in thinking that we can imagine that there could have been pains
without brain states. And the only model I can think of for what the
illusion might be, or at least the model given by the analogy the
materialists suggest, namely, heat and molecular motion, simply does not
work in this case. So the materialist is up against a very stiff challenge.
He has to show that these things we think we can see to be possible are in
fact not possible. He has to show that these things which we can imagine
are not in fact things we can imagine. And that requires some very
different philosophical argument from the sort which has been given in the
case of heat and molecular motion. And it would have to be a deeper and
subtler argument than I can fathom and subtler than has ever appeared in
any materialist literature that I have read. So the conclusion of this
investigation would be that the analytical tools we are using go against the
identity thesis and so go against the general thesis that mental states are
just physical states. 34
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The early anti-naturalist sentiments articulated by Nagel and Kripke in the 1970s were
shaped into distinctive arguments by Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers
in the 1980s and 1990s.
Joseph Levine and the Explanatory Gap
While rejecting the metaphysical conclusions of Kripke’s modal argument, Joseph
Levine amplifies its fundamental epistemological point in “Materialism and Qualia: The
Explanatory Gap.” 35 Kripke’s analysis pointed to the difference between statements like
“heat is the motion of molecules” and psycho-neural identity statements like “pain is the
firing of c-fibers.” According to Kripke, if these statements are genuine identities, they
must be necessary. In the case of heat, the felt contingency can be explained away;
however, the felt contingency with the psycho-neural identity cannot be explained away
in the same manner. Levine is concerned with probing why this is the case. He does so in
light of the notion of fully explanatory identity. “Fully explanatory identities,” according
to Levine, are identities that leave nothing crucial out. Thus the identification of heat with
the motion of molecules “is explanatory in the sense that our knowledge of chemistry and
physics makes intelligible how it is that something like the motion of molecules could
play the causal role we associate with heat. Furthermore, antecedent to our discovery of
the essential nature of heat, its causal role…exhausts our notion of it.” 36
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Levine argues that the psycho-neural identity, “pain is the firing of c-fibers,” is
also explanatory in this sense, but his point is that in the case of such psycho-neural
identities physical and functional analysis does not exhaustively explain the concept
“pain.”
[T]here is more to our concept of pain than its causal role, there is its
qualitative character, how it feels; and what is left unexplained by the
discovery of C-fiber firing is why pain should feel the way it does! For
there seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally
“fit” the phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some
other set of phenomenal properties. Unlike its functional role, the
identification of the qualitative side of pain with C-fiber firing…leaves the
connection between it and what we identify it with completely
mysterious. 37
Because qualia cannot be captured in physical or functional terms, it is natural to imagine
that these purported identities can in fact come apart:
If there is nothing we can determine about C-fiber firing that explains why
having one’s C-fibers fire has the qualitative character that it does—or, to
put it another way, if what’s it’s particularly like to have one’s C-fibers
fire is not explained, or made intelligible, by understanding the physical or
functional properties of C-fibers firings—it immediately becomes
imaginable that there be C-fiber firings without the feeling of pain, and
vice versa. We don’t have the corresponding intuition in the case of heat
and the motion of molecules—once we get clear about the right way to
characterize what we imagine—because whatever there is to explain about
heat is explained by its being the motion of molecules. 38
Levine’s argument is an argument from the absence of conceptual analysis.
Because consciousness cannot be exhaustively analyzed in physical or functional terms
an explanatory gap will always remain between properties of the brain and conscious
mental properties. Importantly, Levine’s argument from the absence of conceptual
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analysis is an epistemological argument. Physicalism may be true; we just don’t
understand how it can be true. For both Frank Jackson and David Chalmers the lack of
deductive entailment between consciousness and the physical implies that conscious
mental properties are non-physical.
Frank Jackson and the Knowledge Argument
The lack of entailment from physical facts to phenomenal facts is the focus of a
famous thought experiment by Frank Jackson. In “Epiphenomenl Qualia,” Jackson
explicitly seeks to avoid mere clashes of intuition about qualia by developing an
argument whose premises are obvious to all.
There are many qualia freaks, and some of them say that their rejection of
physicalism is an unargued intuition. I think they are being unfair to
themselves. They have the following argument. Nothing you could tell of
a physical sort captures the smell of a rose, for instance. Therefore,
physicalism is false. By our lights this is a perfectly good argument.… I
must, however, admit that it is weak from a polemical point of view. There
are, unfortunately for us, many who do not find the premise intuitively
obvious. The task then is to present an argument whose premises are
obvious to all, or at least to as many as possible. 39
The result is his now famous color scientist Mary:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to
investigate the world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white
television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and
acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain
about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms
like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on….What will happen when Mary is released
from her black-and-white room or is given a color-television monitor?
Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn
something about our world and our visual experience of it. But then it is
inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all
39
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the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and
physicalism is false. 40
In a later article, Jackson presents “a convenient and accurate” way to present the
argument:
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know
about other people.
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know
about other people (because she learns something about them on her
release).
Therefore,
(3) There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the
physicalist story. 41
The argument is an attempt to show that there is no deductive entailment between the
physical and the phenomenal; and as a result physical and phenomenal properties must be
thought of as distinct. Brian Loar summarizes the argument well:
Consider any phenomenal quality and any physical property however
complex. We can know that a person has the physical property without
knowing that she experiences the phenomenal quality. And no amount of a
priori reasoning or construction can bridge this conceptual gap. That is the
intuitive premise. The conclusion is drawn that the phenomenal quality
cannot be identical to the physical property. The argument is equivalent to
this: since physical and phenomenal conceptions can be connected only a
posteriori, physical properties must be distinct from phenomenal
properties. 42
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David Chalmers and the Hard Problem
In his 1996 work, The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers brings together both
modal arguments and knowledge arguments as part of a defense of property dualism. 43
Chalmers famously distinguishes between “easy problems” and the “hard problem” in the
philosophy of mind. In making this distinction, Chalmers differentiates two concepts of
mind: the psychological and the phenomenal. Psychological aspects of mind, including
psychological aspects of consciousness may be scientifically perplexing, but they are not
particularly philosophically perplexing because the psychological mind can be analyzed
in functional and physical terms. Echoing Levine and Jackson, however, Chalmers argues
that no such analysis is available for phenomenal consciousness. The “hard problem” is
thus the problem of how objective brains give rise to subjective experience. Chalmers
argues that consciousness cannot be explained in physicalist terms and then moves to the
conclusion that physicalism is false.
In discussing the explanation of consciousness, Chalmers draws upon the notions
of supervenience and reductive explanation. Importantly, Chalmers distinguishes between
two types of supervenience: logical supervenience and natural supervenience. “Bproperties supervene logically on A-properties if no two logically possible situations are
identical with respect to their A-properties but distinct with respect to their Bproperties.” 44 However, Chalmers points out there are other forms of supervenience than
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logical supervenience. This occurs in cases where there are systematic correlations
between two sets of properties in the natural world. This is natural supervenience: “In
general, B-properties supervene naturally on A-properties if any two naturally possible
situations with the same A-properties have the same B-properties.” 45 Logical
supervenience is linked closely to Chalmers’ notion of reductive explanation.
For almost every natural phenomenon above the level of microscopic
physics, there seems in principle to exist a reductive explanation: that is,
an explanation wholly in terms of simpler entities. In these cases, when we
give an appropriate account of lower-level processes, an explanation of the
higher-level phenomenon falls out. 46
Logical supervenience is related to reductive explanation in the following manner:
“A natural phenomenon is reductively explainable in terms of some low-level properties
precisely when it is logically supervenient on these properties. It is reductively
explainable in terms of physical properties—or simply “reductively explainable” when it
is logically supervenient on the physical.” 47 Chalmers argues that consciousness fails to
logically supervene upon the physical and thus escapes the net of reductive explanation.
Chalmers bases his conclusions about the failure of logical supervenience and reductive
explanation on a number of dualist arguments under consideration.
(1) Absent Qualia: It is logically possible to conceive of a creature—a
philosophical zombie—who is physically and functionally identical to me but
lacks conscious experience. Of course, such a being is empirically impossible,
but the conceivability of zombies shows the failure of logical supervenience
and reductive explanation.
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(2) Inverted Qualia: One can imagine two people who are physically and
functionally identical but who have inverted conscious experiences. When I
have a red experience my inverted twin has a blue experience and vice versa.
As a logical possibility, it seems coherent that experiences could be inverted
while physical structure is duplicated exactly.
(3) The Knowledge Argument: Mary cannot know what it is like to see red on
the basis of physical facts. Subjective facts escape the physicalist story.
(4) Absence of Conceptual Analysis: No sort of physicalist conceptual
analysis—i.e. structural and functional analysis—is possible with
consciousness: “For consciousness to be entailed by a set of physical facts,
one would need some kind of analysis of the notion of consciousness—the
kind of analysis whose satisfaction physical facts could imply—and there is
no such analysis to be had.” 48
On the basis of these arguments, Chalmers argues that scientific explanations of
consciousness might well be able to explain psychological properties of the mind and
even psychological consciousness, but they fail to explain phenomenal consciousness. In
other words, they explain “easy problems” but not the “hard problem.” Writing on a
number of different scientific explanations of consciousness, Chalmers argues:
The problems with the models and theories presented here do not lie in the
details; at least, we have not needed to consider the details in order to see
what is wrong with them. The problem lies in the overall explanatory
strategy. These models and theories are simply not the sort of thing that
could explain consciousness. 49
For Chalmers, the failure of reductive explanation shows that physicalism is false. The
failure of logical supervenience and reductive explanation establish consciousness as a
further fact, over and above the physical facts of the world. Chalmers thus advocates a
form of property dualism:
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The arguments do not lead us to a dualism such as that of Descartes, with
a separate realm of mental substance that exerts its own influence on
physical processes. The best evidence of contemporary science tells us
that the physical world is more or less causally closed: for every physical
event, there is a physical sufficient cause. If so, there is no room for a
mental “ghost in the machine” to do any extra causal work….The dualism
implied here is instead a kind of property dualism: conscious experience
involves properties of an individual that are not entailed by the physical
properties of that individual, although they may depend lawfully on those
properties. Consciousness is a feature of the world over and above the
physical features of the world…[T]here are properties of individuals in the
world—the phenomenal properties—that are ontologically independent of
physical properties. 50
Dualism in Question
The ambitious nature of the arguments of Kripke, Jackson, and Chalmers should
not be missed. They seek to establish the truth of dualism and the falsity of physicalism
by a priori means alone. The sections that follow mount a critique and response to
dualism. Dualist arguments are first critiqued in light of the incompleteness of our
concepts concerning consciousness and the brain. Dualist arguments based on a priori
conceptual analysis assume that our concepts of both consciousness and brain processes
are complete and that the identity conditions for both sensations and brain processes are
fully understood. If our knowledge of such concepts and their mutual relationships is not
complete, this casts significant doubt on dualist arguments. Conceptual incompleteness
cannot establish physicalism, but it does give substantial reasons to be skeptical of dualist
arguments.
Even though their conclusions are false, much can be learned from dualist
arguments. Dualist arguments do establish the importance of taking conscious
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subjectivity seriously and the inadequacy of any approach that does not do so. However,
contrary to dualist claims, one can fully affirm subjectivity while remaining a cardcarrying physicalist. Thus a naturalistic account of subjectivity is developed following the
critique of dualism. It is argued that a naturalistic account enables one to take
subjectivity seriously while not ruling out explanations at the levels of scientific
psychology and neuroscience.
The Incomplete Concepts Strategy
The methodological and ontological problems for neurophilosophy and identity
theory seem enormous indeed. Neurophilosophy and identity theory are predicated on the
possibility of some sort of “reflective equilibrium” being established by phenomenal
consciousness, cognitive science, and neuroscience. 51 Modal and knowledge arguments
seem to call into question the entire ontology of physicalism. If consciousness is, as
Chalmers claims, a deep further fact about the world, the most one will be able to expect
from cognitive and neuroscientific theories of consciousness are lawful correlations.
Consciousness just isn’t the sort of thing that can be explained scientifically. However,
there are ample reasons to doubt the property dualism proposed by Kripke, Jackson, and
Chalmers.
The arguments of Kripke, Jackson, and Chalmers are rooted in a certain
conception of philosophy, a conception that appeals to hypothetical a priori reasoning in
order to establish metaphysical truths about the fundamental nature of reality. Note that
dualism is already at odds with the physics, biology, and neuroscience constraints
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discussed earlier. It is surely wrongheaded simply to dismiss such arguments, but a
certain amount of skepticism is more than justified. Dualism does not cohere well with
our current knowledge of physics, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience. There are also
ample reasons to be skeptical of dualist arguments in light of inductive evidence from the
history of science. Indeed, the history of modern science reads as a long litany of once
indisputable explanatory gaps being closed. Seventeenth century physics, particularly
Newton’s physics, closed the explanatory gap between sublunary and superlunary realms
so central in Aristotelian physics. While Immanuel Kant confidently declared that there
would never be a Newton of a blade of grass, nineteenth and twentieth century biology
closed the explanatory gap between life and mechanistic physical processes. The point of
this section is not to establish physicalism or naturalism, but rather to cast significant
doubt about the rather robust claims advanced in arguments by Kripke, Jackson, and
Chalmers.
The fundamental issue at stake is whether our concepts of phenomenal
consciousness and our concepts of neurophysiological states are well developed enough
to draw dualist conclusions about them. Philosophers like Robert Van Gulick, Patricia
Churchland, and Thomas Polger have voiced skepticism about the metaphysical
conclusions drawn by Kripke, Jackson, and Chalmers. Note that the debate revolves
around empirical concepts and a posteriori necessity, and as Kripke and Chalmers both
acknowledge, it is possible to be misled by conceivability arguments concerning a
posteriori necessity. We might think that heat can come apart from mean molecular
kinetic energy or that water can come apart from H20, but it really is not possible. Such
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thoughts might be conceivable in some sense, but they are not really possible.
Significantly, for Kripke and Chalmers, we can explain away the appearance of
contingency with other identities, but this strategy is not available with consciousness and
brain processes. However, examples like heat and water come from largely completed
sciences like chemistry and physics.
The disanalogy between purported mind-brain identities and other empirically
discovered identities might be due to the fact that neuroscience is simply a very young
science. Debates concerning vitalism in biology provide an instructive example. Life was
thought to be a fact “over and above” the physical structures and functions of an
organism; however, thanks to nineteenth and twentieth century advances in the life
sciences, we know that life is not a deep further fact—it just is certain underlying
mechanical processes. Dualists have a ready reply to the vitalism analogy. It is possible to
conceptually analyze the concept “life” in functionalist terms while it is impossible to do
this with phenomenal consciousness. Note, however, that this example of conceptual
analysis is applied post facto to a largely completed science. It was by no means evident
in the nineteenth century that such a conceptual analysis was available.
Robert Van Gulick has highlighted these issues in what he calls an argument from
“parallel conceptual inadequacy.” He argues that one could imagine a nineteenth century
vitalist biologist deploying the following argument:
1. I can conceive of creatures that are just like actual creatures (say actual cats)
in all physical respects but that have no ability to reproduce.
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2. Therefore the ability to reproduce does not logically supervene on a creature’s
physical structure. 52
With the benefit of nineteenth and twentieth century science, however, we know that the
vitalist conclusion is just dead wrong. The vitalist lacks both an adequate concept of
reproduction and an adequate concept of the total physical structure of the organism, as
well as an adequate theory of how the two might fit together.
The vitalist might have conjoined his concept of the total physical
structure of a cat with the negation of his concept of the ability to
reproduce without generating any a priori contradictions, but given the
radical incompleteness of his concepts vis-à-vis the natures of the two
phenomena to which he applied them, nothing really follows regarding
what relations of logical (or metaphysical) possibility might hold between
these phenomena themselves. 53
The implications for consciousness become clear. Our concepts of consciousness and
neurophysiology are simply too primitive to draw any putative conclusions regarding
their non-identity. Now, as Van Gulick acknowledges, the vitalist analogy also leaves the
naturalist with a hefty IOU. The nineteenth century materialist seeking to reply to the
vitalist lacked adequate conceptual tools by which to do so, but “carrying the burden of a
large promissory note is not the same as having been refuted.” 54
Patricia Churchland has raised similar reservations about the adequacy of our
concepts of consciousness. Churchland draws attention to the fact that conceptual
boundaries are constantly being re-drawn in the history of science. Fire provides an
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instructive example of conceptual re-classification. 55 Pre-theoretically “fire” included any
phenomena that emitted heat and light. Thus burning wood and the sun were thought to
share the same “fiery” essence; burning wood, rusting, and bodily metabolism were seen
as utterly distinct phenomena. From the benefit of modern physics and chemistry, we
now know that burning wood and the sun are governed by two entirely different
processes: fast oxidation and nuclear fusion; we also know that burning wood, rusting,
and bodily metabolism are in fact examples of the same process: oxidation. The moral of
all this for Churchland is that explicit definitions only become available fairly late in the
game, as the science that embeds them firms up and matures. In light of this, Churchland
voices skepticism regarding Chalmers’s hard-and-fast division of consciousness into hard
and easy problems.
My suspicion with respect to the Hard Problem strategy is that it seems to
take the class of conscious experiences to be much better defined than it is.
The point is, if you are careful to restrict your focus to the prototypical
cases, you can easily be hornswoggled into assuming the class is welldefined. As soon as you broaden your horizons, troublesome questions
about fuzzy boundaries, about the connections between attention, short
term memory and awareness, are present in full, what-do-we-do-with-that
glory. 56
Conceptual inadequacy thus provides a clear response to both the modal argument and
the knowledge argument. With regard to Kripke’s modal arguments, conceptual
inadequacy becomes a way of explaining away contingencies without appealing to
appearance/reality distinctions. In order to know whether a purported identity holds or
55

Churchland, Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy, 129ff.

56

Patricia Smith Churchland, "The Hornswoggle Problem" (1996). Retrieved from:
http://www.wm-johnston.co.uk/philosophy/hornswoggle.htm (accessed 11/21/08).

40
doesn’t hold, one must be aware of its identity conditions. However, at present, we do not
know the identity conditions of either sensations or brain processes. This might in fact
explain the appearance of contingency. That is all a response to Kripke requires. As
Thomas Polger notes:
I argue that, in our current ignorance of identity conditions of both
sensations and brain processes, as far as we know sensations and brain
processes may be identical. This is enough…to explain why we might
think that the relationship between sensations and brain processes is
contingent even if it is not….Remember Kripke’s challenge to the
naturalist: if we cannot explain the appearance of contingency between the
objects of putative identity, then we must deny the identity; but if we can
explain the appearance of contingency, then it is possible that the items are
identical. 57
The conceptual inadequacy strategy also provides an initial response to the knowledge
argument. At the very least, it suggests that caution is appropriate when drawing strong
metaphysical conclusions based on hypothetical reasoning about incomplete concepts. As
Robert Van Gulick observes:
The hypothetical epistemic situation is so unlike the real world contexts in
which we operate that it is difficult to have uncontroversial intuitions
about it. Can the knowledge argument’s defenders make the case that their
imagined scenario of Mary’s postrelease surprise is the only a priori
acceptable one? Can they assume that the alternative imagined by its
critics—can be ruled out as impossible by pure a priori reflection on our
concepts? It is a big assumption to make, and one can already feel the
counterbalancing of plausibility between the argument’s assumptions and
its radical conclusion. The argument’s need for a decisive intuitive
judgment in favor of its preferred scenario may seem a thin reed on which
to hang so momentous a metaphysical result. 58
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Daniel Dennett, in particular, has exploited this style of response to the knowledge
argument, arguing that it is just as plausible to assume that Mary doesn’t learn anything
upon her release, given her exhaustive knowledge of all the physical facts. Dennett has us
imagine Mary being presented with a blue banana upon her release:
And so, one day, Mary’s captors decided it was time for her to see colors.
As a trick, they prepared a bright blue banana to present as her first color
experience ever. Mary took one look at it and said ‘Hey! You tried to trick
me! Bananas are yellow, but this one is blue!’ Her captors were
dumbfounded. How did she do it? “Simple,” she replied. “You have to
remember that I know everything—absolutely everything—that could ever
be known about the physical causes and effects of color vision. So of
course before you brought the banana in, I had already written down, in
exquisite detail, exactly what physical impression a yellow object or a blue
object would have upon my nervous system. So I already knew exactly
what thoughts I would have (because, after all, the ‘mere disposition’ to
think about this or that is not one of your famous qualia is it?). I was not in
the slightest surprised by my experience of blue….I realize it is hard for
you to imagine that I could know so much about my reactive dispositions
that the way blue affected me came as no surprise. Of course it’s hard for
you to imagine. It’s hard for anyone to imagine the consequences of
someone knowing everything physical about anything! 59
Dennett’s point is not that his twist on the knowledge argument establishes physicalism,
it is rather that one should not mistake “a failure of imagination for an insight into
necessity.” 60
Considerations of conceptual inadequacy do not establish physicalism, but they
certainly raise suspicion about the dualist conclusions drawn by Kripke, Jackson, and
Chalmers. The conceptual inadequacy strategy is helpful in refuting arguments
maintaining in principle that one cannot identify consciousness and brain processes;
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however, it isn’t a particularly constructive strategy. Indeed, considerations of conceptual
inadequacy lead Colin McGinn to maintain that there can in principle be no constructive
account of the mind-body problem. 61 As a naturalist, McGinn is convinced that such a
concept must exist; however, knowledge of such a concept simply exceeds the cognitive
abilities of human beings. McGinn’s anti-constructive naturalism or mysterian position is
not warranted however. 62
If one wants to be a constructive naturalist, one owes more of an account of the
place of subjectivity in the natural world than the conceptual inadequacy strategy
provides. The knowledge argument is a failure as an argument for dualism, but it is of
great heuristic value for physicalists. It clues one into what an adequate account of
physicalism must amount to. In particular, it points to the importance of taking
subjectivity seriously. Physicalism is thought to preclude a robust account of subjectivity,
but this is not the case. The next section examines issues of physicalism and subjectivity
in response to the knowledge argument.
Subjectivity Naturalized: Neurophilosophical Identity Theory
and Phenomenal Realism
The incomplete concepts strategy effectively blocks arguments for property
dualism; however, this is just a first pass. The refutation of property dualism certainly
doesn’t suffice to establish naturalism as a compelling position. More needs to be said
about naturalism and its relationship to subjectivity. The next sections will argue that
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naturalism is able to respond to the concern that naturalism “leaves out what it is like;” it
argues in fact, that naturalism provides the most compelling account of subjectivity
currently available.
Naturalism and Phenomenal Realism
Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument proves particularly helpful as a point of
departure in exploring issues concerning phenomenal consciousness and naturalism. Let
us first review Jackson’s “convenient and accurate” way of displaying the knowledge
argument:
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know
about other people.
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know
about other people (because she learns something about them on her
release).
Therefore,
(3) There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the
physicalist story. 63
The two responses to the argument seem to be either agreeing with Jackson that
Mary learns something on her release, which leads to property dualism, or rejecting
premise (2) and denying that Mary learns anything. But, might one be able to admit that
Mary does indeed learn something in a fairly robust sense and still remain a physicalist?
In approaching this question, Ned Block’s distinction between inflationist and deflationist
forms of physicalism is helpful. 64 Deflationists hold that consciousness can be
conceptually analyzed in non-phenomenal terms, thus Mary does not learn anything upon
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her release. Inflationist physicalism, on the other hand, is a form of phenomenal realism.
Inflationists argue that consciousness cannot be conceptually reduced or otherwise
philosophically reduced in non-phenomenological terms, but that consciousness is
nonetheless physical. 65
Jackson’s argument equates physical knowledge with third person physical
concepts that refer to physical properties of the brain. 66 These physical science facts are
taken to be exhaustive of the physical. Mary has knowledge of all the physical concepts
and these concepts refer to all the physical properties of the brain. Because Mary gains
knowledge, Jackson argues that consciousness must involve non-physical properties.
Subjective facts are thus non-physical facts. However, physical knowledge might involve
first person phenomenal concepts as well as third person physical concepts. Both first
person phenomenal concepts and third person physical concepts refer to physical
properties in the brain, but phenomenal concepts may only be acquired through
experience. Mary might have knowledge of all the physical properties of the brain, but
she knows these facts only in virtue of physical concepts. Because she has never seen red,
she lacks the phenomenal concepts that also refer to the same physical properties in the
brain. In this sense, “physical knowledge” might extend beyond objective physical
science fact and include states that obtain in virtue of the physical science facts. In this
sense, physical knowledge might be both objective and subjective, and one has an
account of how Mary might gain knowledge without this involving any non-physical
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facts or non-physical properties. Mary’s acquisition of new knowledge may be purely
epistemological rather than metaphysical.
In this account, seeing red is an entirely physical experience. Prior to her release,
Mary knows all about this experience from a third person, objective perspective, but her
red channels have never been activated. Upon her release the perceptual/phenomenal
concept is trigged in Mary’s mind by the basic biological mechanisms that subserve
normal color perception. Now an experience of red is not the language of physics. But an
experience of red is a physical event in a suitably hooked-up system, a subjective
physical fact. As Owen Flanagan notes:
Completed physics, chemistry, and neuroscience, along with a functionalrole description, will explain what an experience of red is, in the sense that
they will explain how red experiences are realized, what their functional
role is, and so on. But no linguistic description will completely capture
what a first-person experience of red is like. That is only captured in the
first-person. You have to be there….[W]e need to beware of the
temptation to think that for physicalism to be true, the basic physical
sciences must be able to capture all truths. This is stronger than requiring
that physicalism be true; that is, it is stronger than requiring that
everything that happens is physical. Physicalism can be true in this sense
without being able to explain everything, let alone capture everything in
the languages of the basic physical sciences. 67
The issue at stake is really epistemological and semantic and not ontological. Third
person physical concepts do not suffice for picking out every state of affairs in the world.
Physicalism/naturalism is not scientism. Everything that is real is physical in the sense
that it is in some way or another realized by underlying physical processes or structures.
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But the universality of physical realization is compatible with our epistemic and
theoretical need for a diversity of means of representing and modeling reality. 68
One can remain a card carrying physicalist and yet admit that the knowledge
argument reveals something important about consciousness: namely, that we have two
ways of thinking about it with third-person person physical science concepts and firstperson phenomenal concepts. 69 The key point is that the dualism is not at the level of
substances or properties but rather the concepts of properties. H20 and water both name
the same properties but they are distinct concepts. In Fregean terms, the reference is the
same but the sense is different. Prior to her release, Mary knew all about the subjective
experience of red via physical concepts, after she left the room she acquired a
phenomenal concept of the same property. Mary thus indeed learns something new. She
learns new ways to think about consciousness that she did not have before.
Responses are thus available for all of the arguments that naturalism cannot in
principle explain consciousness. Because two concepts are available for thinking about
consciousness, we can be led into thinking that the physical and the phenomenal can be
separated—as in the case of philosophical zombies—when, in fact they cannot.
Philosophical zombies may be conceivable but they are not possible. Mary does indeed
learn something upon her release, but as we have seen, that is no brief against
physicalism. The world is exhausted by physical facts but certain physical facts—
subjective physical facts—can only be had through experience. The argument is really an
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argument for empiricism and the limits of discursive knowledge rather than any sort of
argument against physicalism. None of the arguments for property dualism are
successful. But naturalism is more than anti-dualism. More needs to be said about the
place of the conscious self in the natural world.
Subjectivity and Naturalism: Leaving Out ‘What It Is Like’?
If the arguments in the previous sections have been successful, it is clear that
dualist arguments in the philosophy of mind are not successful. But what about the claim
that naturalistic accounts of consciousness “leave out what it is like”? As Thomas Nagel
objected, “[A]ny shift to greater objectivity—does not take us nearer to the real nature of
the phenomenon it takes us farther away.” 70
Owen Flanagan has offered an important critique of Nagel’s line of thought,
particularly with regard to ambiguities in the use of the term “real nature.” “Real nature”
might mean (1) the way things seem for a particular person (the sense probably intended
by Nagel), (2) what is going on with the cognitive system as a whole. 71 In terms of the
first sense, Flanagan acknowledges that it is true that a purely objective account cannot
capture points of view or the way things seem to someone. However, it should be noted
that such a critique equates physicalism with objective physical facts, but, as the previous
sections of this chapter have illustrated objective physical facts do not exhaust
physicalism, for there are subjective physical facts as well.
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Nagel makes precisely the same mistake as Jackson. Objective analysis cannot
capture points of view, but that is no brief against naturalism, for the doctrine of
naturalism includes both objective physical facts and subjective physical facts. As
Flanagan notes naturalism is perfectly well positioned to explain “why only you can
capture what it’s like to be you: “Only your sensory receptors and brain are properly
hooked up to each other and to the rest of you so that what is received at those receptors
accrues to you as your experiences.” 72 This same point has been made by David
Papineau:
Despite the plausibility of Nagel’s line of argument, I think that
physicalism can meet the challenge he poses….For a start, we should
immediately concede that there is one sense in which we human beings are
indeed cut off from the facts of bat experiences. We do not have
echolocatory experiences, whereas bats do. In this sense it is undoubtedly
true that we ‘lack access to’, ‘cannot appreciate’, or whatever phrase you
prefer, the ‘subjective reality’ of bat experience. But this observation in
itself clearly yields no argument against physicalism. For physicalists are
just as well placed as anybody else to explain this difference between bats
and humans. Physicalists think that conscious experiences are identical
with certain physical events in the brain. So physicalists can say that the
difference between bats, who have echolocatory experiences, and humans,
who do not, is simply that certain physical events, namely those which
constitute echolocatory experiences, occur in bats, but not in humans. In
this sense the physicalist can happily agree that bats have access to
experiences which humans cannot appreciate.
The point is central to the physicalist view of conscious
experience. Physicalism does not deny that there are conscious
experiences, nor if you wish, ‘that it is like something to have them.’ The
claim is only that this is nothing different from what it is to be a physical
system of the relevant kind. 73

72

Ibid., 94.

73

David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 105-106.

49
In the second sense of “real nature”—referring to the cognitive system as a
whole—a naturalist account does not take one away from the “real nature” of the
phenomena at all, anymore than an analysis of water as H20 takes one away from the
“real nature” of water. Precisely because subjective facts are physical facts means they
can be analyzed in third person scientific terms. As Flanagan notes: “The important point
is this: there is absolutely no reason why a naturalist cannot both acknowledge the
existence of subjectivity and view getting an accurate description of it as part of the
overall project of understanding human nature….It is crucial to see that description at the
phenomenal level is something that can be provided from the first-person point of view
and the third-person point of view.” 74 Subjective physical facts and objective physical
facts are merely two sides of the same coin. But what about the complaint that objective
physical facts do not “capture” the “true” character of phenomenal experience? This
complaint misses the mark. Third person descriptions explain consciousness, they do not
create consciousness any more than a theory of digestion creates digestion.
As Flanagan writes:
[W]e do understand how physicalism can be true. It can be true if every
mental event is realized in the brain. Those of us who believe that all
mental events, conscious and unconscious, are tokened in the brain do not
believe that the theory that eventually explains how they are tokened will
capture “the true character of the experiences” as experiences. The whole
idea that the qualitative feel of some experience should reveal itself in a
theoretical description of how that experience is realized fails to
acknowledge the abstract relation between any theory and the phenomena
it accounts for…. [T]he naturalist is the first to accept that a particular
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realization will be an experience only for the agent who is causally
connected to the realization in the right sort of way. 75
Consciousness and the Brain: Explaining the Intuition of Distinctness
Mind-brain identity is thus similar in ways to identities like H20 = water, but an
intuition of distinctness remains with mind-brain identities that does not with other
identities. There is, in fact, growing evidence from developmental and cognitive science
that mind-body dualism is the cognitive default of human beings; 76 this issue will be
explored in much greater detail in Chapter Three. However, other reasons for the
“intuition of distinctness” can be found in the anatomy and physiology of our brains, in
the structure of our conscious experience, and in our concepts of conscious experience.
Mind and brain seem distinct because all of our experiences are “out-of-brain”
experiences. There are several factors behind the “out-of-brain” nature of conscious
experience. Our subjective experiences don’t seem to be brain experiences. In terms of
basic anatomy and physiology, the cranium prevents us from observing the workings of
our own brains in the way that we can observe the workings of our muscles. As Rodolfo
Llinas has observed, this is no small thing:
If we had an external skeleton, the concept of how movement is generated
might be just as incomprehensible to us as is the concept of thinking or
mindness. Having an internal skeleton, means that we become quite aware
of our muscles from birth. We can see their movement and feel their
contractions and clearly understand, in a very intimate way, their relation
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to the movement of our different body parts. Unfortunately, we do not
have such direct knowledge concerning the workings of our brain. Why
not? Because from a cerebral mass point of view, we are crustaceans—
our brains and spinal cord are covered by exoskeleton!
If we could observe or feel the brain at work, it would be
immediately obvious that neuronal function is as related to how we see,
interpret, and react, as muscle contractions are related to the movements
we make. 77
Access to the brain is limited in an even more significant manner due to the fact
that the brain has no sensory apparatus directed toward itself; “the brain is not about
itself." 78 As Todd Feinberg observes:
As Globus puts it, the brain does not “represent in any way its own
structure to the subject.” There is no way that the subject can become
aware of his own neurons “from the inside.” They can be known only
objectively from the “outside.” We have already seen that there is no
“inner eye,” no inner homunculus watching the brain itself, perceiving its
own neurons, no “brain-skin” which feels the neurosurgeon’s knife. When
I test a patients’ pinprick sensitivity by applying a pin to the hand, and ask
them to localize where on the body the sensation is, no one has ever
pointed to their head. Conscious neural activity refers to things, not to the
brain itself. Conscious neural states are about things, not about the
neurons themselves. 79
Precisely because conscious neural states are about things and not about the neurons
themselves it is very easy to confuse the qualities of conscious experience with the
qualities of the objects experienced. U.T. Place dubbed this the “phenomenological
fallacy.” Once the distinction is made, and once we realize that consciousness has a depth
structure hidden from introspective access, identity theory becomes much more plausible.
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Finally, the nature of our concepts of consciousness easily fuels the intuition of
distinctness. There are two ways of thinking about consciousness: with third-person
physical concepts and with first-person phenomenal concepts. As thinkers like David
Papineau have pointed out, phenomenal concepts have the peculiar feature of resembling
the conscious properties they are referring to. When we deploy a phenomenal concept
either through imagination or introspection we recreate the experience itself; exercising a
phenomenal concept feels like having the experience itself. No such thing happens with
material concepts of the same experience. These two ways about thinking about
concepts—via phenomenal concepts and via material concepts—can very easily lead us
to believe that they are referring to entirely different things.
There is a sense in which material concepts do ‘leave out’ the feelings.
They do not use the experiences in question—they do not activate them,
by contrast with phenomenal concepts which do activate the experiences.
But it simply does not follow that material concepts ‘leave out’ the
feelings in the sense of failing to mention them. They can still refer to the
feelings, even though they don’t activate them.
After all, most concepts don’t use or involve the things they refer
to. When I think of being rich, say, or having measles, this doesn’t in any
sense make me rich or give me measles. In using the states they mention,
phenomenal concepts are very much the exception. So we shouldn’t
conclude on this account that material concepts, which work in the normal
way of most concepts, in not using the states they mention, fail to refer to
these states.
This then offers a natural account of the intuitive feeling that
conscious experiences must be distinct from any material states. This
feeling arises because we have a special way of thinking about our
conscious experiences—namely by using phenomenal concepts. We can
think about our conscious experiences using concepts to which they bear a
phenomenal resemblance. And this then creates the fallacious impression
that other, material ways of thinking about those experiences fail to refer
to the felt experiences themselves. 80
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But this is simply a use-mention fallacy: because third-person ways of thinking
about conscious experience do not use versions of those conscious experiences, we
conclude falsely that these third person ways of thinking about consciousness do not
mention those conscious experiences, but only physical states. 81 Papineau calls this
fallacy the “antipathetic fallacy.”
Ruskin coined the phrase ‘pathetic fallacy’ for the poetic figure of speech
which attributes human feelings to nature….I am currently discussing a
converse fallacy, where we refuse to recognize that conscious feelings
inhere in certain parts of nature, namely the brains of conscious beings. 82
Naturalism and Qualia
Subjectivity thus has no dire consequences for physicalism. There are no
principled reasons why qualia cannot be explained in a naturalistic perspective. However,
an opposite problem presents itself within certain forms of naturalism. Some philosophers
of a naturalistic bent have argued that the entire notion of “qualia” should be jettisoned.
Daniel Dennett proposes just such a move in Consciousness Explained:
When your kite string gets snarled up, in principle it can be unsnarled,
especially if you’re patient and analytic. But there’s a point beyond which
principle lapses and practicality triumphs. Some snarls should just be
abandoned. Go get a new kite string. It’s actually cheaper in the end than
the labor it would take to salvage the old one, and you get your kite
airborne again sooner. That’s how it is, in my opinion, with the
philosophical topic of qualia, a tormented snarl of increasingly convoluted
and bizarre thought experiments, jargon, in-jokes, allusions to putative
refutations, “received” results that should be returned to sender, and a
bounty of other sidetrackers and time-wasters. 83
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This section offers a more nuanced assessment of qualia. We can talk intelligently
about qualia while avoiding either dualist or eliminativist conclusions about them. A
naturalistic account that aims to take subjectivity seriously must address the issue of
qualia or the way things seem. Owen Flanagan has offered a number of important
insights about qualia from a naturalistic perspective. Flanagan importantly distinguishes
between two ways in which qualia can be understood. In the first and unproblematic
sense, qualia are simply the ways things seem. In the second and problematic sense,
qualia are understood to possess additional features; qualia are understood to be atomic,
non-relational, ineffable, incomparable and incorrigibly accessible from the first-person
point of view. The problem for Flanagan is not one snarled kite string, but rather two kite
strings that have become ensnarled together:
One string is attached to an ordinary box kite that announces that there are
certain ways things seem. The other string is attached to a gaudy kite that
ostentatiously flies banners announcing that the ways things seem consists
of a set of atomic, non-relational states that possess ineffable properties
known deeply, incorrigibly, and exclusively from the first-person point of
view. We can immediately improve matters by freeing the box kite from
the extraneous one tangled up with it, the one that immodestly depicts
qualia as possessing special problematic features… 84
Flanagan offers compelling reasons why it is important to retain the first notion of qualia.
The concept of qualia is needed to distinguish mental states with “feel” from those
without feel, to taxonomize various forms of subjective experience, and to set the agenda
for hypothesis generation and theory construction at lower levels. 85
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Color experiences are typically appealed to as the quintessential examples of
qualia. Opponents of naturalism have articulated some fairly robust claims about the
nature of color qualia, arguing that subjective experience is beyond the predictive and
explanatory powers of any physical theory. Dualistic conclusions are thus drawn about
the metaphysical distinctness and irreducibility of qualia. These conclusions however are
dubious.
Paul Churchland’s Neurophilosophical Model of Qualia
In his article, “Chimerical Colors” Paul Churchland provides a striking example
of work being done at the interface of psychology and neuroscience. 86 Color vision has
long been a topic of psychological research with the psychologist Munsell mapping
phenomenological color space nearly a century ago. More recently, cognitive
neuroscientists have attempted to model and understand the mechanisms of human color
vision. The Hurvich-Jameson network—what Churchland calls the “standard model of
color perception”—is an attempt to explain the structure of color space in terms of the
human visual system and has yielded some striking results.
What exactly is the H-J net? The H-J net is a theoretical model of human color
vision that begins with retinal cone cells (inputs) and ends with color opponent cells
(outputs). Cone cells are broadly tuned to different wavelengths of light: short (blue),
medium(green), long(red), and background illumination. The three types of coloropponent cells (red-green, blue-yellow, and white-black) are the site of completion
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between excitatory and inhibitory signals arriving from the cone cells. The H-J net
converts a four-tuple of inputs: S, M, L, B into a three-tuple of outputs (A B/Y, A G/R,
A W/B). 87
These patterns of activation can be represented as coding vectors. The resting or
default level is postulated to be 50% of the maximum activation levels. Thus the seen
color gray results from a <50,50,50> coding vector. Color variations result when the
excitatory/inhibitory signals coming in from the cones send the activation levels above or
below 50. Increasingly saturated red results from excitatory signals from the cones,
sending the number over 50, e.g. <50,90,50>, while increasingly saturated green results
from inhibitory signals sending activation levels below 50, e.g. <50, 10,50>.
Significantly, this configuration of coding vectors is structurally almost identical
to the structure of phenomenal color space independently mapped by Munsell nearly a
century ago. As Churchland notes:
[T]his peculiar configuration of possible coding vectors is structurally
almost identical to the peculiar configuration, originally and independently
reconstructed by Munsell, of possible color experiences in normal
humans.… [T]he family of distance relations between all of the color
experiences internal to the Munsell space is roughly identical with the
family of distance relations between all of the coding triplets internal to
the H-J spindle….From precisely such global isomorphisms are
speculative thoughts of intertheoretic identities likely to be born. The
systematic parallels here described—though highly improbable on a priori
grounds—become entirely nonmysterious if human color experiences (at a
given point in one’s visual field) simple are the output coding vectors (at a
suitable place within some topographical brain-map of the retina)
produced by some neuronal instantiation of the H-J net. 88
87

Ibid., 164-166.

88

Ibid., 169-70.

57
The H-J network also yields a number of explanations and predictions regarding
colored after images. When one fixates on a red circle against a gray background and
then moves one’s gaze to a neutral gray background, a circular green afterimage is seen
against the gray background. Why?
This happens because, when the (now fatigued) opponent cells
representing the circular red stimulus are suddenly asked to fall back to
representing a less-demanding middle-gray stimulus, they overshoot the
required <50,50,50> coding vector by an amount equal to whatever
fatigue or potentiation has been acquired in each of the three coding
dimensions during the protracted exposure to the original red stimulus.
That original red stimulus produced an initial coding vector of
<50,95,50>, but during protracted fixation, that initial vector slowly inches
back to something like a vector or <50,55,50>, thanks to the accumulated
minus-40% fatigue in its middle AG/R element.
Accordingly, when the opponent cells in the fatigued area are
suddenly asked to represent an objectively middle-gray stimulus, they can
only manage to produce a vector of <50,10,50>—the coding triplet for an
obvious middle green—instead of the <50,50,50> they would normally
produce. For the AG/R cells in the affected circular area are, temporarily,
too tired to respond normally. They produce a coding vector with a muchreduced middle component, an abnormal vector that represents green, not
gray. 89
These predictions about colored after images are within the normal range of human color
vision inside of the Munsell color spindle. But the H-J network predicts and explains the
existence also of what Churchland calls “chimerical colors,” colors outside the Munsell
color spindle but within the opponent cell activation cube.
But…what about all that unused space in the several upper and lower
corners of the opponent cell activation cube? What would be the
significance of a possible activation triplet outside the classical color
spindle, a triplet somewhere in that fairly considerable volume of unused
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opponent-cell activation space.… [Y]ou might ask after the
phenomenological significance of such an extraspindle activation vector. 90
Regarding such questions, the H-J network:
yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and
unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a
considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience,
color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had
before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language
appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. 91
These chimerical colors are not the objective colors of real objects, but anomalous
color representations within the cubical-cell activation space and can be produced by
selective fatigue/potentiation by prolonged fixation on a suitable color stimulus. 92
What are the philosophical implications of all of this? This account of color vision
shows that the qualitative character of subjective experience is indeed not beyond the
predictive or explanatory power of physical theory, and that there are good reasons to
identify color qualia with neural coding vectors. The Munsell color solid neatly maps
onto the H-J network’s opponent cell activation cube, and as noted by Churchland, it is
precisely such global isomorphisms that lead one to posit intertheoretic identities.
Here, as in those other cases from our scientific history, the principle
intellectual motive for embracing the systematic color qualia/codingvector identities proposed is simply the extent and quality of the predictive
and explanatory unity that the relevant reduction provides. 93
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Further, the chimerical colors predicted and explained by the H-J net provide
excess empirical content and thus another motive for embracing the identity of color
qualia and coding vectors.
If these predictions are correct, they provide an additional motive for
embracing the proposed reduction of color qualia to coding vectors. For it
was no part of the motives—for the H-J net’s original proposal—that these
particular experimental predictions be a part of the explanatory target.
They were unanticipated, and they are faintly paradoxical on their face.
They thus provide some “excess empirical content” beyond the original
explanatory target, namely, our familiar experiences of the mundane
colors of external objects.
Such excess empirical contents are familiar from the history of
science. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the assumption that
light was identical to electromagnetic waves entailed that there should be
such a thing as invisible light (an apparent contradiction, note well)…. The
parallel assumption, that human color representations or color qualia are
identical with opponent cell-cell coding triplets in a neuronal instantiation
of the H-J network, yields a similarly implausible prediction. There should
exist color-qualia outside the qualitative range of the classical color
spindle, qualia whose perfectly accurate descriptions violate our normal
semantic expectations. The H-J theory further suggests how to produce
such chimerical qualia—through opponent-cell fatigue/potentiation—so
that we may test those unexpected predictions against our own
experience. 94
Naturalistic Anti-Reductionism: Functionalism and
the Autonomy of Psychology
Dualist arguments are the most far-reaching of anti-reductionist arguments in the
philosophy of mind. Here the very possibility of vertical integration between phenomenal
consciousness, scientific psychology, and neuroscience is ruled out, because
consciousness cannot be explained in physical or functional terms because consciousness
just isn’t physical. However, anti-reductionist arguments are also popular among
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physicalist philosophers of mind. These claims have important implications because they
maintain that neuroscientific work will ultimately tell us nothing interesting about the
mind.
Functionalism, Multiple Realizability, and the Autonomy of Psychology
Functionalists like Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor argued that mental states are
properly characterized by their abstract causal role linking sensory inputs, mental states,
and behavioral outputs, not by the “stuff” that realizes a particular mental state. Putnam
and Fodor argued that different physical states could realize the same mental state: this is
the doctrine of multiple realizability. Mental states are not type identical to specific brain
states but rather token identical to any number of physical realizers. Functionalists saw
the type identity envisioned in identity theory as overly ambitious. Identity theory,
Putnam wrote:
…becomes still more ambitious when we realize that the brain-state
theorist is not just saying that pain is a brain state; he is, of course,
concerned to maintain that every psychological state is a brain state. Thus
if we can find even one psychological predicate which can clearly be
applied to both a mammal and an octopus (say “hungry”), but whose
physical-chemical “correlate” is different in the two cases, the brain-state
theory has collapsed. It seems to me overwhelmingly probable that we can
do this. 95
Jerry Fodor appealed to multiple realizability arguments to show the failure of
psycho-neural reduction and establish the autonomy of psychology from lower-level
disciplines like neuroscience:
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If it turns out that the functional decomposition of the nervous system
corresponds precisely to its neurological (anatomical, biochemical,
physical) decomposition, then there are only epistemological reasons for
studying the former instead of the latter. But suppose that there is no such
correspondence? Suppose the functional organization of the nervous
system cross-cuts its neurological organization. Then the existence of
psychology depends not on the fact that neurons are so depressingly small,
but rather on the fact that neurology does not posit the kinds that
psychology requires. 96
Functionalist multiple realizability arguments thus cast doubt on the project of
establishing reflective equilibrium between common sense psychology/phenomenal
consciousness, scientific psychology, and neuroscience. There may be reflective
equilibrium between common sense psychology and scientific psychology, but there will
not be any sort of reflective equilibrium between scientific psychology and neuroscience.
Productive research on mind will necessarily occur at levels higher than neuroscience.
Neuroscience might well provide some interesting engineering details about how mind is
implemented in homo sapiens, but neuroscience can no more explain the mind than
physics can explain monetary exchange. 97 The moral of the functionalist account of
multiple realizability is the autonomy of psychology from lower-level neuroscience.
Multiple Realizability Critiqued
Like the dualist arguments considered above, multiple realizability arguments
seem to have a certain plausibility. However, when one dips into actual scientific
practice, the claims of multiple realizability are counter-indicated. Scientific reductions
and identities are contextual and domain-specific. When one fails to take into account
96
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considerations of context and domain specificity, multiple realizability is in fact rampant
throughout physical science. Consider, for example, the classic textbook identification of
temperature with mean molecular kinetic energy. This claim, however, only applies to
temperature in a gas.
Temperature in a solid, however, is identical to mean maximal kinetic
energy, since the molecules of a solid are bound in lattice structures and
hence restricted to a range of vibratory motions. Temperature in a plasma
is something else entirely, since the molecular constituents of a plasma
have been ripped apart. Even a vacuum can have a (“blackbody”)
temperature, though it contains no molecular constituents. Temperature of
classical thermodynamics is multiply realized microphysically in a variety
of distinct physical states. Yet this is a “textbook” intertheoretic reduction
and cross-theory identification. The reductions and identifications are
specific to the domain of the physical state. 98
When one attends to such contextual factors, one sees, in fact, how little multiple
realizability occurs at the interface of psychology and neuroscience. As John Bickle
observes:
If radical multiple realizability really obtained among species in the actual
world, contemporary neuroscientific experimental techniques built upon
this assumption [of the continuity of underlying neural mechanisms within
and across species] should bear little fruit. Why study the macaque visual
system to investigate human visual processing, for example, if we can’t
safely assume some continuity across species? Why should positron
emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) reveal common areas of high metabolic activity during
psychological task performance, both across and within individual
humans—how down to a millimeter of spatial resolution? Standard
neuroscientific experimental procedures and even clinical diagnostic tools
would be hopelessly naïve in the face of significant multiple realizability.
But these procedures do work (and are not hopelessly naïve). 99
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William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale have recently developed this “argument
from neurosciences success” in some detail. Bechtel and Mundale bring a wealth of
neuroscientific examples to bear on the issue and help pinpoint with some precision what
goes wrong with multiple realizability arguments. Bechtel and Mundale consider
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological approaches to brain mapping and also consider
the role of neuroscience in the decomposition of the visual processing system.
Since the late 1800’s neuroscientists have been engaged in the project of mapping
different areas of the brain. Korbinian Brodmann used anatomical tools to map the brain
in the early part of the 20th century, resulting in the famous Brodmann maps of the brain
still used today. Advances in cell staining techniques enabled Brodmann to recognize
different types of neurons in the cortex and to discover that the cortex consisted of six
different layers of neurons. 100 Significantly, Brodmann did his work comparatively. In
defending his claim regarding six different layers in the cortex, Brodmann reports on
preparations made from fifty-five different species. 101 His goal in identifying different
regions of the brain was due to the fact that he thought such anatomical differences would
also be functionally significant.
Psychological criteria have also been central to brain mapping. Such
psychological mapping is in fact older than neuroanatomical mapping, having its roots in
the work of Franz Josef Gall. Here the research strategy focuses on deficits in
psychological capacities that follow damage to particular parts of the brain. Language is
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perhaps the best known example, due to the pioneering work of Paul Broca and Karl
Wernicke. Since this pioneering work lesion studies have become legion. But such lesion
studies would not be successful if multiple realizibility was true. As Bechtel and Mundale
observe, “it is important to note that in interpreting these deficits, researchers implicitly
reject multiple realization among human brains and assume that damage to a brain area in
anyone will result in a deficit to a particular cognitive function that is performed by that
area in undamaged brains.” 102 Such work has also expanded to include stimulation
studies and imaging studies.
Neuroscience has also proved successful in guiding the cognitive decomposition
of visual processing in humans. As Bechtel and Mundale note, “if the taxonomies of
brain states and psychological states were as independent of each other as the multiple
realizability argument suggests, brain decomposition would be a poor guide for
psychological decomposition;” however, understanding of psychological function is
being fostered precisely by such an appeal to the brain and its organization.” 103
Bechtel and Mundale not only point to the lack of examples of multiple
realizability at the psychology-neuroscience interface, they also pinpoint the intuitive
appeal of multiple realizability arguments. The key issue involves contextuality.
“Whenever one asks whether two items are the same or different, the question makes
little sense unless one asks about sameness or difference with respect to some other
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consideration.” 104 Particularly significant in terms of the psychology-neuroscience
interface are issues concerning what Bechtel and Mundale call “grain size.” Multiple
realizability arguments are flawed because they equivocate on the issue of grain size,
differentiating psychological states in a coarse-grained manner while differentiating
neurological states in a fine-grained manner. As Bechtel and Mundale write:
[O]ne diagnosis of what has made the multiple realizability claim as
plausible as it has been is that researchers have employed different grains
of analysis in identifying psychological states and brain states, using a
coarse grain to identify psychological states and a fine grain to
differentiate brain states. Having invoked different grains, it is relatively
easy to make a case a case for multiple realization. But if the grain size is
kept constant, then the claim that psychological states are in fact multiply
realized looks far less plausible. 105
It is precisely this issue at stake in Putnam’s famous example of the multiple realizability
of hunger in humans and octopi:
A human’s psychological state and that of an octopus might well be
counted as the same insofar as they are associated with some general
feature (such as food-seeking behavior in the case of hunger). But with
respect to other considerations, a human psychological state may be
considered different from that of an octopus, even if we limit the scope to
mere behavior. Food-seeking behavior for the octopus is different from
food-seeking behavior in the human if one is concerned about such things
as how one seeks the food, what foods are sought, under what conditions,
etc. This much seems simple and apparent, but the assertion that what we
broadly call “hunger” is the same psychological state when instanced in
human and octopi has apparently been widely and easily accepted without
specifying the context for judging sameness. 106
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Vertical Integration: Beyond Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism
We have looked at several attempts to block the project of vertical integration
between common sense psychology/ phenomenal consciousness, scientific psychology,
and neuroscience. All attempts to deny that neuroscience in principle cannot offer an
explanation of the conscious self has been denied. The project of vertical integration
remains viable, but what sort of vertical integration is imaged? With anti-reductionist
arguments blocked, does the alternative proposal for vertical integration have to be
necessarily a reductive one? Are higher levels in the explanatory hierarchy destined to be
lopped off by a matured neuroscience? This section answers no. Much of the debate
between “emergentism and reductionism” or “reductive and non-reductive physicalism”
rests upon a false dichotomy. As William Wimsatt observes:
An opposition between reduction and emergence forces people to take
sides along an axis missing some of the most revealing cuts on the issue.
One can be a reductionist and an emergentist too, with a proper
understanding of these notions. Misunderstandings engender opposition to
reductionism, and make emergence unnecessarily mysterious. 107
This section explores how one can move beyond the “reduction vs. autonomy”
discussions that have dominated so much of contemporary philosophy of mind.
The Co-Evolution of Psychology and Neuroscience:
Reduction and Elimination
Because they reject the thesis of the principled autonomy of psychology from
lower-level neuroscience, neurophilosophers and philosophers of neuroscience typically
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advocate a co-evolutionary research program between psychology and neuroscience;
however, they differ sharply in their understanding of what co-evolution entails and what
the outcome of that co-evolution is. 108 Robert McCauley has helpfully pointed out three
ways in which co-evolution can be understood. 109 According to McCauley, psychology
and neuroscience can be understood to co-evolve in a reductive (co-evolutionm),
eliminative (co-evolutions), or pluralist (co-evolutionp) manner. 110
Co-evolution is frequently understood in either a reductive or eliminative manner.
Advocates of both reduction and elimination understand the selection pressures in the coevolution of psychology and neuroscience to be exerted almost exclusively in a bottomup manner. The theories differ on the question of whether the reduction of psychology to
neuroscience will be a smooth or bumpy one. The logical positivist notions of
explanation and reduction used by early identity theorists envisioned scientific
development in terms of smooth mapping of one higher-level scientific theory onto
another lower level theory, as illustrated, for example, in the reduction of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. This is primarily the understanding of coevolution at work in co-evolutionm.
However, other reductions are not so smooth. Some reductions eliminate rather
than smoothly reduce the phenomenon in question. Rather than a smooth one-to-one
mapping, theory change in science often involves the displacement of one theory by the
108
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other. Ptolemaic astronomy did not map neatly onto Copernican astronomy; rather the
concepts of Ptolemaic astronomy were eliminated within Copernican theory. Phlogiston
did not map neatly onto the theory of combustion; rather the concept “phlogiston” was
eliminated by its successor theory. Looking at what they saw as the rather dismal
explanatory success of common sense or folk psychology, the Churchlands argued that
the mind-brain relationship was best understood in terms of elimination rather than
reduction:
As the eliminative materialists see it, the one-to-one match-ups will not be
found, and our common-sense psychological framework will not enjoy an
intertheoretic reduction, because our common-sense psychological
framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of
human behavior and the nature of cognitive activity. On this view, folk
psychology is not just an incomplete representation of our inner natures; it
is an outright misrepresentation of our internal states and activities.
Consequently, we cannot expect a truly adequate neuroscientific account
of our inner lives to provide theoretical categories that match up nicely
with the categories of our common-sense framework. Accordingly, we
must expect that the older framework will simply be eliminated, rather
than be reduced, by a matured neuroscience. 111
Where the functionalists argued that psychology was autonomous from the
neurosciences, the Churchlands’ position envisioned the elimination of common-sense
and scientific psychology by a matured neuroscience. The eliminativist model
understands the evolution of psychology and neuroscience based on the model of
eliminative reductions that occur in scientific revolutions, hence co-evolutions.
Beyond Autonomy and Reduction
Importantly McCauley suggests that neither co-evolutionm nor co-evolutions are
the most adequate accounts of the co-evolution that occurs at the interface between
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psychology and neuroscience. In contrast to these accounts, McCauley defends a
pluralistic account of co-evolution, co-evolutionp. McCauley’s work is part of a broader
naturalistic movement in the philosophy of science. Naturalistic philosophy of science
attends to models at work in actual scientific practice, rather than imposing “one-sizefits-all” models on the whole of science. With this naturalistic turn, philosophy of science
becomes the philosophy of a particular science, in this case psychology, biology, and
neuroscience. Contemporary philosophers of biology, psychology, and neuroscience have
called into question the adequacy of deductive-nomological models of explanation and
reduction in these sciences, developing instead notions of mechanistic explanation and
explanatory pluralism. Significantly, mechanistic and pluralistic models of explanation
call into question the entire “autonomy vs. reduction” framework in which so much of the
debate in the philosophy of mind has been cast. As William Bechtel observes:
There are other serious issues raised by the use of the reduction model as
way of relating disciplines…Within this framework the focal questions
have been whether or not psychological theories can be derived from
neuroscientific ones. If so, psychological theories lose their autonomy.
Accordingly, those arguing for the special status of psychology or other
higher-level sciences have argued that such derivations are not
possible…However…most neuroscience explanations do not take the
form of D-N explanations in which phenomena are derived from laws, but
rather are models of mechanisms. This casts a different light on the issue
of reduction. Models of mechanisms are inherently reductionist: each
proposed mechanism is designed to show how a phenomenon ascribed to a
system is due to its constituent parts and their interaction. On the other
hand, reduction no longer threatens the autonomy of the higher-level
science: the higher level characterizes the interaction of processes, the
lower level accounts for the performance of individual processes. 112
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Wimsatt, Bechtel, and McCauley along with Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden
and Carl Craver have developed accounts of mechanistic explanation that allow for
substantial rapprochement between functionalism and identity theory without endorsing
either autonomy or reduction. Mechanistic explanation is inherently multi-level and
pluralistic. In an understanding of mechanistic explanation proposed by Carl Craver, an
ideally complete mechanistic explanation of a system describes that system in three ways:
as isolated, as situated, and as constituted. 113 At the isolated (0-level), the system itself is
described at its characteristic level. Situated (+1-level) and constituted (-1-level)
descriptions operate above and below the isolated level. At the situated (+1-level) the
system is situated in the context of some other systems. At the constituted (-1-level) the
system is decomposed into its constitutive parts. 114 As Thomas Polger notes, this model
is neither inherently reductionist nor anti-reductionist:
The mechanistic model is not a “reductionist” style of explanation. In this
respect it agrees with functionalism. Although mechanism permits
multiple levels of causal-mechanical explanation, it is not
“antireductionist” either, because that view still clings to the autonomy
thesis. Classical “reductionist” inward- and downward-looking
explanations emphasize the constitutive part of mechanistic integrations
and neglect contextual explanation. In contrast, functional analysis
emphasizes outward- and upward-looking contextual explanation and
neglects constitutive explanation. Both, therefore, are incomplete from the
point of view of mechanism. 115
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Explanatory Pluralism and Co-Evolution
The explanatory pluralism inherent in mechanistic explanation suggests another
way the co-evolution of psychology and neuroscience might be understood. This is a
pluralistic understanding of co-evolution that McCauley calls co-evolutionp. Coevolutionp is closely linked with the reductive account of co-evolution (co-evolutionm) but
differs from it in important ways. Co-evolutionm understands the overwhelming majority
of the selection pressures in the co-evolution of psychology and neuroscience to be
exerted from the bottom up. While the upper-level theory may contribute in the process
of discovery, providing an initial vocabulary and problems for research, sooner or later it
must conform to the lower-level theory’s explanation. In co-evolutionp by contrast,
theoretical proposals and the research they spawn at the higher level do
not merely contribute to the process of discovery at the lower level. The
upper level science provides a body of evidence against which the science
at the lower level can evaluate competing models. This evidence is
particularly useful, precisely because it frequently arises independently of
the formulation of the specific lower-level models to whose assessment it
contributes.” 116
McCauley is particularly concerned to mount a critique of the eliminative
understanding of co-evolution, co-evolutions. Here he draws upon an important
distinction, initially made by Wimsatt, between interlevel and intralevel contexts. 117
Eliminative reductions like those seen in scientific revolutions occur almost exclusively
at an intralevel context rather than an interlevel context.
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The sorts of unequivocal eliminations of theories and ontologies that coevolution countenances arise in intralevel contexts involving considerable
incommensurability. These contexts concern changes within a particular
science over time. They include the classic cases that philosophers group
under the rubric of “scientific revolutions” – impetus, phlogiston, caloric
fluid, and the like. Within a particular level of analysis, some newly
proposed theory proves superior to its immediate predecessor with which
it is substantially discontinuous. When the scientific community opts for
this new theory, most traces of its predecessor rapidly disappear. Since
they offer incompatible accounts of many of the same phenomena, the
new theory explains the old theory away. 118
However, the psychology-neuroscience interface is an interlevel context, and
eliminations are exceedingly rare between levels.
Incommensurability in interlevel contexts neither requires the elimination
of theories on principled grounds nor results in such eliminations in fact
…[T]he history of science and especially the history of late nineteenthand twentieth century science offer no examples of large-scale interlevel
theory elimination (particularly of the wholesale variety standard
eliminativism and co-evolutions, envision) once the upper-level science
achieves sufficient historical momentum to enjoy the accoutrements of
other recognized sciences (such as characteristic research techniques and
instruments, journals, university departments, professional societies, and
funding agencies). The reason is simple enough. Mature sciences are
largely defined by their theories and, more generally, by their research
traditions; hence, elimination of an upper-level theory by a lower-level
theory may risk the elimination of the upper-level scientific enterprise! 119
This section has argued that one can embrace a neurophilosophical account of identity
theory without eliminating higher-level sciences, but how exactly does identity theory
function in the context of mechanistic explanation and explanatory pluralism?
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Identity Theory and Explanation
A key question facing an identity theorist is the question of why one should posit
identities rather than mere correlations. In dualist accounts, it is claimed that logical
supervenience is necessary for reductive explanation and identification. Logical
supervenience is determined on the basis of being able to conceptually analyze a
phenomenon in physical and functional terms. Without such a necessary connection, the
dualist critique claims that one can only assert correlations rather than identities. We have
seen however, that there are ample reasons to question the explanatory criteria employed
by dualists, but more needs to be said on the issue of “correlation’ vs. “identity.”
There is a great deal of ambiguity with the notion of “correlation” and a “neural
correlate of consciousness.” This point is made well by Ilya Farber:
First off, it’s important to realize that there’s something misleading about
the “correlate” part of “neural correlate of consciousness.” The term
naturally focuses attention on correlational sources of evidence for NCC’s,
such as the widely-cited experiments in which Nikos Logothetis found
single cells whose activity covaried with monkeys’ behaviorally reported
percepts. To treat the theories themselves as having this structure,
however, is to mistake a noun for a verb. An NCC is a correlate, a thing
which corresponds to consciousness; moment-to-moment psychophysical
correlation is just one of many elements in this correspondence. All of the
major NCC theories in fact draw multiple parallels, based on functional
anatomy and pathology, on inter-species comparisons, and on interactions
between the hypothesized NCC and other neural mechanisms which
underlie related phenomena such as memory, dreaming, and emotion. The
relation which these theories establish between the neural and phenomenal
aspects of consciousness is thus something much richer and more complex
than mere correlation; it is a type of isomorphism, a multidimensional
mapping between entities, structures and dynamics in the twin domains of
mind and brain…The goal of the NCC project is not to produce a causal
model on which consciousness stands apart as a product of the brain, but
rather to find the patterns of consciousness within the structure and
dynamics of the brain. The methodology for pursuing this goal has already
been charted out by researchers studying memory and perception: in
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roughest outline, it involves functionally decomposing the cognitive
process in question, functionally and physically decomposing the brain,
and trying to find matching patterns amidst the bits on each side. This
process is fundamentally analogical rather than correlational, and the
relation that it attempts to establish is not one of causal interaction but one
of identity. 120
Bechtel and McCauley have developed a scientifically informed heuristic account
of identity theory much in line with Farber’s comments. 121 Bechtel and McCauley, in a
manner very similar to Churchland, understand identity claims not so much as fixed
metaphysical conclusions but as heuristics guiding scientific inquiry. Significantly, the
notion of heuristic identity theory provides a powerful response to the correlation
objection beloved by dualists. Hypothetical identities are not only conclusions of
research; they also function as the premises of such research, as heuristics guiding
scientific discovery. Essentially, heuristic identities guide scientific discovery through the
converse of Leibniz’s law—instead of the identity of indiscernables, emphasis is on the
indiscernability of identicals in guiding subsequent research. 122 What this means
precisely is that what is learned about an entity or process under one description must
apply to it under its other descriptions. Note that if the connection is a mere correlation,
there would be no reason to expect such discoveries.
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Consider, for example, genes and chromosomes. Cytologists in the early twentieth
century identified chromosomes as paired structures in the cell nucleus, while the
rediscovery of Mendel suggested paired factors accounting for heredity. As Bechtel
notes, at the time there were only three similarities known to apply both to chromosomes
and genes. There were other factors known just of genes or just of chromosomes. Hence,
under heuristic identity theory the factors known to be true of genes were inferred to be
true of chromosomes and vice versa. 123
For Bechtel, the importance of the heuristic perspective is the recognition that
what gives credibility to the identity claim is the productivity of the claim in bringing two
phenomena together. Identity theory does impose stringent demands—the application of
Leibniz’s law. Applied to issues of consciousness and neuroscience, phenomenal
experience guides discovery of neural mechanisms and neural mechanisms guide
discovery about phenomenal experience.
The importance of the heuristic perspective is the recognition that what
gives credibility to the identity claim is not… the correlations advanced at
a given time, but the productivity of the claim in discovering new
phenomenon that would only be expected on the basis of the identity. But
that does not mean that the identity claim does not impose a tough
demand. It does, but it is a demand not on evidence at a time but on the
development of evidence in the course of research. What one should be
seeking now is a promising identity claim between phenomenal
experience and brain processes, one that points to future productive
research. After advancing the identity claim, the demands imposed by
Leibniz’s law apply. Future research must fill out the mapping by showing
that everything known or learned about phenomenal experience maps onto
neural processes, and vice versa. If the research is productive, then the
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identity claim will have proven its worth and the charge of mere
correlation will lose plausibility. 124
Note that this is precisely the sort of process that occurs in Paul Churchland’s
“Chimerical Colors,” where neuroscientific data is used to make predictions regarding
color qualia. Churchland’s remarks about the basis of identifying opponent-cell coding
triplets and human visual color qualia echo the remarks of Farber, Bechtel, and
McCauley:
The reader will note that, despite the nontrivial (but wholly defeasible)
case laid out earlier, in support of the strict identity of human visual color
qualia on the one hand and human opponent-cell coding triplets on the
other; at no point did we establish, or even try to establish, that there is
any sort of necessary connection between the two. I did not argue, nor
claim, that the former are ‘logically supervenient, upon the latter (cf.
Chalmers 1996). I did not argue, nor do I believe, that the identity at issue
is blessed by any form of metaphysical necessity (cf. Kripke 1972). Nor
did I suggest that there is any form of ‘lawlike’ or ‘nomological’
connection between the two. As I have argued elsewhere, all of these
diverse modal relations are philosophical extravagances or confusions
imposed, post facto, on successful cases of historical intertheoretic
reductions, all of which were achieved without the help of such modal
relations, and none of which displays any one of them. Here, as in those
other cases from our scientific history, the principal intellectual motive for
embracing the systematic color-qualia/coding-vector identities proposed is
simply the extent and quality of the predictive and explanatory unity that
the relevant reduction provides. 125
As Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker point out, such“[i]dentities allow a transfer of
explanatory and causal force not allowed by mere correlations.” 126

124

Ibid.

125

Churchland, “Chimerical Colors,” 191.

126

Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap,"
The Philosophical Review 108, no. 1 (1999), 24.

77
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that nothing stands in the way of
bio-psychological explanation of the conscious self in terms of brain processes and that in
fact psychoneural identity theories provide the most viable solution to the mind-body
problem. Dualism and functionalism call into question the possibility of the vertical
integration of phenomenal consciousness, scientific psychology, and neuroscience. This
chapter has demonstrated that none of these arguments is compelling. However, it has
also avoided equating identity theory with either reductive or eliminative forms of
naturalism.
In light of the overall dissertation project, the point of the chapter was to establish
that the identification of mind and brain is very well motivated scientifically and
philosophically. Work of scientists and philosophers at the mind-brain, psychologyneuroscience interface stands in sharp contrast to the views of the religious dualists
introduced at the beginning of this chapter. These issues will be revisited in Chapter
Three, where attempts to integrate Christianity and Buddhism with the contemporary
mind-sciences will be discussed. But what about the cross-cultural ubiquity of dualism?
Surely that demands an explanation as well. This issue will form the topic of Chapter
Two.

CHAPTER TWO
TOWARD A NATURALISTIC, BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXPLANATION OF DUALISM
Naturalism and the Ubiquity of Dualism
The previous chapter argued that dualism is no longer a compelling position in
light of philosophical and scientific work at the mind-brain interface; however, the
overwhelming majority of the world’s population holds very robust dualist beliefs.
People typically understand and experience themselves as separate and distinct from their
bodies, believe in some sort of afterlife, and in “persons without bodies” (God, gods,
spirits, ancestors, etc.). These beliefs are intimately linked with a variety of vivid dualist
experiences in which the soul seems literally separate from the body.
How should one make sense of such dualist beliefs and experiences? If the
arguments of Chapter One have been successful, significant doubt has been cast on the
ability of dualism to withstand scientific and philosophical scrutiny. The view of the
human person emerging from contemporary mind science and philosophy of mind differs
radically from the view of the person entertained by most of humanity and by most of the
world’s religious traditions. If the arguments of Chapter One have been successful, we
have every reason to believe that this view of the person is correct and reason to be
skeptical about dualist claims about the human person, but if dualism is not true, the
naturalist surely owes an explanation for the cross cultural ubiquity of dualism. This
78
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chapter charts the course for a naturalistic explanation of dualism. Drawing upon the
resources of neurophilosophy, neuroscience, and cognitive-developmental psychology, it
argues that religious dualism is not true, but is “natural” in the sense that it is an
outgrowth of our common sense understanding of our selves, other minds, and material
objects.
Principled Humanist Objections to a Naturalistic,
Bio-Psychological Explanation of Dualism
Chapter One addressed dualist and functionalist concerns about lower-level biopsychological explanation of consciousness. However skepticism about lower-level biopsychological explanations extends far beyond issues concerning consciousness in the
philosophy of mind. Humanists, traditional social scientists, and scholars of religion
typically favor “culture only” analyses and resist the claim that the sciences have much to
contribute to the humanities. 1 The humanist emphasis on the autonomy of culture and on
a methodology distinct from the natural sciences is itself rooted in a residual dualism. Of
course, most scholars in the humanities explicitly reject mind-body dualism. Indeed, it
would be hard to find a figure more reviled by humanist academics than Rene Descartes.
Yet, at the same time, many humanists vigorously oppose any attempt to understand
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human and social reality in biological terms. 2 An odd sort of false consciousness thus
pervades large swathes of humanist academe: dualism is explicitly rejected while
continuing to function operationally in some of the most basic assumptions of humanist
and standard social scientific inquiry.
The crypto-dualist assumptions that pervade the humanities are perhaps most
evident in Wilhelm Dilthey’s principled distinction between the natural sciences
(Naturwissenschaften) and the sciences of the free human spirit (Geisteswissenschaften).
The German makes the principle of distinction between the sciences and the humanities
explicit. The difference concerns the “objects” of inquiry: inert matter or the free human
Geist. This radical difference in the objects of inquiry leads Dilthey to conclude that
Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften are also rooted in radically different
epistemologies and methodologies. Erklären or reductive scientific explanation is the
appropriate method of the Naturwissenschaften; however, the realm of the free human
spirit can only be grasped by Verstehen or empathetic understanding. 3
These dualist assumptions frequently go hand-in-hand with strong versions of
social constructivism and arguments for the autonomy of culture. The link between
dualism and social constructivism is perhaps most evident in the writing of the founder of
modern sociology, Emile Durkheim:
Man is double. There are two beings in him: an individual being which
has its foundation in the organism and the circle of whose activities is
2
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therefore strictly limited, and a social being which represents the highest
reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation
– I mean society. 4
Durkheim’s dualist doctrine of the double man leads to a very specific understanding of
social reality: society is seen as a superorganism inscribing the “blank slate” of the
human mind. This understanding of social reality has very important methodological
implications. To seek to explain social phenomena by appeal to psychology or biology is
to miss the boat completely:
Every time that that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a
psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is
false….The group thinks, feels, and acts quite differently from the way in
which members would were they isolated…. If we begin with the
individual in seeking to explain phenomena, we shall be able to
understand nothing of what takes place in the group….Individual natures
are merely the indeterminate material that the social factor molds and
transforms. Their contribution consists exclusively in very general
attitudes, in vague and consequently plastic predispositions.5
While Durkheim declared society off limits to lower level sciences, he saw
religion as a social phenomenon and attempted to understand it accordingly; however,
one very influential approach to religious studies rejects even Durkheim’s sociological
model as overly reductive. For scholars in the history and phenomenology of religion, the
experience of the “sacred” is sui generis, and thus off limits to even higher level sciences
like sociology. As Mircea Eliade writes:
A religious phenomenon will only be recognized as such if it is grasped at
its own level, that is to say, if it is studied as something religious. To try to
grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of physiology,
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sociology, economics, linguistics, art, or any other study is false; it misses
the one unique and irreducible element in it – the element of the sacred. 6
Hermeneutical distinctions between Geisteswissenschaften and
Naturwissenschaften, coupled with social constructivist arguments about the autonomy of
society have led not merely to a focus on interpretation over vertical explanation, but to
principled exclusion of vertical explanation in the humanities and social sciences.
Attempts at vertical integration are almost inevitably branded as reductionist. As Edward
Slingerland writes:
The degree to which the mind versus body – and therefore understanding
versus explanation – split has become entrenched in the modern university
is reflected by the fact that, in the humanities, “reductionistic” has come to
function as an immediately recognizable term of dismissive abuse: a claim
that the understanding Geist has crossed the line and inappropriately
slipped from Verstehen to Erklären, treating its subject as an object.
People do seem fundamentally different to us than objects, which is why
this understanding versus explanation distinction is able to gain a foothold
in our minds. However, the conviction that the human can never be
explained – that human-level phenomena can never be reduced to lowerlevel causal forces – takes this intuition a step further. The result is that the
field of human inquiry has proudly wrapped itself in an impenetrable shell
of verstehen and violently resists any attempt by the natural sciences to
breach this boundary. 7
The arguments and discussion in Chapter One provide an important point of
departure in addressing these humanist concerns. The arguments of Chapter One give us
good reason to be skeptical of dualist claims and thus of strong distinctions between
Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. There simply is no Geist that exists
independently of Natur. The arguments of Chapter One also called into question strong
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versions of the “autonomy of psychology” thesis. This gives us cause for suspicion
concerning other types of autonomy arguments. As Slingerland’s quote points out,
autonomy arguments in the humanities and social sciences are frequently driven by a fear
of reductionism. However, as Chapter One also pointed out, autonomy vs. reduction is a
false dichotomy. The fear is that the natural sciences will somehow displace the
humanities and even higher-level sciences. But such a notion of reductionism is either a
bogeyman or, at best, highly antiquated. As Robert McCauley has pointed out:
The assumptions of antiquated conceptions of cross-scientific relations in
terms of intertheoretic reduction, which envision the ability of lower level
theories to displace higher level proposals and their ontologies, have
haunted [humanists] from afar. Much recent work in the philosophy of
science would aid considerably in exorcising these demons….Contrary to
classical reductionism, displacing work at other levels is usually the last
thing on scientists’ minds! Little, if any, evidence exists in twentieth
century science of such displacements of theory or ontology arising as the
result of investigations simultaneously carried on at multiple levels of
analysis. 8
That human-level interpretive strategies have much to offer is not being contested.
What is being contested are claims of principled autonomy and complete independence.
The discipline of religious studies originated in the West and in the context of Christian
theology. The focus on particularities emphasized by many contemporary scholars in
religious studies and the humanities has helped to correct many false assumptions about
religion, but taken to extremes it creates its own problems. Here language might serve as
an apt analogy. Language seems like the quintessential example of cultural diversity and
plurality. But a purely cultural account of language leaves many questions unanswered.
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Why are the depth grammars underlying all languages so similar? How can one account
for the ability of children’s ability to become competent language users given the fact that
they are exposed to it in a piecemeal manner? In the case of language this is all old
history. Noam Chomsky and other cognitive linguists revolutionized the study of
language in focusing on commonalities underlying the seemingly wild diversity of
languages. The cognitive linguists were not calling into question the academic study of
language and literature; they were asking a different kind of question. The burgeoning
discipline of cognitive science of religion asks similar questions of religion. As cognitive
anthropologist Scott Atran points out, there are many questions that have been left largely
unanswered in the contemporary academic study of religion:
Why do agent concepts predominate in religion?
Why are supernatural-agent concepts culturally universal?
Why are some supernatural-agent concepts inherently better candidates for
cultural selection than others?
Why is it necessary, and how is it possible, to validate belief in
supernatural agents that are logically and factually inscrutable?
How is it possible to prevent people from deciding that the existing moral
order is simply wrong or arbitrary and from defecting from the social
consensus through denial, dismissal or deception? 9
Atran’s questions are closely linked to issues concerning dualism that this chapter is
concerned to address, specifically the ubiquity of dualism in wildly diverse religious
belief systems. The project is not so much to understand specific dualist beliefs, as to
understand the “depth grammar” of dualism underlying religious particularities.

9

Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 7.

85
Natural Sources of the Dualist Self: Toward a Bio-Psychological
Explanation of Religious Dualism
Principled objections to bio-psychological explanations of religion have been
addressed, but many questions are still left unanswered. Even if one agrees that biopsychological explanation of religion is possible, there is no agreed upon explanatory
framework or anything remotely close to it. The most developed attempts at biopsychological explanation of religion have come from neuroscience, cognitivedevelopmental psychology, and evolutionary biology, but there has been very little crossfertilization between these approaches. All three of these approaches are relevant to the
explanation of religious phenomena, but until very recently, issues concerning the
conscious self and issues concerning dualism have not been a central concern in biopsychological explanations of religion. Brain scans of religious experience are not the
only or even the most important way the mind sciences can contribute to the biopsychological explanation of religion. A bio-psychological account of the self and a biopsychological account of dualism are equally important. In fact, discussions of scientific
accounts of religious experience are apt to be mired in confusion if these foundational
questions concerning the self and dualism are not addressed. The following sections offer
a bio-psychological account of the natural sources of the dualist self. Its fundamental
argument is that dualism emerges as a natural by-product of human beings’ common
sense understanding of their selves (folk phenomenology) and other selves (folk
psychology).
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Toward a Bio-Psychological Explanation of Religious Dualism:
Insights from Neuroscience and Neurophilosophy
A central premise of this dissertation is that souls do not exist, nor do strongly
emergent selves. We can be realists of a sort about phenomenal experience and the
phenomenal self, but there is nothing mysterious about this. The self is not something
independent of the brain, or something miraculously squirted out by the brain. The self is
merely a vastly complex representational structure within the human brain and
experienced “from the inside” as it were. In this sense, Francis Crick is absolutely right
that we are “nothing but a pack of neurons,” 10 and this hypothesis is indeed astonishing
when seen in light of dualist and emergentist theories of mind that understand
consciousness as a further fact or an added extra.
This section explores how the conscious self can be explained in a vertically
integrated manner and uses this information to shed light on the ubiquity of dualism. This
bio-psychological account of the self bolsters the arguments in favor of the naturalistic,
vertical explanation of the conscious self offered in Chapter One. In that chapter, it was
argued that principled objections to a naturalistic account of the conscious self were not
compelling, and argued that the hard problem of consciousness is best seen as a real but
empirically tractable problem. Chapter One showed that the hard problem was
empirically tractable; this section shows how the hard problem is empirically tractable.
Actual scientific, bio-psychological research programs and theories of consciousness
have been, and continue to be, developed (and very well funded) despite the nay-saying
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arguments of dualists, and naturalism becomes compelling not so much as a refutation of
dualism but because of its constructive potential in generating testable, progressive
research programs and because of the explanatory success of such programs. The proof of
naturalism is in the pudding, so to speak. However, a bio-psychological account puts one
in a position not only to defend naturalism but to explain dualism. As such, the
implications of such an account extend far beyond neuroscience, cognitive science, and
the philosophy of mind. Because of the ubiquity of immaterial mind concepts (i.e.,
“persons without bodies”) within religious traditions, such an account is surely germane
to theology, philosophy of religion, and religious studies more generally.
While scientific accounts of consciousness have exploded in recent years, this
section focuses particularly on the work of Antonio Damasio and Thomas Metzinger.
Damasio and Metzinger’s work is significant for a number of reasons. First, both thinkers
take the hard problem of consciousness seriously, while seeking an empirical solution to
it. Second, both thinkers are concerned with the issue of the conscious self and not merely
with the issue of consciousness. Third, the work of these thinkers shares a number of
important and striking similarities, particularly the emphasis on the conscious self as a
complex representational phenomenon. Finally, Metzinger’s work sheds a great deal of
light on the ubiquity of dualism and the explanation of that ubiquity. This section first
explores how Damasio and Metzinger understand and pose the problem of the conscious
self. It then turns to Damasio’s representationalist account of the origins and evolution of
the self and to Thomas Metzinger’s representational account of the conscious self as a
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transparent phenomenal self-model (PSM). Finally, it is shown how these
representational accounts of the self help to explain the ubiquity of dualism.
Defining the Problem of the Conscious Self
Two temptations are almost impossible to avoid in terms of the hard problem:
making the hard problem an impossible mystery or turning the hard problem into an easy
problem. Dualists and mysterians are guilty of the first mistake; deflationist materialists
are guilty of the second. Explaining the conscious self is not intractable, but its difficulty
should not be underestimated either. Antonio Damasio and Thomas Metzinger are both
thinkers who take the hard problem seriously while aiming for an empirical solution to it.
The hard problem is the problem of how objective brains give rise to subjective
experience. The hard problem is typically posed as a problem concerning consciousness,
but it is important to note that the problem of the conscious self is implied in the
definition of the hard problem. The problem is not just how objective brains give rise to
experience but how they give rise to subjective experience. Consciousness and the
conscious self are thus both parts of the hard problem. Metzinger captures these
important distinctions well:
What is it that makes consciousness such a special target phenomenon?
In conscious experience a reality is present. But what does it mean to say
that, for all beings enjoying conscious experience, necessarily a world
appears? It means at least three different things: In conscious experience
there is a world, there is a self, and there is a relation between both—
because in an interesting sense this world appears to the experiencing self.
We therefore distinguish three different aspects of our original question.
The first set of questions is about what it means that a reality appears.
The second set is about how it can be that this reality appears to someone,
to a subject of experience. The third set is about how this subject becomes
the center of its own world, how it transforms the appearance of a reality
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into a truly subjective phenomenon by tying it to an individual first-person
perspective. 11
As Damasio more colloquially puts it, there are thus at least two problems implied
in the hard problem: “the problem of how the movie-in-the-brain is generated, and the
problem of how the brain also generates the sense that there is an owner and observer for
that movie.” 12
An Evolutionary Account of the Conscious Self: Antonio Damasio
One source of mischief with the mind-body problem is that in philosophical
discussions it is almost always approached in a synchronic manner, i.e., how do objective
brains create subjective experiences right now? The diachronic question of how
something like a conscious self could emerge in an evolutionary context is seldom
addressed, but viewing the conscious self in a diachronic, evolutionary manner goes a
long way in making the synchronic problem much less mysterious. It is significant to
note that viewing biological phenomena in an exclusively synchronic manner creates
similar befuddlement. Viewed synchronically it is nearly impossible to see how anything
other than ex nihilo intelligent design could generate the complex design of organisms.
Diachronic, gradational thinking introduced in nineteenth century geology and biology
culminating in the work of Darwin changed all of this. Explaining consciousness and
explaining the apparent design of organisms are not the same thing, but there are
significant analogies, and a diachronic approach to the mind-body problem may prove as
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fruitful for the explanation of consciousness as it was for the explanation of the apparent
intelligent design of organisms.
One thing a diachronic, evolutionary approach draws attention to is the centrality
of body and environment/world in thinking about the conscious self. The hard problem
cannot be solved by approaching it exclusively in a synchronic manner, and it also cannot
be solved by thinking of mind and brain in an isolated and atomistic manner. It is easy to
think of the mind performing abstract operations that seem disconnected with the life of
an organism, and it is possible to view the brain in an atomistic “brain-in-the-vat” fashion
apart from the needs to the rest of the body, but it is precisely the mind-brain’s
connection with the entire organism and with the external environment that explains its
evolutionary origins and helps to dissolve the hard problem. When the mind-brain
problem is approached in a diachronic, evolutionary manner, as the mind-brain-bodyworld problem, one begins not with minds and brains but rather with simple single-celled
organisms (bodies) in an external environment (world). Damasio’s work draws particular
attention to the long natural history of the self. Even at the very rudimentary level of
single-celled organisms, the boundary that defines the organism marks off its internal
environment (“the internal milieu”) from an external environment.
Life is carried out inside a boundary that defines a body. Life and the life
urge exist inside a boundary, the selectively permeable wall that separates
the internal environment with the external environment. The idea of
organism revolves around the existence of that boundary.… Life needs a
boundary. I believe that minds and consciousness, when they eventually
appeared in evolution, were first and foremost about life and the life urge
within a boundary. 13
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It was the French biologist Claude Bernard who first noted an organism’s need to
maintain a consistent “internal milieu” in an environment that is in constant flux. The
British biologist W.B. Cannon amplified Bernard’s work, coining the term homeostasis:
“the coordinated physiological reactions which maintain most of the steady states of the
body…and which are so peculiar to the living organism.” 14 Even the simplest singlecelled organisms possess an “internal milieu” that must be kept constant in light of a
constantly changing environment. It is precisely here that rudiments of the mind-brain
can thus be found. Damasio argues that the “internal milieu” of an organism is thus the
precursor to more robust notions of self:
The specifications for survival that I am describing here include: a
boundary; an internal structure; a dispositional arrangement for the
regulation of internal states that subsumes a mandate to maintain life; a
narrow range of variability of internal states so that those states are
relatively stable. Now consider these specifications. Am I describing just a
list of specifications for the survival of a simple living organism, or could
it be that I am also describing some of the biological antecedents of the
sense of self – the sense of a single, bounded, living organism bent on
maintaining stability to maintain its life? I would say that I might be
describing either. It is intriguing to think that the constancy of the internal
milieu is essential to maintain life and that it might be a blueprint and
anchor for what will eventually become a self in the mind. 15
Nervous systems greatly enhance these capacities for coordinating the inside of an
organism with its external environment. This first occurs entirely unconsciously through
the function of what Damasio calls the proto-self:
I have come to conclude that the organism, as represented inside its own
brain, is a likely biological forerunner for what eventually becomes the
elusive sense of self. The deep roots for the self, including the elaborate
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self which encompasses identity and personhood, are to be found in the
ensemble of brain devices which continuously and nonconsciously
maintain the body state within the narrow range and relative stability
required for survival. These devices continually represent, nonconsciously,
the state of the living body, along its many dimensions. I call the state of
activity within the ensemble of such devices the proto-self, the
nonconscious forerunner for the levels of self which appear in our minds
as the conscious protagonists of consciousness: core self and
autobiographical self. 16
What becomes clear from this discussion of internal milieu and proto-self is that
the organism needs to “know” its own needs, be aware of threats to its internal milieu,
and engage in coordinated movement in response to an external environment that is
continually changing. As Damasio puts it, “body-minded minds help save the body.” 17
“Survival depends on finding and incorporating sources of energy and on preventing all
sorts of situations which threaten the integrity of living tissue.” 18 This requires a complex
coordination of action and image. A device that facilitates this complex coordination
would have conferred enormous advantage to an organism possessing it:
If actions are at the root of survival and if their power is tied to the
availability of guiding images, it follows that a device capable of
maximizing the effective manipulation of images in the service of the
interests of a particular organism would have given enormous advantages
to the organisms that possessed the device and would probably have
prevailed in evolution. Consciousness is precisely such a device. The
pathbreaking novelty provided by consciousness was the possibility of
connecting the inner sanctum of life regulation with the processing of
images. 19
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How exactly does consciousness and the conscious self emerge from the
nonconscious proto-self? According to Damasio, consciousness/ the conscious self
emerges as the organism is affected by an object. Importantly, for Damasio, this is
necessarily a second-order activity. The state of the organism is constantly being mapped
by the proto-self; any object the organism interacts with is also mapped within the
sensory and motor structures of the brain. 20 These sensorimotor representations cause
changes to the representations pertaining to the organism, i.e., the proto-self.
Consciousness and the conscious self emerge as these changes are re-represented in
higher-order maps representing the relationship between organism and object. 21
Consciousness is a form of higher-order representation: “The first basis for the conscious
you is a feeling which arises in the re-representation of the nonconscious proto-self in the
process of being modified.” 22 This form of consciousness is what Damasio calls “core
consciousness”: “a simple, biological phenomenon, it has one single level of
organization; it is stable across the lifetime of the organism; it is not exclusively human;
and it is not dependent on conventional memory, working memory, reasoning, or
language.” 23 Importantly, a core self emerges in this second-order process of organism
being affected by an object:
Looking back, with the license of metaphor, one might say that the swift,
second-order nonverbal account narrates a story: that of the organism
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caught in the act of representing its own changing state as it goes about
representing something else. But the astonishing fact is that the knowable
entity of the catcher has just been created in the narrative of the catching
process. 24
The sense of self that emerges from core consciousness Damasio calls the core self, “a
transient entity, ceaselessly recreated for each and every object with which the brain
interacts.” 25 This form of consciousness and conscious selfhood is created in pulses, in
the constant interaction of organism and object. Core consciousness and the core self
emerge in the process of the proto-self being modified by interaction with the external
environment. Core consciousness and the core self in turn generate extended
consciousness and the autobiographical self. This is a robust sense of self; the self Daniel
Dennett has called “the center of narrative gravity.” 26 Most simply, it is an “an organized
record of past experiences of an individual organism.” 27
The emergence of consciousness and the conscious self is of clear evolutionary
significance. As Damasio understands it, consciousness introduces a new means of
maintaining the internal milieu of an organism and thus preserving homeostasis. 28 It does
this not by replacing the functions of the proto-self that can be performed with great
efficiency in an unconscious manner, but by helping the organism respond more
efficiently to changes in the external environment.
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Creatures with consciousness have some advantages over those that do not
have consciousness. They can establish a link between the world of
automatic regulation (the world of basic homeostasis that is interwoven
with the proto-self) and the world of imagination (the world in which
images of different modalities can be combined to produce novel images
of situations that have not yet happened). The world of imaginary
creations—the world of planning, the world of formulation of scenarios
and prediction of outcomes—is linked to the world of the proto-self. The
sense of self links forethought, on the one hand, to preexisting automation,
on the other.
Consciousness is not the sole means of generating adequate
responses to an environment and thus achieving homeostasis.
Consciousness is just the latest and most sophisticated means of doing so,
and it performs its function by making way for the creation of novel
responses in the sort of environment which an organism has not been
designed to match, in terms of automated responses. 29
Damasio helps us see how a complex phenomenon like the conscious self is
related to more fundamental issues concerning the relationship between organisms in
particular environments. Such an approach goes a long way toward demystifying the
conscious self. It also becomes clear that the notion of representation does a great deal of
conceptual work in Damasio’s account.
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism I: Selves as Transparent
Phenomenal Self Models: Thomas Metzinger
Metzinger also offers a representationalist analysis of consciousness with many of
the same emphases as Damasio. In Metzinger’s analysis, the self emerges as a
phenomenal self model (PSM) is placed inside of a phenomenal world model:
First, our brains generate a world-simulation, so perfect that we do not
recognize it as an image in our minds. Then, they generate an inner image
of ourselves as a whole. This image includes not only our body and our
psychological states but also our relationship to the past and the future, as
well as to other conscious beings. The internal image of the person-as-a
29
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whole is the phenomenal Ego, the “I” or “self” as it appears in conscious
experience…. The phenomenal Ego is not some mysterious thing or little
man inside the head but the content of an inner image—namely, the
conscious self-model, or PSM. By placing the self-model within the world
model, a center is created. It is the origins of what philosophers often call
the first-person perspective. 30
Damasio and Metzinger both highlight how something like a first-person
perspective might emerge. The first-person perspective is a crucial aspect of
consciousness phenomenology, but it is not the only one. Our conscious experience does
not seem to have a character of a representational model and certainly does not seem very
brainy: on the contrary, we seem to be outside of our brains and in direct contact with
reality. Metzinger, in particular, draws attention to this aspect of our conscious
experience, what he calls the transparency of phenomenal self model (PSM). The notion
of the transparency that Metzinger is drawing upon was originally introduced by G.E.
Moore:
… the fact that when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the
sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only
single term. The term “blue” is easy enough to distinguish, but the other
element which I have called “consciousness”—that which a sensation of
blue has in common with a sensation of green—is extremely difficult to
fix…And in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact
seems to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent—
we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that
there is something, but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly
recognized. 31
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When something is transparent, one does not see it but sees through it, “we do not
see the window but only the bird flying by;” we are not aware of the medium through
which information reaches us. 32 It is precisely transparency—the fact that we never see
the self model but only see through it—that turns a system model into a self-model.
“[T]he transparency of representational structures is the decisive criterion for turning a
model into an appearance, into an apparent reality.” 33 In Metzinger’s self-model theory of
subjectivity, the self is understood as a representational model, a phenomenal self-model
(PSM), that is not recognized as a model.
Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious selfmodels that could not be recognized as models. The phenomenal self is
not a thing, but a process—and the subjective experience of being
someone emerges if a conscious information-processing system operates
under a transparent self-model….[T]he conscious self-model of human
beings is the best invention Mother Nature has made. It is a wonderfully
efficient two-way window that allows an organism to conceive of itself as
a whole, and thereby causally interact with its inner and outer environment
in an entirely new, integrated, and intelligent manner. Consciousness, the
phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective are fascinating
representational phenomena that have a long evolutionary history, a
history which eventually led to the formation of complex societies and a
cultural embedding of conscious experience itself. 34
The phenomenology of transparency is phenomenology of immediacy, of
apparently direct perception, due to the fact that the representational character of the
contents of conscious experience is itself not accessible to conscious experience. 35
“Inaccessible to conscious experience is the simple fact that this is taking place within a
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medium.” 36 The transparency of the conscious self makes perfect sense in an
evolutionary perspective. The transparency of representation allows for what seems to be
immediate contact with reality, the sense that “I am present in a world outside my brain
and in immediate contact with reality.” For instance, I see an animal. “I” and “the
animal” are complex representational structures in my brain, but we do not need to know
this. It does not help us in “flagging the dangerous present” 37 at all. In fact, it would
spectacularly hinder our ability to do so. It is easy to see the massive selective advantages
transparency would allow. Transparency allows for efficient action in the present (e.g.,
escaping an attacking animal). Note too, that the baseline “zero-world” model provided
by the transparency of consciousness becomes essential as human beings develop more
sophisticated off-line meta-representational capacities such as conscious planning,
thinking, and deliberating. Such conscious deliberation and planning are only intelligible
against a baseline reality provided by the transparent self model. Transparency allows for
the introduction of a reality/representation, appearance/reality distinction.
The phenomenology of transparent representation gives us the sense of being
outside our brains and in immediate contact with the world. It is important to realize that
what makes good sense from a pragmatic evolutionary standpoint does not necessarily
make sense from a scientific-philosophical point of view. It’s difficult to estimate the
number of errors that result from a failure to recognize this. It’s an easy slide from a
pragmatic-evolutionary folk phenomenology to folk metaphysics. There, the transparency
36
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of consciousness and the conscious self makes us naïve realists about the external world
and dualists about the self (dualism might be thought of as naïve realism about the
internal world). We conclude that we must really be outside of our brains and in
immediate contact with the world. But understanding ourselves as literally outside of our
brains and in immediate contact with the world makes no sense scientifically. How can
the self interact with the world without violating conservation laws? How can a nonphysical self emerge in the process of evolution? Here it is clear that phenomenology is
not ontology, we are not really outside our brains, and we are not really in immediate
contact with reality—dualism and naïve realism are elaborate cognitive illusions, virtual
realities. The Finnish neuroscientist Annti Revonsuo puts this well:
[M]other nature…clothed us, that is, the phenomenological level of
organization, with a built-in “out-of-brain” experience. But, remember, we
are not really out of our brains in our experiences—how could we if all the
required neural machinery sits tightly there…. No, we are only virtually
out of the brain and in the external world. In fact, we did not invent VR
[Virtual Reality] at all—evolution invented it for us millions of years ago.
We have merely invented one fresh way to use, with the help of computer
technology, the natural VR machine in our brain. 38
The virtual reality metaphor is a great heuristic tool for thinking about the hard
problem in an empirically tractable manner, but it also has limitations. In artificial virtual
reality, there is still a conscious self experiencing the virtual reality, but Metzinger and
Revonsuo are not advocating a homuncular metaphor of consciousness: the conscious
self is itself part of the virtual reality. Metzinger uses the image of a “total flight
simulator” to illustrate this point:
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The brain is like a total flight simulator, a self-modeling airplane that,
rather than being flown by a pilot, generates a complex internal image of
itself within its own internal flight simulator. The image is transparent and
thus cannot be recognized as an image by the system. Operating under the
condition of a naïve-realistic self-misunderstanding, the system interprets
the control element in this image as a nonphysical object: the “pilot” is
born into a virtual reality with no opportunity to discover this fact…. If the
virtual self functions extremely well, the organism using it is completely
unaware of its “as if” nature. The self-model activated in the human brain
has been optimized over millions of years. The process that constructs it is
fast, reliable, and has a much higher resolution than any of today’s virtualreality games. As a result, the virtuality of the phenomenal self-model
tends to be invisible to the user. But strictly speaking, it is simply the best
hypothesis the system has about its own current state—presented in a new,
highly integrated data format. 39
The transparency of the phenomenal self model and the virtual reality metaphor
has very significant implications. They provide a way to take phenomenology seriously
while at the same avoiding dualist intuitions, both the Scylla of deflationist materialism
and the Charybdis of dualism are avoided. The notion of the transparent phenomenal self
model allows one to view the self as part of a vertical explanatory hierarchy. As
Metzinger notes:
In introducing the working concept of a PSM I claim that it constitutes a
distinct theoretical entity. That is, I claim that it is not only something that
can meaningfully be described on a number of different levels of
description mirroring each other in a heuristically fruitful manner but that
it is something that can be found by suitable empirical research program.
And it can be found on every level of description. 40
How can we understand this? What is commonly referred to as “the self” is identical to a
phenomenal self-model (PSM). As such, the PSM, can be viewed from a first person and
third person perspective and at various explanatory levels found in scientific psychology
39
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and neuroscience (i.e., representational, functional, neurological). When viewed from a
first person phenomenological perspective, the self model is not experienced as a model
due to the transparent nature of the self model. It is thus a great temptation to view the
phenomenological level as entirely apart from this explanatory hierarchy (as in robust
versions of dualism) or as an additional, autonomous vertical level in the explanatory
hierarchy, as something over-and-above the descriptive levels found in scientific
psychology and neuroscience (as in property dualism and emergentism). The
phenomenological level is not something “over-and-above” the representational level.
The phenomenal self is the content of the transparent PSM and the transparent PSM can
be identified with some global neural correlate of consciousness. The first person-third
person shift is a horizontal relation and not a vertical one: subjective physical facts and
objective physical facts are the same thing viewed from different perspectives, from “the
inside” and “the outside” as it were.
But the significance of the notion of a transparent self-model extends beyond the
scientific and philosophical study of consciousness. The phenomenal self-model is not
recognized as a model. As a result all of our experience seems to be “out-of-brain”
experience, thus providing a potent source of dualist intuitions. However, the brain is
capable of generating an even more robust sense of dualism. The brain can generate the
sense of not only being outside our brain but being outside our body. Research on how
the brain represents the body not only provides empirical support for the notion of the
self as a virtual, representational model, it also helps to explain another very important
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source of dualist intuitions—out-of-body experiences (OBEs). Research on bodily
representation and specifically on OBEs forms the topic of the next section.
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism II:
Thomas Metzinger and Olaf Blanke on Out-of-Body-Experiences
OBEs are a well-reported cross-cultural phenomenon and occur in about 10
percent of the general population. For those undergoing these vivid experiences dualist
intuitions are almost inevitable. As Metzinger writes:
For anyone who actually has had that type of experiences it is almost
impossible not to become an ontological dualist afterwards. In all their
realism, cognitive clarity, and general coherence, these phenomenal
experiences almost inevitably lead the experiencing subject to conclude
that conscious experience can, as a matter of fact, take place
independently of the brain and the body: what is phenomenologically
possible in such a clear and vivid manner must also be metaphysically
possible or actually the case. 41
Much neuroscientific light has been shed on issues of bodily self-representation in recent
years, and, as Metzinger and the Swiss neuroscientist Olaf Blanke have shown, progress
can be made by viewing OBEs in such a context.
The previous section was at pains to point out that the self is not a “thing” but a
pragmatic model—the brain’s best guess about the organism’s status in relation to the
present external environment. This pragmatic, virtual character of the self has been
documented in a number of experiments on bodily representation. Representing one’s
body is no small thing. The sense of one’s body that one has at every instant requires the
interpretation of inputs from various sensory modalities in order to integrate and bind all
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of this information together. Understanding how everything “comes together” to create
the apparent cohesiveness and unity of conscious experience is one of the most
significant problems in neuroscience, the so-called “binding problem.” The binding
problem is not, as yet, completely understood, but the failure to bind information and the
various multi-sensory conflicts and illusions generated by the failure of sensory
integration in the brain are increasingly subject to empirical investigation. As Metzinger
and Blanke have shown, far from being mystical, occult phenomena, OBEs can be
fruitfully viewed in such a context.
In clinical literature, OBEs are classified as a type of autoscopic illusion. 42
Autoscopic illusions all involve seeing a duplicate of one’s own body. Metzinger has
helpfully placed discussion of these complex whole-body illusions alongside body part
illusions. Vivid examples of the pragmatic nature of self-modeling and bodily
representation – i.e., its virtual character – can be seen in research on body part
attribution and location. In an experiment by University of Pittsburgh psychiatrists,
Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen, healthy experimental subjects experienced an
artificial rubber hand as their own hand; this has come to be known as the rubber hand
illusion (RHI). In this experiment, one’s own hand is hidden from view and one observes
a fake rubber hand in front of them. Both the hidden real hand and the seen fake hand are
then stroked with a probe. Because visual information typically overrides other sensory
modalities, observation of the stroking of the fake hand causes people to attribute the fake
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hand to their own bodies (“to feel like it is my hand”). Sensations of having a full blown
“virtual” arm—a connection from the shoulder to the fake hand have also been reported
in other RHI experiments, along with a “proprioceptive drift”—a mislocalization of one’s
hand toward the fake hand. 43
Phantom limbs are another closely related phenomenon. In such cases, patients
have the “persistent and unmistakable impression” that a lost limb is still part of their
body. In certain cases, the phantom limb is paralyzed, creating the impression that the
absent limb cannot be moved. Working with a patient, Philip, with a paralyzed phantom
limb, V.S. Ramachandran and his colleagues provided another striking example of the
dynamic and pragmatic nature of self-modeling, underscoring the degree to which the
self-model depends on perceptual and contextual information. 44 Ramachandran created a
“virtual reality box” by placing a mirror inside a cardboard box open at the top with two
holes cut in the front of the box to either side of the mirror. Philip was instructed to place
his real arm and his paralyzed phantom limb into the box. He was then told to observe the
reflection of his real hand in the mirror. The mirror image of his right hand was used to
create the visual illusion that he actually did have two hands. Next, he was asked to make
symmetrical movements with both his real arm and his paralyzed phantom arm.
Ramachandran describes the experiment in the following manner:
Philip rotated his body, shifting his shoulder, to “insert” his lifeless
phantom into the box. Then he put his right hand on the other side of the
43
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mirror and attempted to make synchronous movements. As he gazed into
the mirror, he gasped and the cried out, “Oh, my God! Oh my God,
doctor! This is unbelievable. It’s mind-boggling.” He was jumping up
and down like a kid. “My left arm is plugged in again. It’s as if I’m in the
past. All these memories from years ago are flooding back into my mind.
I can move my arm again. I can feel my elbow moving, my wrist moving.
It’s all moving again.
After he calmed down a little I said, “Okay Philip, now close your
eyes.” “Oh, my,” he said clearly disappointed. “It’s frozen again. I feel
my right hand moving, but there’s no movement in the phantom.” “Open
your eyes” “Oh, yes. Now it’s moving again.” 45
Rubber hand illusions and phantom limbs both concern representation and
modeling of body parts, but what about the body as a whole and the sense of the self
related to the body as a whole? Could this also be manipulated experimentally? In other
words, could one create a rubber-hand illusion of one’s entire body? Because the self is
typically localized in the body, such an experiment would affect not only bodily
attribution and location but self attribution and location as well—it would create the
experience of being outside the physical boundaries of one’s actual body, an out-of-body
experience. Metzinger and Blanke designed such an experiment with Bigna
Lenggenheger and Tej Tedi. “When I first experienced the rubber-hand illusion, I
immediately thought it would be important to see whether this would also work with a
whole rubber body or an image of yourself. Could one create a full-body analog of the
rubber-hand illusion? Could the entire self be transposed to a location outside the
body?” 46 In the rubber hand illusion, bodily self representation was manipulated
(specifically the sense of “mineness” or ownership of one’s body parts); the phenomenal
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self per se was not manipulated. In their “Video Ergo Sum” experiments, Lenggenhager,
Tedi, Metzinger, and Blanke sought to manipulate attribution and localization of the
entire body and to study the effects of such manipulations on one’s sense of self. In other
words, the experiment sought to induce an out-of-body experience.
Participants were placed two meters in front of a video camera and fitted with a
three-dimensional head mounted display, allowing them to view their backs in threedimensional space. Metzinger described his own experience of wearing the head mounted
display as viewing a 3-D version of Rene Magritte’s La Reproduction Interdite. 47
Participants’ backs were then stroked with a stick. Lenggenhager et al. varied the
experimental conditions in several important ways. A time lag was introduced allowing
for a discrepancy between seen and felt stroking. The virtual body was also varied. In the
first trial, the participants viewed their virtual own body through the head-mounted
display. In other trials, the camera angle focused on a mannequin and on a wood slab.
Thus, participants viewed a virtual fake body and an object through the head-mounted
display. Under synchronous conditions and with their virtual own body or virtual fake
body, participants often felt as though the virtual body was their own body, actually
identifying with it and “jumping into” it. 48 Metzinger describes his own experience in the
following manner:
While I was looking at my own back as seen in the head-mounted display,
Bigna Lenggenhager was stroking my back, while the camera was
recording this action. As I watched my own back being stroked, I
immediately had an awkward feeling: I felt subtly drawn toward my
47
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virtual body in front of me, and I tried to “slip into” it. This is as far as
things went. 49
Immediately after the stroking, participants were blindfolded, displaced and asked
to return to their initial position. Participants showed a drift toward the virtual body in the
synchronous condition with both the virtual own body and virtual fake body. The
difference was weaker and no longer significant with the wooden slab. Lengennhager et
al. describe the significance of the experiment:
With the use of virtual reality and multi-sensory conflict, we induced an
illusion that makes it possible to quantify selfhood by manipulating
attribution and localization of the entire body. Our results show that
humans systematically experience a virtual body as if it were their own
when visually presented in the anterior extrapersonal space and stroked
synchronously. This finding was corroborated by the participants’
mislocalization of their own bodies to a position outside their bodies,
showing that self-attribution and localization of the entire body rely, at
least partly, on similar visual-somatosensory integrative mechanisms to
those of body parts. 50
While such experiments do not exactly duplicate OBEs, they are of tremendous
significance because they show that the sense of self in relation to one’s own body can be
manipulated under experimental conditions. Dualism is not a mysterious and intractable
phenomenon but can be placed under the microscope, as it were, and what is being
studied is not a soul but a phenomenal self-model. In the Video Ergo Sum experiments,
persons or selves do not actually leave their own body and slip into the virtual body—all
of this is the result of complex representational dynamics in the human brain. These
experiments create something very similar to an OBE by creating multi-sensory conflict
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in a “top-down” manner. Such experiences can also be examined from the “bottom-up”
as well.
As noted above, OBEs are part of a range of phenomena known as autoscopic
illusions. Other types of autoscopic phenomena include: autoscopic hallucinations,
feeling-of-a-presence, and heautoscopy. 51 In autoscopic illusions, patients see their own
body but they don’t identify with it and don’t have the feeling that they are “in” this
illusory body. The feeling-of-presence is not a visual illusion but an illusion where the
second illusory body is only felt. Heautoscopy is particularly fascinating. In these
illusions the sense of self tends to alternate between two bodies or to be located between
them. (The Video Ergo Sum experiments generated something very similar to a
heautoscopic illusion). 52 Blanke defines OBEs in terms of three fundamental
characteristics: (1) Disembodiment: the feeling of being outside one’s physical body; (2)
Parasomatic Perspective: the presence of an elevated visio-spatial perspective; (3)
Autoscopy: The seeing of one’s own body from the elevated perspective. 53
Phantom limb phenomena, the rubber hand illusion, and the Video Ergo Sum
experiments highlight the pragmatic, virtual character of self-modeling and bodily
representation. Under conditions involving multisensory conflict people readily attribute
fake body parts to themselves and identify with both a virtual own body and a virtual fake
body, attributing and localizing the self outside the boundaries of their actual physical
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bodies. Blanke uses the framework of multisensory conflict to study full-blown OBEs in
a neurological context. His research into OBEs was launched when, seeking to locate the
seizure site for an epileptic patient, he stimulated an OBE at the right angular gyrus. 54 An
initial stimulation of 2.0-3.0 microamps resulted in the patient reporting that she was
either sinking in the bed or falling from a height. When Blanke increased the stimulation
above 3.0, the patient reported seeing herself lying in bed from above, seeing only her
arms and legs. Blanke then had the patient focus on her arms and legs at 4.0-5.0 mA. She
reported her legs and arms becoming shorter. The patient’s limbs were bent at a 90
degree angle. When stimulated, the patient felt that her arms and legs were moving
toward her face and tried to avoid them.
Recall the three defining characteristics of OBE described by Blanke: (1)
disembodiment, (2) parasomatic perspective, and (3) autoscopy. Blanke argues that a
two-fold disintegration is necessary to create an OBE. First, multisensory conflict and
disintegration—the failure to bind proprioceptive, tactile, and visual sensations-- is
necessary to create the autoscopic aspect of the OBE—seeing one’s own body outside its
own physical boundaries. This sort of conflict was precisely what was induced in the
rubber hand illusion experiments and the Video Ergo Sum experiments. Importantly,
Blanke notes that a second form of conflict—vestibular conflict—is necessary to generate
the sensations of disembodiment and parasomatic perspective. This conflict involves the
relationship between external visual space and one’s internal frame of reference created
by vestibular information. “If the spatial frame of reference created by our sense of
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balance and the one created by vision come apart, the result could be the conscious
experience of seeing one’s body in a position that does not coincide with its felt
position.” 55 Graviceptive and otholithic illusions resulting from vestibular disintegration
have also been investigated scientifically. Such graviceptive-otholithic illusions
frequently occur as responses to microgravity in space missions and on parabolic
flights. 56 Significantly, altered perspective is one common manifestation. Inversion
illusions, for example, involve 180 degree inversions of visual spatial perspective relative
to extra personal space; persons experience themselves as if their bodies were inverted
180 degrees. Blanke argues that an analogous type of vestibular disintegration—along
with multisensory disintegration—is necessary for OBE.
Research by Blanke has localized the neural correlate of OBEs at the temporalparietal junction (TPJ). When healthy subjects were asked to imagine their bodies in the
position of an OBE, the TPJ activated in less than half a second. 57 When that same region
is inhibited by transcranial magnetic stimulation, healthy subjects cannot imagine
themselves in the position of an OBE. 58 Importantly, other studies have highlighted the
central role of the TPJ in multisensory processing, vestibular processing, and higher-level
self processing: exactly the conditions Blanke points to as necessary for OBEs. TPJ along
with cortical areas along the intraparietal sulcus have been associated with integrating
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tactile, proprioceptive, and visual information. Further, core regions of the human
vestibular cortex are situated at the TPJ, including the posterior insula, where brain
damage is associated with graviceptive illusions. TPJ is also involved with perception
and representation of the body. Finally, TPJ is also associated with higher-level self
processing including egocentric visio-spatial perspective, agency, and the self-other
distinction. “These data suggest an interaction between lower-level vestibular and
multisensory processing and higher-level self processing such as egocentric visio-spatial
perspective taking, agency, and self-location.” 59
Empirical research on OBEs provides support for the virtual character of the
phenomenal self model and sheds a great deal of explanatory light on the origins of
dualism. Such research casts significant doubt on the claim that OBEs provide direct
empirical confirmation of dualism. On the contrary, phenomena like OBEs make perfect
sense in light of the understanding of the conscious self developed in the previous
section.
This section provided a naturalistic sketch of the self and showed how the
conscious self can be explained in a bio-psychological vertically integrated manner. In
doing so, it has also shed significant light on how the brain can create the sense of being
outside of the brain (ordinary out-of-brain experience) and even outside of one’s physical
body (extraordinary out-of-body experience). The virtual experiences of being outside
one’s brain and outside one’s physical body are two powerful sources of dualist
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intuitions. Higher-level cognitive science has also shed a great deal of light on dualism.
It is to this research that we now turn.
Toward a Bio-Psychological Explanation of Dualism:
Insights from Cognitive Science
Chapter One and the preceding section were concerned to establish consciousness
and the conscious self as real but entirely natural phenomena, capable of being explained
at the levels of scientific psychology and neuroscience. However, it is quite easy to think
that the phenomenal self is something “over-and-above” the brain and the rest of the
physical body. The transparency of the conscious self—the fact that all of our experience
appears to be “out-of-brain” experience—helps to explain the intuition that selves are
distinct from bodies. Folk phenomenology is one powerful source of dualist intuitions,
but it is not the only one. In the course of their evolutionary history, human beings have
not only developed an elaborate common-sense sense of self; they have also developed
an elaborate common-sense knowledge of the other objects and “subjects” encountered in
the world. Understanding this common-sense knowledge also contributes much to the
explanation of dualism and other aspects of human religiosity. This section explains how.
Human beings possess complex and often implicit knowledge of material objects
(folk physics), living things (folk biology), and other human minds (folk psychology).
Cognitive-developmental psychology has uncovered a massive amount of information
about these various inference systems, and in recent years, these findings have been
applied fruitfully to the study of religion, leading to the emergence of the discipline
known as the cognitive science of religion.

113
This section examines naturalistic explanations of dualism and theism from the
vantage point of cognitive-developmental psychology. It begins with an overview of the
findings of cognitive science on folk physics, folk biology, and folk psychology. It then
applies these findings to questions concerning religious dualism.
Introducing Cognitive Science
In the previous section, the complex conscious autobiographical self that modern
human beings possess was rooted in an evolutionary history involving the interaction
between organism with an “internal milieu” and constantly changing external
environment. That environment is filled with physical objects, living things, other
animals, and most importantly, other human beings. Just as the complex sense of self
possessed by modern human beings can be rooted in the fairly rudimentary notion of an
“internal milieu,” so too, many forms of human knowledge about physical, biological,
and social worlds can be understood to emerge primarily as adaptive skills acquired by
organisms in particular evolutionary contexts.
To understand how this is the case, it is important to draw a crucial distinction
between implicit and explicit knowledge. Knowledge is typically thought of in terms of
explicitly held beliefs acquired through learning and education and conscious reasoning
and deliberation. Many, in fact, have held the position that all knowledge is of this sort;
indeed this is the foundation of the “blank slate” understanding of human nature
discussed above. The cognitive revolution in psychology changed all of this by proposing
that knowledge and beliefs can be implicit as well as explicit. Questions concerning the
acquisition of language led to the demise of a behaviorist psychology focused on explicit
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learning and ushered in the cognitive revolution in psychology. Noam Chomsky’s
groundbreaking work in linguistics in the 1950’s called the most fundamental
assumptions of behaviorism into question. Chomsky called attention to underlying
similarities in the grammars of languages and to children’s ability to learn language
rapidly despite being exposed to it in a very piecemeal manner (“the poverty of the
stimulus”). Chomsky argued that human beings possessed an inborn “language
acquisition device” that guides very young children toward an effortless mastery of their
native language and its grammatical rules.
Chomsky’s pioneering research led to an explosion of work in the cognitive
sciences. Fundamental to much of this work is the notion that human beings possess
innate and implicit forms of knowledge that interact in various ways with explicit
learning channels. We can effortlessly construct grammatically correct sentences in our
native language without knowing any explicit rules of grammar. Explicit knowledge
comes later with former education. Cognitive scientists have extended this fundamental
insight well beyond the specific issue of language. As Justin Barrett puts it,
[c]ognitive scientists…have concluded that the adult human mind has a
large number of devices that are used for different problems and on
different occasions…Most of these mental tools operate automatically,
without any conscious awareness. They efficiently and rapidly solve lots
of problems without concentration or angst, much in the same way that
computer programs solve problems in a swift, effortless fashion. 60
This insight is often expressed in terms of the notion of “domain-specificity”: the
notion that the human mind-brain employs different specialized inference systems in
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response to objects in different conceptual categories. Contemporary cognitive science
draws heavily on evolutionary theory and understands such inference systems to be in
place as responses to problems recurrent in human environments for hundreds of
thousands of years. Pascal Boyer provides a convenient summary of some of these
essential principles:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Perception and understanding of surroundings require inferences and
guesses about different aspects of objects around us.
The mind is composed of specialized systems that produce inferences
about these different aspects.
Objects in different “ontological categories” activate different sets of
these specialized systems.
Each inference system is itself composed of even more specialized
neural structures.
Inference systems make us attend to particular cues in environments
and produce specific inferences from these cues.
Skeletal versions of the principles direct knowledge acquisition from
infancy.
All concepts develop as skills, which is why discussions of innateness
are often meaningless
What principles you have depends on what species you are: which is
why evolution is relevant to mental architecture. 61

Inference systems leave no trace in the fossil record; evidence for their existence comes
primarily from cognitive-developmental psychology: especially the study of very young
children. Such studies are significant because they provide the best control for linguistic
and cultural influences and thus provide an empirical means of adjudicating what were
once entirely philosophical claims about the human person. As Edward Slingerland
observes:
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If assumptions or abilities can be clearly demonstrated in infants or
prelinguistic children, we can be fairly confident that we have eliminated
the influence of language and – at least in the case of infants – culture.
Obviously, the linguistic and cultural assumptions of the experimenters are
still relevant, but the fact that… child development results…have been
replicated across a wide spectrum of cultures increases our confidence that
we are observing species wide cognitive defaults. 62
One cannot talk to babies and babies cannot perform complex behavioral tasks,
yet there is a way to effectively study their mental life. As developmental psychologist
Paul Bloom notes:
Babies may have little control over their bodies, but they can willingly
move their heads and eyes. And what a baby looks at can tell you
something about how it sees the world. This is because babies are like
adults in some regards. If they see the same thing over and over again,
they get bored and look away. If they see something new or unexpected,
they look longer. Thus, analyzing looking time can tell us what babies
think of as being ‘the same thing’ and what they see as being ‘new or
unexpected.’ 63
Following such a methodology, studies in cognitive-developmental psychology have
documented three especially important inference systems. These include common sense
knowledge of material objects or folk physics, common sense knowledge of the living
world or folk biology, and common sense knowledge of other minds or “folk
psychology.”
In terms of common sense knowledge of physical objects or folk physics,
extensive studies have documented that key assumptions about the behavior of such
objects are in place long before children have extensive interaction with the material
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world. Elizabeth Spelke observes that both adults and infants assume that physical
objects will operate according to four fundamental principles:
1. Cohesion: Objects are connected masses of stuff that move as a whole.
If you want to know where the boundaries of an object are, an easy test
is to grab some portion of stuff and pull—what comes with what you
are pulling belongs to the same object; what remains does not.
2. Solidity: Objects are not easily permeable by other objects; if you tap
at an object with your finger, your finger does not penetrate.
3. Continuity: Objects move in continuous paths; they travel through
space without gaps. An object would violate this rule if it disappeared
from one location and reappeared in another.
4. Contact: Objects move through contact. A ball on a pool table is not
going to move unless something contacts it; it will not run from the
cue or come when it is called. The exceptions to this rule are animate
creatures, like people and dogs, and certain complex artifacts like
robots and cars. 64
Human beings distinguish living and non-living things from an early age and
attribute a unique set of properties to living things. Studies by Frank Keil, Scott Atran
and others have documented that common sense knowledge of animals is driven by a
kind of essentialism; animals are understood to have some internal property that is
characteristic of the species and that cannot be removed. 65 Essences are linked to
“insides” rather than to external appearances. Such essentialism is also closely linked
with teleology, the notion that living things “possess properties that have purposes.” In
terms of the understanding of religion, by far the most important form of common sense
knowledge is folk psychology, especially agency detection and theory of mind.
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Folk Psychology: Agency Detection and Theory of Mind
Agency Detection
Common sense knowledge of the basic principles governing physical objects is
clearly important for survival. Even more important, however, is knowledge of agents,
especially other human beings. It is not difficult to see why this is the case from an
evolutionary perspective. Objects, in the sense used here, are inert physical things like
rocks, sticks, plants, and artifacts. If they respond to the world at all, it is in a purely
mechanical fashion. 66 Agents, on the other hand, are beings like animals and other human
beings capable of independently initiating action. Because of this agents call for special
attention. From an evolutionary perspective and in terms of our implicit knowledge,
agents are the things that matter most in an environment. Human beings must rapidly and
accurately distinguish between objects and agents in the environment. Agency detection
—the ability to distinguish between agents and objects in an environment—is thus a
crucial aspect of folk psychology.
As noted above, agency detection depends on both speed and accuracy, but, in
terms of accuracy, confusing an agent for an object (e.g., a snake for a coiled rope) and
confusing an object for an agent (e.g., a coiled rope for a snake) do not involve equal
payoffs. As long as one can rapidly readjust, the cost of “false positives” such as
confusing or interpreting object as an agent is minimal. 67 As anthropologist Stewart
Guthrie has pointed out, agency detection is an implicit form of Pascal’s Wager: from an
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evolutionary perspective, “betting” on agents over objects is a wise choice. 68 False alarms
with agency are evolutionarily advantageous. This becomes the default interpretative
strategy of the agency detection device. “When in doubt about whether something is an
agent, assume that it is. It’s better to have a fast device that occasionally gets it wrong
than a slow device that is always accurate.” 69
One thing crucial to keep in mind in terms of agency detection is that traits that
evolved for one purpose can be used for another purpose. As Paul Bloom notes, “a mind
that has evolved to respond with sexual arousal in situations with actual people (adaptive)
can respond the same way to pornographic movies (nonadaptive); a preference for sweet
fruit (adaptive) can drive one to gorge on candy (nonadaptive).” 70 It is important to note
that this distinction between adaptive and non-adaptive purposes applies to the cognitive
realm as well. Cognitive anthropologists Dan Sperber and Scott Atran distinguish
between what they call a cognitive function’s “proper domain” and “actual domain.” The
proper domain of an agency detection device (ADD) involves “stimuli that track
behaviors of agents including human beings… identifying animate beings as agents with
goals and internal motivations, would allow our ancestors to anticipate goal directed
actions of predators, prey, friends, and foe and profit from this in ways that enhanced
hominid survival and reproductive success.” 71 The actual domain of ADD involves any
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information in the organism’s environment that satisfies the module’s input conditions—
whether or not the information is functionally relevant to ancestral task demands. 72
The “promiscuous” nature of human agency detection has been demonstrated in a
number of psychological experiments. In the 1940s, F. Heider and S. Simmel presented a
movie in which geometrical figures move in certain ways. People instinctively described
the figures as if they were specific people with goals and desires. 73 Atran points to a
number of experiments where mental states were inferred from “poor and fragmentary
triggering experiences” including: interruptible movement toward a goal, 74 selfpropulsion, 75 coordinated motion between subjects, 76 pointing, 77 eye gaze, 78 facial
expression, 79 and interactive gesture and signaling. 80
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Theory of Mind
Agency detection merely distinguishes between agents and objects in the
environment. The actual attribution of complex mental states like propositional attitudes
such as belief and desire require a much more elaborate system of social cognition, one
that is—at least in most respects—unique to human beings. These more complex
inferences concerning other minds are referred to as mentalizing, mind reading, and
theory of mind. 81 While there are many social species, such elaborate mind reading is
uniquely human and indeed at the very foundation of human culture. As Alvin Goldman
observes:
Mentalizing may be the root of our elaborate social nature. Would there
be language and discourse without mentalizing? Would the exquisitely
coordinated enterprises of cultural life, the structures of love, politics, and
games, be what they are without participants attending to the mental states
of others? Would there be a human sense of morality without an
understanding of what others experience, of what their lives are or might
be like? The notion that mentalizing anchors the fabric of social life partly
accounts for the profusion of interest in the subject 82
The development of social cognition and specifically theory of mind follows a
developmental trajectory that has been the subject of intensive research for the past thirty
years. 83 Such findings are intimately connected with findings concerning agency
detection discussed in the previous section. Very young babies have important
expectations concerning faces and hands. Andrew Meltzoff famously demonstrated that
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infants can already respond to the cues of an experimenter a mere forty minutes from
birth. 84 If the experimenter sticks out his or her tongue, the infant will respond in a
similar fashion, an impressive fact given the fact that infants have never seen their
tongues in a mirror but already know that this is the part of their body that corresponds to
that of the experimenter.
Young babies have expectations associated not only with faces but also with
hands. In one experiment, psychologists presented babies with a display containing two
different objects; a hand then reaches for one of the objects. The location of the objects is
then switched. Babies expect that the hand should switch locations, too; however, babies
do not have this expectation for sticks. 85 Significant inferences concerning self and other
minds begin to surface between the first and second years of life.
The gold standard for theory of mind is generally considered to be the ability to
attribute false belief. 86 The attribution of false belief is tested in a number of
experimental tasks. Perhaps the most well known task is the so-called “Sally-Ann Task.”
The scenario for the test is as follows: Sally and Ann are together in a room that contains
a basket and a box. Sally places her marble inside a basket and leaves the room. While
she is gone, naughty Ann moves her marble to the box. Sally returns. Where will Sally
look for the marble? Three-year-olds fail at this task, saying that she will look in the box.
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Four- and five-year-olds pass the test with much greater frequency, reflecting an ability to
distinguish between mental representations and reality. This developmental pattern
continues. The Sally-Ann task tests what has been called first-order theory of mind
(involving second-order reasoning): “I think she thinks X.” What has been called secondorder theory of mind (involving third-order reasoning): “I think she thinks that I/he/she
think(s) X,” emerges significantly later, around age seven. 87
The question of how such mentalizing occurs has been the topic of intense debate
in contemporary cognitive-developmental psychology and philosophy of psychology.
Theory of mind is frequently used as a synonym for mind reading or mentalizing, but
theory of mind is itself actually a scientific theory about how mindreading occurs.
Advocates of this approach argue that mindreading is accomplished primarily by
theorizing; hence, it is referred to as the theory theory of mindreading. Others argue that
mindreading is primarily accomplished by putting oneself in another’s shoes, thereby
simulating the mental states of others. This approach is known as the simulation theory of
mindreading.
Some of the best evidence for theory of mind and insight into its operation comes
from studying its absence. It is possible for theory of mind to be highly impaired or not to
exist at all. A person can have an intact common sense understanding of the world of
objects with little or no understanding of the social world. Many psychologists and
neuroscientists understand autism as a form of “mindblindness.” 88 Human beings
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typically have the opposite problem of autistics. Human social intelligence overshoots in
a number of ways, and this is precisely where theory of mind research becomes relevant
to religion.
Folk Knowledge and Religious Belief:
Introducing Cognitive Science of Religion
How does religion fit into the explanatory framework of cognitive-developmental
psychology? Cognitive scientists typically avoid the claim that religious beliefs are
directly adaptive. They typically understand religion as a by-product of other directly
adaptive inference systems: folk physics, folk biology, and folk psychology. But the
question of how exactly religion is a by-product is the subject of significant debate in the
cognitive science of religion.
One particular sort of byproduct explanation draws on a strand of cognitive
anthropology known as cultural epidemiology. As the name implies, cultural
epidemiologists are concerned with isolating factors that make certain cultural concepts
contagious and easy to transmit. According to this sort of explanation, religious concepts
are best understood as minimally counterintuitive concepts. Such concepts are primarily
cultural creations that exploit key aspects of our cognitive architecture in two important
ways. First, human beings have certain intuitive expectations concerning the concepts
OBJECT, ANIMAL, and PERSON based on their folk physical, folk biological, and folk
psychological inference systems. Minimally counterintuitive concepts become minimally
counterintuitive by violating exactly one ontological expectation (e.g., Soul/Ghost/Spirit
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= PERSON + Counterintuitive Physical Properties). 89 This makes such concepts
memorable. Research on memory has documented that such minimally counterintuitive
concepts are more readily recalled than maximally counterintuitive concepts or intuitive
concepts. 90 Secondly, while minimally counterintuitive, such concepts can still run on
the inference system associated with the concept. Thus in this account, we will reason
about souls/spirits/ghosts in the same way we reason about ordinary persons, barring the
counterintuitive properties.
In this version of by-product explanation, religious beliefs are seen primarily as
explicit cultural creations that draw upon the implicit expectations associated with our
folk physical, folk biological, and folk psychological inference systems. There is much
explanatory potential in the notion of minimally counterintuitive concepts, but such an
approach leaves important questions unanswered. This is particularly true in terms of the
question of dualism. The framework of “minimally counterintuitive concepts” helps
explain the transmission of religious concepts, but can it really explain how such
concepts originated in the first place? Why do dualist religious concepts—e.g., God
concepts, afterlife beliefs—show up cross culturally?
In recent years another trajectory has emerged in the cognitive science of religion
that understands certain aspects of religious beliefs as the direct by-product of our
inference systems, especially folk psychology. In the minimally counter-intuitive
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understanding, religious beliefs are explicit beliefs that run on implicit inference systems
such as folk psychology. In this other trajectory, certain foundational aspects of religious
beliefs are themselves seen as forms of implicit belief/knowledge, that then interact with
explicit beliefs and knowledge. This line of research has especially focused on the
tendency to view both the biological and non-biological natural world as designed for a
purpose and on the tendency for human beings to think in a dualist fashion and believe in
the continuity of certain psychological functions after death.
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism III:
Paul Bloom and Jesse Bering on Folk Psychology and Dualism
Until recently, the topic of dualism per se has not figured prominently in
discussions in the cognitive science of religion. But dualism is central to religion in at
least two ways: (1) most religions hold dualist or idealist beliefs about human nature and
its destiny after death, (2) other religious concepts are also premised on a mind-body
dualism, i.e., God, gods, and spirits are also typically understood as “persons without
bodies.” Dualism must be at least plausible in order to get religious beliefs off the
ground. Dualism is essential not only for explaining soul beliefs but for explaining God
beliefs as well.
Recent research by the developmental psychologists Paul Bloom and Jesse Bering
has drawn attention to the role that our cognitive systems play in the production of
common-sense dualism (a “folk psychology of souls”) and the role of that dualism in the
production of religious belief. Their research suggests that dualism of a fairly robust sort
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may in fact be the cognitive default of homo sapiens. This implicit dualism then interacts
in various ways with different learning channels (e.g., science, religion).
Thus far we have seen that human beings have a number of distinct cognitive
systems for navigating physical, biological, and psychological worlds. That these systems
are separate and distinct was illustrated by conditions like autism where folk physics
exists independently of a robust folk psychology. Paul Bloom argues that the fact that we
have two separate cognitive systems for understanding objects and understanding minds
leads us to see minds/souls and bodies as also separate and distinct. 91 As Bloom notes,
both of these systems are biological adaptations in the human brain working in a coldbloodedly rational way to help people anticipate and understand physical and social
reality. They are like two different computer programs running within the brain
performing different tasks. Because we have two distinct cognitive systems and because
they have incommensurable outputs, dualism emerges as an evolutionary by-product or
accident. 92 We think of human beings as having mind/souls and having bodies. As in the
case of folk phenomenology, ideas about folk physics and folk psychology easily lead to
folk ontology: souls are seen as really distinct from bodies. Folk physics and folk
psychology are cognitive systems located in the human brain, but we don’t think of them
that way, we think in terms of bodies and souls.
The previous section showed that that the ability to differentiate agents and
objects is in place quite early developmentally. There is some evidence that very young
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infants do not recognize human beings as physical objects at all, and that recognizing
human beings as partly physical beings may in fact be a developmental accomplishment.
They may be “superdualists” or idealists. In a study of five-month-olds, Bloom and his
colleagues Valerie Kuhlmeier and Karen Wynn investigated whether infants apply folk
physical principles like cohesion, solidity, and continuity to human beings: “do infants
recognize that, in some cases, the principles they readily apply to inanimate objects also
apply to humans?” 93 Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn focused specifically on the principle
of continuity, drawing on research by Elizabeth Spelke and her colleagues demonstrating
that infants expect continuity with inanimate objects. Infants express surprise when an
object disappears behind a barrier and then seems to reemerges from behind a nonadjacent barrier. Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn performed an experiment that tested
continuity expectations regarding persons rather than objects. Significantly, they
discovered that the principle of continuity was not applied to persons; infants were not
surprised when a human being seemed to violate the law of continuous motion.
Reflecting on these different expectations concerning objects and persons, Kuhlmeier,
Bloom, and Wynn write:
It is possible that the dissociation between objects and humans found in
the present study forms the complement to the distinction between human
and inanimate objects in terms of social, goal-directed behavior. Together,
this double dissociation suggests that young infants may have different
modes of construal for humans versus inanimate objects: humans are
construed in terms of social and intentional actions, while inanimate
objects are interpreted via a system sensitive to object physics….The
existence of this human/inanimate distinction, and the differential
93

Valerie A. Kuhlmeier, Paul Bloom, and Karen Wynn, "Do 5-Month-Old Infants See Humans as
Material Objects?," Cognition (2004): 95.

129
application of principles to each, may help infants to define these areas of
knowledge early in development. The appreciation that these construals
overlap—that in certain regards, people are just objects—may be a
developmental accomplishment. 94
Independent work by developmental psychologists Jesse Bering and Paul Harris
has opened up interesting lines of research pertaining specifically to dualism and afterlife
beliefs. The experiments by Bering, Harris and their colleagues all involved scenarios
involving the death of an agent. Participants were then asked a series of questions
regarding the continuity of various mental states and biological functions after death. As
Harris notes, such studies have direct bearing on the question of dualism:
If children think of the person as an indivisible whole, then whether we
ask them about bodily processes (e.g. the functions of the eyes or the
brain) or about concomitant mental processes (e.g. the functioning of sight
or the mind) they should give consistent replies—claiming either that
bodily and mental processes have stopped or that both types of process
continue. On the other hand, if children are susceptible to dualist
thinking—to construe mental processes as separate from, and independent
of bodily processes—then they would likely offer a different pattern of
replies in the two cases, claiming, for example, that bodily processes no
longer function whereas mental processes continue. 95
Work by Bering and his collaborators and independent work by Paul Harris and his
collaborators show that children are much more likely to understand psychological
functioning continuing at death than biological functioning. This was even true in cases
where a certain bio-psychological function (e.g., vision) was broken into biological (eyes)
and psychological (seeing) components. Bering and Bjorklund found that children are
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much more likely to see the mental process continue than the biological process. 96 Harris
and Marta Gimenez discovered a similar differentiation of mind and body with Catholic
children in Spain, and Harris and Rita Astuti found a similar pattern working with Vezo
children in rural Madagascar. 97 Paul Harris describes the significance of these joint
findings:
How far are our conclusions and interpretations consistent with other
research on afterlife beliefs and their development? A robust finding, both
in Study 1 and in the earlier report of Harris and Gimenez (2005), was that
participants are more likely to acknowledge the continued functioning of
mental as compared to bodily processes after death. Bering and his
colleagues…reported a similar differentiation between mind and body.
Across several experiments, participants were more likely to assert the
continued functioning of mental (e.g. feeling desires or emotions) as
compared to biological (e.g. brain functioning) or psychobiological
processes (e.g. feeling sick). 98
The Bering and Harris groups agree that both children and adults are dualists;
however, there is substantial disagreement between the groups concerning the
explanation of this dualism. At stake is the issue of how common sense psychological
and biological knowledge relate to one another and to various learning channels
(religious, scientific, etc.) during development. Harris and his colleagues are principally
concerned with how children reason about death in secular and religious contexts and
favor an explanation of afterlife beliefs that is primarily cultural. Their approach draws
on Pascal Boyer’s notion that religious beliefs typically involve minimally
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counterintuitive concepts. Astuti and Harris make the case that a consolidated
understanding of biological death may in fact contribute to the acquisition of afterlife
beliefs, precisely because of their counterintuitive nature. 99
This counter-intuitive concept explanation is likely part of the story, especially
where explicit afterlife beliefs are concerned, but a number of questions can be raised
about this explanatory strategy. First, this explanation states that children (and adults)
acquire afterlife beliefs through culture. Children and adults are prone to acquire such
concepts precisely because they violated biological expectations concerning death. The
minimally-counter intuitive nature of afterlife concepts makes them especially “catchy.”
This may be a plausible account of how explicit afterlife beliefs are acquired, but it
leaves unexplained the question of why dualist afterlife beliefs show up within every
human culture. It does not explain the etiology of afterlife concepts and beliefs
themselves. How does the notion of a “person without a body” or an immaterial mind
concept get there in the first place? As Bering notes:
[T]he question remains why individuals the world over represent the
minds of those who have died to be active at all, since tacit biological
knowledge of death and agency might just as easily have resulted in the
complete absence of the concepts ghost, spirit, or afterlife…While cultural
epidemiologists might presuppose that it is precisely this intuitive
knowledge of death renders the child susceptible to afterlife concepts…
this does not solve the very real problem of why specific counterintuitive
concepts such as those dealing with the afterlife would spontaneously
happen to appear in nearly all societies to begin with. 100
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Research by Bering sheds some interesting empirical light on these questions,
suggesting that implicit knowledge may be at work in the formation of afterlife beliefs.
Bering’s work trades on the distinction between explicit and implicit cognition
introduced earlier. He is not claiming that explicit beliefs like “the soul goes to heaven
when you die” are innate, but rather that our innate social cognition biases us toward
certain kinds of afterlife belief which then interact with various learning channels.
[I]s it possible that the general idea of an afterlife is not so much
implanted in people’s heads by way of “exposure” to counterintuitive
tales, as it is already present, already firmly entrenched in representational
structures endemic to human cognition, and only then conceptually
enriched through cultural channels? Can we not scarcely help but believe
in some form of psychological continuity with the dead? 101
Bering investigates this claim in several experiments. In “Intuitive Conceptions of Dead
Agents’ Minds: The Natural Foundations of Afterlife Beliefs as Phenomenological
Boundary,” Bering investigates whether people’s reasoning about the minds of dead
agents is isomorphic with their explicit beliefs about the afterlife and whether afterlife
beliefs resemble the minimally counterintuitive template suggested by Pascal Boyer.
In Religion Explained, Boyer treats dead agents’ minds as a specific form of
minimally counterintuitive concept. For Boyer, a religious concept, as minimally
counterintuitive, “preserves all the relevant default inferences except the ones that are
explicitly barred by the counterintuitive element.” 102 He illustrates this with the concept
of ghost or spirit:
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A good illustration is the familiar concept of ghost or spirit. This is found
more or less the world over, not just in Gothic novels and Victorian
séances. The concept is that of a PERSON who has counterintuitive
physical properties. Unlike other persons, ghosts can go through solid
objects like walls. But notice that apart from this ability, ghosts follow
very strictly the ordinary intuitive concept of PERSON. Imagine a ghost
suddenly materializes in your home as you are having dinner. Startled by
this sudden appearance, you drop your spoon in your plate of soup. In a
situation like that, your mind creates a whole lot of assumptions of which
you are not necessarily conscious. For instance, you assume that the ghost
saw you were having dinner, so she now knows you were eating. Also, the
ghost probably heard the sound of your spoon landing in the soup and can
now remember that you dropped it. You assume that the ghost knows you
are here, since she can see you. It would be unsettling but not too
surprising if the ghost asked you whether you were enjoying your dinner.
It would be very weird if she asked you why you never had dinner at home
or why you never had soup. In other words, you assume that this ghost has
a mind. All of the italicized verbs above describe the sort of thing a mind
does: it perceives actual events in the world and forms beliefs on the basis
of those perceptions. 103
Do people actually represent the minds of dead agents in the manner suggested by
Boyer? Do they represent minds of dead agents simply according to their explicit beliefs
about the afterlife? Bering argues against these approaches. “The postulate that ghost is a
cultural invention may be misguided in that it overlooks the possibility that not only the
spontaneous inference system triggered by it, but also the very concept itself, has natural
foundations in the human mind.” 104 This more nativist line of reasoning is not the absurd
notion that people come ready equipped with the notion that the soul returns to heaven
when they die. It is rather the notion that such explicit conceptions of the afterlife
piggyback on more implicit conceptions of afterlife.

103

Ibid., 73-74.

104

Bering, 269.

134
Bering argues that these more implicit notions of afterlife are generated largely
through the operation of theory of mind. This is Bering’s simulation constraint
hypothesis. As discussed earlier, there is debate among developmental psychologists on
how mentalizing or mind reading takes place. One account holds that mind reading takes
places largely through simulation, or putting oneself in the shoes of another person,
imagining what it is like to be in their particular mental state. According to this account,
passing false belief tasks involves the children’s ability to put themselves in the shoes of
another person whose knowledge is different from their own. Simulation thus depends on
our own conscious experience of “knowing what it is like” to be in certain mental states.
Crucial to Bering’s argument is the observation that death places impossible
constraints on such simulation. We cannot imagine what it is “like” to be dead because
this involves consciously representing a final state of unconsciousness. Further,
simulation is not uniform across all mental states. There are some states that it is easierto-imagine-the-absence-of (EIA states) than others, difficult-to-imagine-the-absence-ofstates (DIA states). The absence of certain mental states appears readily in our conscious
experience. We know what it is like not to be hungry or not to see or hear, because such
mental states are readily switched on and off in our conscious experience. It is much
more difficult to simulate the absence of thinking or emotion. Based on the fact that it is
impossible to consciously simulate death (i.e., to consciously simulate permanent nonconsciousness) and that some mental states are easier to imagine the absence of than
others, Bering hypothesizes that there will be a tendency to project DIA states onto dead
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agents’ minds. Because we cannot simulate what it is like to be dead, we often attribute
states that are difficult to imagine being without to dead agents.
Bering argues there are factors other than simulation constraints at work in the
generation of implicit afterlife beliefs. The genesis of afterlife beliefs can also be
understood through a theory theory approach to mindreading. The essential point is that
whether one relies on simulation or not, reasoning about dead agents’ minds is a difficult
task because individuals simply cannot use the same explanatory frame used in the
regular social domain. According to theory theory, one’s theory of mind is developed by
testing and refining hypotheses based on the behavior of others. Dead agents’ minds
present obstacles here as well, because their behavior provides limited information about
underlying mental states. As Bering notes, the absence of action does not necessarily
imply the absence of mental states. Young children, for example, tend to attribute mental
states to agents in a dreamless sleep. 105
Along with these explanations based on simulation and theory approaches to
mindreading, Bering suggests that another aspect of our social cognition may be
responsible for the genesis of afterlife beliefs: the off-line character of much of our social
reasoning. 106 Human beings engage in social reasoning not only when others are actually
present, but in their absence as well. This leads us to assume that the individuals with
whom we have relationships are engaged in actions even when we cannot directly
observe them. This extends not only to living agents but to dead agents as well.

105

Bering, "The Folk Psychology of Souls," 455.

106

Ibid., 455-465.

136
Additionally, certain mental states involving external sensory organs seem to us
more directly connected to biological functioning than, say, thinking or desiring. Such
perceptual and psychobiological states seem much less ephemeral than thought and
emotion, which seem to have no obvious connecting to physicality. Since such states
seem more intimately connected with our biology and physicality, they are more prone to
become integrated into our folk biological knowledge that death is the end of the
organism. Mental states with no directly observable connection to our biology/physicality
will be less prone to such integration.
Is this DIA/EIA distinction in fact evident in people’s reasoning about the
afterlife? As Bering notes:
In order for the simulationist model of the “intuitiveness” of belief in life
after death to be borne out, several hypotheses must be supported. First, if
indeed DIA states are more resistant to discontinuity reasoning because
this requires that explicit biological knowledge must deliberately “turn
off” the default simulation system, then all individuals, no matter their
professed beliefs on the fate of personal consciousness after death, should
be more likely to say that DIA states continue after death than they are
EIA states, where biological knowledge can effectively co-opt the default
system….In addition, it could be argued on the basis of the predictions
made by the simulation model that discontinuity response latencies should
be, in general, longer for DIA than for EIA states, since the former would
require that reflexive simulation attempts be overwritten by explicit
biological theorizing to arrive at such responses, reasoning about death in
full scientific fashion, while the latter employs default simulations.107
On the other hand, Bering notes that if a “culture only” explanation of afterlife
beliefs is correct, no differentiation should show up between DIA/EIA in people with
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differing afterlife beliefs. 108 People’s understanding of the afterlife will reflect their
explicitly learned beliefs. For example, an extinctivist will say that all processes stop at
death. A reincarnationist will say that all processes continue. An immortalist who
understands the soul to leave the body at death, will understand it in a manner similar to
Boyerian spirit concepts, as possessing the same mental properties it did before death. 109
Bering tested this hypothesis on undergraduate students. The students were
presented with a story about an individual meeting an unexpected death. Participants
were then asked questions about the individual in the story and instructed to answer the
questions seriously. They were also told that there was no right or wrong answer; the
experimenter was only interested in their opinion. 110 All questions were prefaced with
“Now that he/she is dead…” Interviews contained questions dealing with the following
categories: BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL (Is he still hungry?),
PERCEPTUAL (Can he see the paramedic trying to resuscitate him?), EPISTEMIC (Is
he still thinking about his wife?), EMOTIONAL (Is he still angry with his wife?),
DESIRE (Does he want to be alive?). 111
At the very end of the interview (so as not to bias responses), participants were
asked to classify their explicit afterlife beliefs according to five categories:
Extinctivist: Personal consciousness ceases entirely at death.
Agnostic: Uncertain as to what becomes of personal consciousness after death.
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Immortalist: Personal consciousness survives the death of the body and exists
forever.
Reincarnationist: Personal consciousness is reincarnated into a new body after
death.
Eclectic: Combination of immortalist and reincarnation classifications.
Other: Personal consciousness survives the death of the body but uncertain what
happens after this. 112
The findings of the experiment support Bering’s hypothesis that factors other than
explicit knowledge are at work in the formation of afterlife beliefs. All groups of
participants stated that biological and biopsychological functions ended with death; all
groups also showed a significant drop in discontinuity responses for the emotional,
desire, and epistemic categories. The major difference in response patterns occurs
between agnostics, extinctivists, and all other groups. Agnostics and extinctivists had
significantly higher discontinuity responses in the emotional, desire, and epistemic
categories. Significantly, however, these discontinuity responses in those categories were
not at ceiling. The four other groups produced very high discontinuity responses for
biological and psychobiological categories; the rate of discontinuity responses dropped
significantly for the perceptual category, and approached floor levels for the emotion,
desire, and epistemic categories.
Such findings are significant because they suggest that dead agent’s minds are
represented in a manner different from the minimally counterintuitive concept model
(Spirit = Invisible Person) suggested by Pascal Boyer. As Bering observes:
In terms of the cognitive underpinnings of religion, contrary to previous
accounts (cf. Boyer, 2001), most afterlife believers do not represent ghosts
or spirits simply as invisible human beings, but rather as invisible human
beings with a narrower range of subjective experience than living agents –
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experience that is delimited by the inactivation of specific psychological
systems at death. 113
The pattern of response offered by reincarnationists and extinctivists also supports
the hypothesis that more is at work in reasoning about dead agent’s minds than explicit
beliefs about the afterlife.
[A]lthough they were the lowest of all, one would have expected the
reincarnationists to have provided an even lower percentage of
discontinuity responses for the biological and psychobiological questions
than they did (83% and 90% respectively), only if to support their stated
explicit beliefs that “personal consciousness” becomes reincarnated into
another physical body at some point after death. Likewise, given their
adamancy on the questionnaires that personal consciousness is
exhaustively terminated at death, it is somewhat surprising that the
extinctivists were not at ceiling with discontinuity responses for the DIA
mental states (i.e., emotional, desire, and epistemic states; 68%, 68%, and
64% respectively), and in fact were significantly less likely to state that
epistemic states discontinued after death than they were the two EIA
states. Theoretically, if explicit (i.e., learned or adopted) beliefs were the
whole story, reincarnationists should have been at absolute floor for all of
the questions posed to them, and extinctivists at absolute ceiling. 114
The simulation constraint hypothesis is also borne out in measurements of response
latencies for the various questions types. Participants required more time to state that DIA
states did not continue after death than they did for EIA states.
Bering and his colleagues have also have explored afterlife beliefs in children. If a
purely cultural account is true, then the youngest children should exhibit the lowest
number of continuity responses and continuity responses should increase with age. If
other factors are involved, as the simulation constraint hypothesis suggests, belief in the
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continuity of mental states should actually decrease with age. In experiments with
American school children, Bering and David Bjorklund tested two hypotheses:
[I]f all that were influencing people’s afterlife judgments were mainstream
cultural beliefs, with increasing age, children should be more likely to
make attributions of psychological continuation following death because
of their increasing exposure to cultural norms.
Our first hypothesis was therefore that people’s judgments about
the continuity of psychological processes following death should actually
decrease with increasing age, despite the background of cultural influence
to the contrary….
Our second hypothesis was that these judgments about the
continuity of psychological processes following death would also vary as a
function of the nature of the mechanisms under question. 115
Bering and Bjorklund presented students with a narrative in which a mouse is
eaten by an alligator. The children were then asked a number of questions concerning the
continuity of the various states introduced earlier: BIOLOGICAL,
PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL, PERCEPTUAL, EPISTEMIC, EMOTIONAL, DESIRE. In
experiments with children in the United States and with Catholic and secularly schooled
children in Spain, Bering and Bjorklund found the same developmental trajectory:
psychological continuity responses were, in fact, highest for the youngest children and
decreased with age (Figure 8). 116 This provides evidence that factors other than explicit
religious indoctrination are responsible for afterlife beliefs. Bering argues that such a
decrease is the result of increased biological knowledge and its relationship to
psychological states.
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The findings show that older children and adults were, overall, more likely
to state that both biological imperatives and psychological states ceased at
death and were more likely to report that particular categories of
psychological states (i.e. psychobiological and perceptual states) ended at
death than that other did (i.e. emotional, desire, and epistemic states). In
contrast the youngest children in the sample, although acknowledging that
biological imperatives no longer applied to the dead agent, failed to
distinguish between the different categories of psychological states and
were just as likely to report that one type of state (e.g. psychobiological)
continued after death as that another one did (e.g. epistemic). The finding
may be explained by the implicit nature of the youngest children’s
knowledge about the biology of death; only after this knowledge has
become conceptually enriched and made explicit can it be applied when
reasoning about the psychological states of dead agents. However, even
when explicit knowledge is in place, reasoning that certain types of
psychological states (i.e. emotional, desire, and epistemic states) become
extinguished at death appears difficult. Discontinuity reasoning for these
types of mental states encounters resistance. 117
As discussed above, Bering offers several explanations of this resistance:
simulation constrains, the off-line nature of social reasoning, and the ephemeral nature of
these states. Interestingly, such a pattern was found in both religious and secularly
schooled children in Spain. The Catholic students had higher levels of continuity
responses, but followed the same developmental trajectory: the youngest students offered
the greatest number of continuity responses. In terms of the higher overall continuity
responses, Bering argues that explicit religious education might in fact reinforce the
default cognitive stance in the face of explicit biological knowledge. It is in
understanding the interaction between implicit afterlife beliefs and explicit afterlife
beliefs acquired through religious indoctrination that the notion of minimally
counterintuitive concepts becomes helpful. Bering hypothesizes that explicit afterlife
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beliefs might becomes especially salient precisely because they violate biological
expectations about death.
One of the roles served by religious instruction concerning ‘life after
death’ may be to conceptually enrich a default stance that involves
attributing mental states to dead agents. Although the present study did
not directly test for this, religious pedagogy on the topic of the afterlife
might serve to quarantine biologically relevant information such that this
information is not used for theoretical applications concerning the fate of
agents’ minds after death. It is important to clarify that we are not arguing
that biological knowledge among religiously schooled children is more
impoverished than that of their secularly schooled peers, but only that
these children may encounter a greater degree of conflict, and hence
separation between biological verities and their religious beliefs. As such,
biological reasoning about the psychological status of dead agents may be
set aside in favour of explicit religious ideas that defy naturalistic
principles and that are regularly communicated to these children by adult
authority figures… Indeed, it may be precisely this disparity between
biological facts and religious ideas that contributes to the memorability of
the latter, fostering their cultural transmission to children…This was
supported by the present data in that, at every age, there were fewer
Catholic school students who could be classified as consistent cessation
theorists than there were secular school students who had such a response
profile. 118
The cognitive science of dualism is significant not only in shedding light on the
dualist view of human nature and the afterlife beliefs that many religions share. Such
dualism is also important in understanding the origin of God concepts and God beliefs.
God is understood very much on the model of an immaterial person. Without an initial
sense that minds and bodies are distinct, belief in God would be fundamentally
unintelligible. As Paul Bloom writes:
Most significantly for religion, dualism makes it possible to imagine souls
without bodies. Christianity and Judaism, for instance, involve a God who
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created the universe, performs miracles, and listens to prayers. He is
omnipotent and omniscient, possessing infinite kindness, justice, and
mercy. But he does not, in any literal sense, have a body. 119
But factors other than dualism are involved in the production of God concepts and
beliefs, most importantly the over-attribution of agency and design and the tendency to
view events as symbolic communications.
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism IV: From Dualism to Theism:
Over Attribution of Agency and Design
Over Attribution of Agency
It is not difficult to see the implications of agency detection for the study of
religion. As Justin Barrett notes, agency detection contributes to the formation of
religious concepts in a number of different ways. It can both contribute to the origin of
religious beliefs and reinforce and encourage religious beliefs already held.
Sometimes HADD’s [Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device] tendency
to attach agency to objects contributes to the formation of religious
concepts. The most straightforward manner is in identifying some
ambiguous thing, such as a wispy form as an intentional agent—a ghost.
With the assistance of face detectors and other tools sensitive to human
forms, occasionally people see what appear to be humanlike figures
…Whether the sighting is an illusion or not, if the right information is fed
to these mental tools, the outcome is a nonreflective belief in a ghost or
spirit. Without sufficient reflective defenses, this nonreflective belief will
become a reflective one. 120
However, agency need not be directly attributed to an object. A known object may be
manipulated or controlled by an intentional agent acting “behind the scenes”:
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HADD’s tendency to find agency in objects contributes to the formation
of religious concepts in a second manner. Often the objects that HADD
registers as being agents are known objects. Unlike in the case of spirits,
HADD may suggest that known nonagents are exhibiting agency. A storm
cloud might have destroyed one and only one home in a village with hail
and lightening. Under some conditions, HADD might register the cloud as
an agent acting purposefully. But a cloud is not an agent… [T]hough
HADD may have detected an object behaving like an agent, a more salient
candidate may be attributed responsibility for the action in question. For
instance, if villagers believe a certain god controls the weather, the storm
cloud’s apparent agency might be directed by that god against the
reprobate individual. In these cases, HADD encourages belief in already
known superhuman agents. 121
Over Attribution of Design
We are examining the origins of immaterial mind concepts like God and the soul
and belief in these concepts. One major source of intuitions about the existence of God—
i.e., a divine mind—is design, the sense that the universe as a whole and the organisms in
it were designed for a purpose. Design arguments are the most commonly cited
justification for belief in God. 122 Proposals to teach the so-called “Intelligent Design
Theory” as part of the biological curriculum in public high schools generated a national
debate over a century after Darwin. Anthropic “fine tuning” arguments remain popular
among some very sophisticated thinkers. Important work by the cognitive-developmental
psychologist Deborah Kelemen indicates that the tendency toward “promiscuous
teleology” may in fact the cognitive default, a by-product of over-zealous social
cognition. Theory of mind is naturally extended not only to human beings but to the
artifacts that human beings create. Research by Kelemen indicates that theory of mind
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extends well beyond the world of human beings and their artifacts; it extends to the
biological and non-biological natural world as well. Kelemen’s research has documented
children’s tendency to understand objects as existing for a purpose, a bias which she dubs
“promiscuous teleology.” 123 Kelemen’s work along with the independent research of M.
Evans has also documented children’s tendency to view natural phenomena as
intentionally created by a non-human agent. 124
Research on teleological reasoning originally occurred in the context of
discussions of common sense or folk biology. In that context, “studies have discovered
that children’s reasoning about living things is constrained by teleological assumptions
from a very early age.” 125 Kelemen’s work is significant in finding that children apply
such teleological reasoning to the non-biological natural world as well.
[W]hen asked to identify unanswerable questions, American 4- and 5year-olds differ from adults by finding the question “what’s this for?”
appropriate not only to artifacts and body parts, but also to whole living
things like lions (“to go in the zoo”) and nonliving natural kinds like
clouds (“for raining”)….
These kinds of promiscuous teleological intuitions persist into
elementary school, particularly in relation to object properties. For
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instance, when asked to conduct a “science” task” and decide whether
prehistoric rocks were pointy because of a physical process (e.g., “bits of
stuff piled up for a long period of time”) or because they performed a
function, American 7- and 8-year-olds, unlike adults, preferred
teleological explanations whether they invoked “self-survival” functions
(e.g. “so that animals wouldn’t sit on them and smash them”) or “artifact”
functions (e.g. so that animals could scratch on them when they got itchy”)
(Kelemen, 1999c). 126
Where do such teleological explanations come from? A culture-only explanation
suggests itself. American children are teleologists because American culture is saturated
with theism and theism of a very creationist sort. Kelemen argues against this
explanation. The bias toward teleological reasoning in American children has been
replicated in the much more secular context of Great Britain. 127 More significantly,
independent work by M. Evans found that children from both fundamentalist and nonfundamentalist homes show a bias toward “creationist” accounts of how species
originate. 128 Kelemen argues that such teleological and creationist reasoning may be the
by-product of our over-active social cognition: “Perhaps children’s generalized
attributions of purpose are, essentially, side effects of a socially intelligent mind and is,
therefore, oriented toward explanations characterizing nature as an intentionally
designed artifact—an orientation given further support by the artifact-saturated context of
human cultures. 129
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This “intuitive theism” or “theism as by-product” thesis—that children make
sense of the natural world in terms of a “somebody who designed them for a purpose”
depends on several prerequisites being in place. (1) The capacity to maintain a mental
representation of such an agent despite its intangibility, (2) the ability to attribute to that
special agent mental states distinguishing it from more commonplace agents, (3) the
ability to attribute design intentions to agents and understand an objects’ purpose as
deriving from such intentions. 130 Kelemen argues that all three prerequisites are in place
around age five, thus bolstering her case for intuitive theism.
In terms of the first prerequisite, children’s tendency to form imaginary
relationships is indicative of their ability to reason about invisible individuals. 131 Recent
research has also highlighted children’s ability to distinguish between God and other
agents when attributing mental states. Justin Barrett and his colleagues devised an
experiment to test this, drawing on the shift between three- and five-year olds ability to
pass false belief tasks. 132 Barrett and his colleagues used a standard form of the test.
Children were shown a cracker box and asked what it contained and then allowed to look
inside the box, seeing that the cracker box actually contained pebbles. The children were
then asked what would someone (who had not been shown) believe was in the box. They
were then asked what God would believe. Three-year-olds answered pebbles in both
130
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cases: a true response in the case of God and a false response in the case of human
beings. Interestingly, the older children understood that human beings would have a false
belief and answer “crackers,” but even with this understanding of false beliefs in place,
they answered “peebles” for God, showing a distinction between the mental states of God
(where representation is reality) and human beings (where representation and reality may
be distinct). These findings suggest that around five-years of age children have the ability
to distinguish between human beings and God when attributing mental states. Kelemen
also found evidence for the presence of the third prerequisite—the understanding of
artifacts and design:
[A]n underlying developmental pattern does emerge across all of these
studies. With some reliability, the findings suggest that beginning
sometime around the kindergarten period, children adopt a design-based
teleological view of objects with increasing consistency. In light of this
work, and earlier described research on children’s reasoning about
nonnatural agent’s mental states, the proposal that children might be
intuitive theists becomes increasingly viable. 133
Such findings, of course, have a significance that extends far beyond childhood.
Kelemen argues that this teleological stance is likely to remain the cognitive default: “If,
as suggested here, the tendency to think in teleological quasi-artifact terms is a side effect
of human mental design (and pan-cultural experience with artifacts) rather than
socialization, it is likely to remain as a default explanatory strategy throughout life, even
as other explanations are elaborated.” 134 Kelemen cites several factors that seem to
support such a conclusion. First, reasoning about nature in “nonteleological physical133
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reductionist” terms is a relatively recent development and “contemporary adults are still
surprisingly bad at it.” 135 Studies also indicate that college age students will use
teleological explanations outside of scientific contexts. Finally, research with
scientifically uneducated Romanian Gypsy adults has found that they have promiscuous
teleological intuitions much like scientifically naïve British and American elementaryschool children. 136
Second-Order Theory of Mind and Symbolic Communication
We have been examining naturalistic sources of dualism, and it was argued that
such dualism is relevant not only in understanding soul concepts but in understanding the
genesis of God concepts as well. However, God concepts are not merely “big soul”
concepts; other factors alongside dualism contribute to the formation of God concepts.
Hyperactive agency detection leads us to see “faces in the clouds.” Theory of mind leads
us to over-attribute purpose and design to the biological and non-biological natural world.
But surely other notions are important as well. One important distinction between soul
concepts and God concepts is epistemic. It is a truism that human beings have limited
knowledge; this is especially true in the social sphere. Human beings seem to enjoy a
kind of privileged access to their own mental states, whereas the mental states of other
can only be inferred indirectly (vis-à-vis theory of mind). The limited knowledge of
human beings stands in contrast to the omniscience characteristic of God concepts and
other supernatural concepts. A central aspect of this omniscience is the notion that
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supernatural agents also enjoy privileged access to the mental states of human beings. As
Jesse Bering and Dominic Johnson write:
A central component of religious systems are concepts of supernatural
agents that have privileged access to the self’s mental states. Religious
scholars would be hard pressed to find a religious system that does not
have within its ranks some supernatural agent that, among other
impressive facts, is envisioned as knowing rather than merely inferring
from behavior the self’s true intention.
Whereas deception is possible with human beings—one can withhold strategic
information from them—it is not possible with God. God is a “full access strategic
agent,” as Pascal Boyer puts it.
Now, the notion of privileged access goes hand in hand with the idea that God
symbolically communicates through various positive or negative events. As Bering and
Johnson write: “Moralizing gods can only find their way into large social groups insofar
as individuals are capable of envisioning these gods as enforcing their morals through the
occurrence of positive and negative events. A moralizing god who fails to ‘communicate’
with its followers would not be a very effective one.” 137
Attributing communicative intent is even more complex than agency detection
and more complex than design attribution. Jesse Bering has convincingly argued that
understanding events as symbolic communication requires having second order theory of
mind in place, i.e., “knowing that God knows that I know/desire/etc. X.” “We argue, it is
only with the appearance of second-order theory of mind that the child begins to see the
natural events occurring in his life as meaningful, or more specifically, as symbolic and
137
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declarative of an abstract intentional agent’s desire to share social information with
him.” 138
Bering and his colleague Dorothy Parker tested this developmental claim on
children aged 3-9. In this experiment, children played a forced choice game, where they
had to guess which of two boxes contained a hidden ball. The children were to guess the
location of the ball by placing their hand on the top of the box they believed contained
the ball. The children were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help
them play by “telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box.” 139 An
experimenter would trigger an unexpected event (lights flashing on and off or a picture
falling from the wall) and children’s response to the event was coded. Only the oldest
children reported declarative agentive responses—an unexpected event intentionally
caused by an agent to communicate symbolic intent. 140 Middle aged children saw the
unexpected events as caused by Princess Alice without communicative intent. The
youngest children offered purely physical explanations. 141
Bering’s research indicates that the cognitive capacities that play a role in
generating various religious representations like soul and God concepts develop at
different stages. With intuitive dualism and afterlife beliefs this occurs quite early. This
intuitive dualism likely plays an important role in the construction of God and spirit
concepts, as both concepts involve the notion of “a person/mind without a body.”
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However, God and spirit concepts are more than simply persons without bodies; they are
persons without bodies who both create and/or communicate. Entertaining such notions
involves the capacity to see the natural world and items in the natural world as created for
a purpose, and seeing certain events as symbolic communications. These features likely
emerge at a somewhat later developmental stage as by-products of first and second order
theory of mind.
Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to provide a naturalistic explanation of the crosscultural ubiquity of dualism. Such an explanation is part of the burden of proof for
naturalists; they have to show not only that dualism is false; they also have to provide a
compelling explanation of dualism. This chapter was an exercise in such explanation. It
provided naturalistic explanations of dualism both on the levels of neuroscience and
cognitive science.
In terms of neuroscience, it was shown that one major source of dualist intuitions
concerns our folk phenomenology: this folk phenomenology generates both “out-ofbrain” and “out-of-body” experiences. Such experiences are real and vivid enough, but
can be explained in entirely naturalistic terms in light of the notions of a transparent
phenomenal self model and bodily self-representation. In terms of cognitive science, it
was shown that dualism emerges as an evolutionary by-product of other directly adaptive
inference systems: folk physics, folk biology, and folk psychology. Dualism emerges as a
consequence of the fact that we have two different inference systems for reasoning about
social reality and reasoning about physical reality and from the fact that some mental
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states are easier to imagine being without than other mental states. The fact that dualism
comes so naturally to human beings also contributes to the genesis of other supernatural
concepts like god concepts. Here dualism couples with another by-product of human
cognition, the tendency to over-attribute agency and design. The promiscuous nature of
agency detection and theory of mind lead us to see “faces in the clouds,” to see biological
and non biological natural world as designed for a purpose, and to see events as symbolic
communications.
The purpose of Chapters One and Chapter Two was to examine the implications
of contemporary neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind for our
understanding of ourselves and our understanding of religion. Its fundamental argument
is that the biggest implication of the contemporary science and philosophy of the mindbrain is that it calls into question mind-body dualism: the notion that a self can exist
without a body, that there can in fact be Swinburnian “persons without bodies.” Chapter
One was largely concerned with arguing for the truth of this position. However,
contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science not only call into question mind-body
dualism, they also have begun to offer compelling explanations as to why we almost
inevitably think in dualist categories. Chapter Two argued that contemporary mind
science is in fact well positioned to explain the natural sources of the dualist self. Having
made this argument, the dissertation will address the implications of these for religion.
This is the focus of Chapter Three.

CHAPTER THREE
BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION AND THE TRUTH OF RELIGIOUS
DUALISM
Recap: Why Mind-Brain Science Matters for the Study of Religion
This dissertation began with the claim that scientific and philosophical work on
consciousness and the conscious self is essential for the academic study of religion,
particularly aspects of the academic study of religion involving the intersection of
religion and science. Many religious traditions are rooted in strong forms of mind-body
dualism, where consciousness and the conscious self are seen as distinct from brains and
bodies, and capable of existing independently of them. Religious dualism is typically a
two-fold dualism. Not only are human beings understood in a dualist manner, but all of
reality is seen as grounded in some sort of immaterial mind or consciousness.
Chapters One and Two investigated the truth of such dualist claims about human
persons and also explored how such dualist beliefs (including dualist religious beliefs) are
generated. This chapter turns more explicitly to matters of religion. In particular, it is
concerned to address the following question. Given the demise of dualism as a doctrine
about human persons and the explanatory power of a naturalistic account of dualism, is
any form of religious dualism a viable intellectual option today? This chapter argues that
religious dualism is no longer a viable option. One seeking to integrate the claims of
religion and science should thus look elsewhere.
154
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The overall argument structure of the dissertation might be diagramed as follows:
RELIGIONCONSCIOUSNESS/CONSCIOUS SELF MIND SCIENCE
Christianity
Buddhism

“THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM”
“BRAIN-CONSCIOUSNESS PROBLEM”

(Dualism vs. Naturalism)

Chapters One and Two focused primarily on human minds, specifically, the
impact of the mind sciences on the contemporary mind-body problem or the problem of
consciousness.
CONSCIOUSNESS/CONSCIOUS SELF MIND SCIENCE
“THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM”
“BRAIN-CONSCIOUSNESS PROBEM “
(Dualism vs. Naturalism)

Chapters One and Two argued that contemporary mind science calls into question
dualist claims about consciousness while simultaneously explaining their origin in human
thought. Chapter One presented the debate between dualism and naturalism as a debate
about the adequacy of bio-psychological explanation of consciousness, and argued that
principled dualist and mysterian objections to a scientific, bio-psychological explanation
of consciousness are simply not compelling. Such claims are rooted in inadequate
deductive criteria of explanation and reduction, and, as such, fail to appreciate the
resources a naturalistic, bio-psychological framework has for taking the subjectivity of
consciousness seriously. The mind-body problem, or, more specifically, the brainconsciousness problem, was resolved in favor of a neurophilosophical, inflationist form
of naturalism. Chapter Two then argued that the contemporary mind sciences not only
call dualism into question, they also help explain the genesis of robust dualist intuitions
in human thought.
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Chapter One and Chapter Two also corrected methodological misconceptions that
naturalism is often saddled with. Naturalism does not entail a deflationist reduction of
phenomena like phenomenal consciousness, nor does it entail a collapsing of all higherlevel disciplines into biology, much less physics. What naturalism does rule out are
claims about the ontological independence of consciousness and claims about the
methodological independence of higher level disciplines such as the humanities and
social sciences. Thus we have addressed the debate between dualism and naturalism
concerning human minds and in the process corrected some methodological worries
about naturalism.
If these arguments have been successful, there is every reason to be skeptical
about dualism as a doctrine about human persons. What sort of implications does this
have for religion? This is the central issue in the current chapter of this dissertation. We
are now moving from questions about mind science and the mind-body problem to
explicitly address matters of religion.
RELIGIONCONSCIOUSNESS/CONSCIOUS SELF MIND SCIENCE
Ch. 3

“THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM”

Ch. 1-2

“BRAIN-CONSCIOUSNESS PROBLEM”

Religious dualism was introduced in the beginning of the first chapter. Chapters
One and Two then offered a philosophical and scientific critique and explanation of
dualism. The truth of dualism as a philosophical thesis about consciousness was called
into question in Chapter One, and Chapter Two offered a naturalistic explanation of the
ubiquity of mind-dualism. This Chapter explicitly explores the implications of the
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conclusions of Chapter One and Chapter Two for religious dualist claims with the
Christian and Buddhist traditions.
In the first section, I establish the intimate link between dualism and theism
through an analysis of classical theism. I argue that classical theists are right that the
rejection of dualism has some fairly significant theological fallout, but they are wrong in
thinking that substance dualism can be saved as a doctrine about human persons.
Classical dualists rely on a priori philosophical arguments that were shown to be
unsuccessful, and their work fails to make any significant contact with actual work in the
mind sciences. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of attempts to
integrate religion and the mind sciences.
Many Christian theologians interested in “religion and science” deny dualism as a
doctrine about human persons while seeking to preserve a dualist doctrine of God. I
consider what is perhaps the most sophisticated version of this position—Philip Clayton’s
synthesis of emergentism and theism. Claims about immaterial minds and consciousness
surface not only in the dialogue between Christianity and science but in the Buddhistmind science dialogue as well. I conclude the chapter with a consideration B. Alan
Wallace’s attempt to integrate Buddhism and mind science through his “contemplative
science” project.
Dualism and Classical Theism
There are very significant links between dualism and theistic belief. The aim of
this section is to make this link explicit. Theistic religious traditions frequently endorse a
dualist understanding of human nature. In particular, within Christian theism, a dualist
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understanding of human nature certainly figures prominently. This is perhaps most
apparent in matters of eschatology and afterlife beliefs. Contemporary theologians like to
remind people that Christian teaching involves resurrection of the body rather than
immortality of the soul, but this is surely a false dichotomy. 1 Perhaps the majority of the
ecumenical Christian tradition has held a view that combines the notions of the
immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body. As Charles Taliaferro notes:
In general, I think the Christian understanding of the afterlife is best
served by assuming a dualist view of human nature. It is widely believed
in the Christian tradition that persons exist after the destruction of their
body and that, at the resurrection, they will receive either a new
embodiment or an embodiment that is constituted by their reconfigured,
transformed earlier body. The personal life between death and
resurrection is often thought of as either disembodied or as some
intermediary embodiment…These scenarios all assume some form of
dualism, for if materialism is true and the person is her body, then the
annihilation of the body entails the annihilation of the person. 2
John Cooper is forthright about the consequences of a rejection of dualism for this aspect
of Christian belief:
Many in the academic community have taken a clear position on the bodysoul question which they continue to assert with conviction. And if what
they are saying is true, then two disturbing conclusions immediately
follow. First, a doctrine affirmed by most of the Christian Church from the
beginning is false. A second consequence is more personal and
existential—what millions of Christians believe will happen to them when
they die is also a delusion…If souls are not the sort of thing which can be
broken loose from bodies, then we do not actually exist between death and
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resurrection, either with Christ or somewhere else, either consciously or
unconsciously. 3
Much more is at stake with the issue of dualism than matters of eschatology.
There exists an intimate link between dualist notion of human persons and the conception
of God within classical theism. Theism, in fact, is a form of dualism and also functions as
the explanation of dualism regarding human persons. Dualism as a doctrine about human
nature thus has very significant bearing on fundamental issues concerning the nature and
existence of God. Maurice Schouten describes this link well:
In classical theism, the (personal) properties we typically ascribe to our
fellow human beings and to ourselves are projected onto God. Thus, the
view of God is modeled after the dualist image of humanity. God is seen
as an incorporeal personlike being with perfectly rational and conscious
thought who intervenes in the material world on the basis of knowledge,
and all of this without bodily features. God listens, hears, sees, believes,
knows, wants, and so forth—but all without ears, eyes, a mouth, or a
cerebral cortex. And this image comports nicely with the traditional
picture of ourselves according to which the spiritual part of the human
agent directs its bodily part and acts out into the material world he or she
is surrounded by. 4
Theism thus depends on dualism to secure a notion of immaterial personhood, a
notion of God as a “person without a body.” As Charles Taliaferro puts it,
In western tradition God is typically conceived of as an immaterial,
spiritual being. God is a nonphysical, powerful, intentional agent present
throughout the cosmos without being identical with it or with some
material object in it…If a materialist view of the cosmos, according to
which all of reality is fundamentally physical, is correct, then the
traditional understanding of God is incorrect. 5
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Taliaferro is, of course, aware that God is not a super soul or as he puts it a “super homo
sapiens,” but he also has the awareness that theism involves making analogical
predications based on human cognition and that such predications cannot get off the
ground given a naturalist view of the human person:
In the great monotheistic religious traditions, God is not, of course,
depicted with precisely the same attributes as created persons; God is not a
super homo sapiens. And at important junctures in the development of
these religions, theists have gone to great lengths to insist that God differs
from us in that God is eternal; while we are temporal; God is not made up
of parts, we are; God has no sense organs, we do; God creates galaxies
from nothing, we only shape things that already exist; God is without
origin and incorruptible, we are neither. In the central conviction that God
exists necessarily, while we exist only contingently it might appear that
the God of classical theism resembles abstract propositions like “7+5=12”
which are necessarily true far more than God resembles us. But God is
also believed to know about the world, to be an all-good agent, to reshape
things which already exist, to love the cosmos. Theists will diverge on
how to understand these features as ascribed to God, but it is evident that
these ascriptions make up central items in the folk-psychological
framework that is under attack in much contemporary philosophy. Theists
refine terms like “intelligence,” “agency,” and “emotions” as applied to
God, but surely the theistic enterprise requires that we have some
conceptual handle on our own intelligence, agency, and emotions before
religious refining can take place. And if…materialism…holds sway, it is
difficult to see how such theistic refining can even get started. 6
A dualist doctrine of the human person is intimately related not just to questions
concerning the nature of God but also to questions concerning God’s existence. A dualist
doctrine of the human person must explain how an immaterial human mind or soul could
originate and then become conjoined with a particular body. Theism has thus also served
as the explanation for a dualist notion of human persons; divine consciousness explains
human consciousness. This finds expression in notions of God as the direct creator of the
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human soul and in attempts to argue from the fact of human consciousness to the
existence of God.
Roman Catholic intellectuals frequently like to point out that Catholicism is
completely compatible with the theory of evolution. They frequently point with approval
to Pope John Paul II’s 1996 address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, “Truth
Cannot Contradict Truth.” In this address John Paul goes beyond Pope Pius XII’s
statement of compatibility in his 1950 encyclical Humani Generis, and proclaims that a
half century of evidence leads to the conclusion that evolution is “more than a
hypothesis”:
Today, almost half a century after the publication of the encyclical
[Humani Generis], new knowledge has led to the recognition of the theory
of evolution as more than a hypothesis. It is indeed remarkable that this
theory has been progressively accepted by researchers, following a series
of discoveries in various fields of knowledge. The convergence, neither
sought nor fabricated, of the results of work that was conducted
independently is in itself a significant argument in favor of this theory. 7
But, it is important to note that the former pope is speaking of the evolution of the body.
The mental life of human beings, i.e. the soul, must be understood as directly created by
God:
The Church's magisterium is directly concerned with the question of
evolution, for it involves the conception of man: Revelation teaches us that
he was created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gn 1:27-29). The
conciliar constitution Gaudium et Spes has magnificently explained this
doctrine, which is pivotal to Christian thought. It recalled that man is "the
only creature on earth that God has wanted for its own sake" (No. 24). In
other terms, the human individual cannot be subordinated as a pure means
or a pure instrument, either to the species or to society; he has value per
se. He is a person. With his intellect and his will, he is capable of forming
7
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a relationship of communion, solidarity and self-giving with his peers. St.
Thomas observes that man's likeness to God resides especially in his
speculative intellect, for his relationship with the object of his knowledge
resembles God's relationship with what he has created (Summa
Theologica I-II:3:5, ad 1). But even more, man is called to enter into a
relationship of knowledge and love with God himself, a relationship which
will find its complete fulfillment beyond time, in eternity. All the depth
and grandeur of this vocation are revealed to us in the mystery of the risen
Christ (cf. Gaudium et Spes, 22). It is by virtue of his spiritual soul that the
whole person possesses such a dignity even in his body. Pius XII stressed
this essential point: If the human body takes its origin from pre-existent
living matter, the spiritual soul is immediately created by God.
Consequently, theories of evolution which, in accordance with the
philosophies inspiring them, consider the spirit as emerging from the
forces of living matter or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are
incompatible with the truth about man. Nor are they able to ground the
dignity of the person. 8
As claims about God as creator of the cosmos find expression in cosmological
arguments, claims about God as the direct creator of the soul find expression in
arguments from consciousness. Such arguments date back at least to John Locke and
have recently been revived by Richard Swinburne, Robert Adams, and J.P. Moreland.
Swinburne, for example, argues that while science cannot explain the relationship
between the objective brains and subjective selves, theism can:
But theism can provide an explanation of these things. God, being
omnipotent, is able to join souls to bodies. He can cause there to be the
particular brain event-mental event connections which there are. He can
do this by causing molecules when formed into brains to have powers to
produce mental events in souls to which they are connected, and the
liabilities to execute the purposes of such connected souls (new powers
and liabilities not deriving from the ordinary ones which chemistry
analyses). And he can make the souls in the first place and choose to
which brain (and so body), each soul is to be connected when foetal brain
events require a soul to be connected to the brain. 9
8

Ibid.

9

Richard Swinburne, Is There a God? (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1996), 90.

163
J.P. Moreland nicely outlines the premises of the “argument from consciousness”
taken as a straightforward deductive argument:
(1) Mental events are genuine non-physical mental entities that exist.
(2) Specific mental event types are regularly correlated with specific
physical event types.
(3) There is an explanation for these correlations.
(4) Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation
(5) The explanation for these correlations is either a personal or natural
scientific explanation.
(6) The explanation is not a natural scientific one.
(7) Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.
(8) If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.
(9) Therefore, explanation is theistic. 10
All of these arguments are premised upon very strong forms of substance dualism, and, as
such, rest on very strong versions of the Correlation Claim introduced in Chapter One:
the claim that the relationship of mind and brain can only be understood in terms of
correlation and not identity.
All dualists hold the Correlation Claim and thus deny mind-brain identity, but
body-soul dualists deny even the dependence/supervenience of the human mind/soul on
the brain (indeed they must in order to claim God as the direct creator of the soul and
preserve the argument from consciousness). Classical theists who are also substance
dualists thus hold not only the Correlation Claim but the more robust No Neural
Correlates Claim for both the soul and for God: Consciousness or the conscious self is
capable of existing without any neural or physical correlates (e.g., the post-mortem soul,
God, substrate consciousness).
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In short, classical religious dualists recognize the intimate link between substance
dualism and theism and recognize how even mild versions of mind-brain dependency/
supervenience compromise theism. Philip Clayton, a theologian who rejects substance
dualism in favor of an emergentist doctrine of the human person, also expresses this
worry:
[T]he case for emergent mental causation is not by itself a case for the
existence of God, divine action, an eternal soul, or life after death; it is not
directly a theological conclusion at all. Indeed, in some ways it might
seem to be an anti-theological conclusion, because it understands mental
phenomena to be “of a piece” with physical phenomena, and because the
supervenience relationship asserts a dependence of the mental life on its
physical basis—indeed a high correlation between physical causes and
mental effects—which is on the surface inconsistent with many parts of
Christian teaching. 11
What is significant to note is that the arguments of Chapter One called into
question even mild versions of the correlation claim, as expressed in emergentist and
property dualist positions. If property dualism is untenable, substance dualism is a fortiori
untenable. The strongest arguments for property dualism are knowledge arguments and
modal arguments that attempt to show that conscious mental properties cannot be
physical properties and that the mind-brain relation can only be understood in terms of
correlation and not identity.
Chapter One considered in some detail knowledge and modal arguments proposed
by Thomas Nagel, Saul Kripke, Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers. The
flaw of such arguments rests on a failure to understand the incompleteness of our

11

Philip Clayton, "Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account," in Neuroscience
and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Nancey Murphy Robert John Russell, Theo C.
Meyering, Michael A. Arbib (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 2002), 206.

165
concepts linking consciousness and the brain, a failure to appreciate the resources
naturalism/physicalism has for accommodating subjectivity, and from inadequate
deductive criteria of explanation. Chapter One went on to defend an inflationist
naturalistic account of consciousness in the philosophy of mind, and explanatory
pluralism and mechanistic explanation in the philosophy of psychology and biology. It
was then shown how the hard problem of consciousness could be pursued in an
empirically tractable manner. Chapter Two then offered a fully naturalistic account of
dualist “intuitions of distinctness.”
A number of neurological and psychological factors contribute to our dualist
intuitions. We do not directly sense the brain; certain mental states are more intimately
connected with the body than others. Brain states are also unique in nature in that they are
both perspectival and transparent. Brain states are unique in that they can be experienced
from both a first person and a third person perspective: subjectively and objectively.
Subjective physical facts are just objective physical facts experienced by a particular
organism. I can experience the phenomenal level in my brain from a first person and third
person perspective. Such first person facts do not seem very brainy, due to the
transparency of consciousness, the fact that “the brain is not about itself”; 12 it is a form of
“virtual reality” generated by the brain that seems to take us out of the brain and place us
in immediate contact with reality. For these reasons, dualist thinking comes fairly easily
to us, but it ultimately is not true.
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Is this a definitive disproof of dualism? No, but arguments based on consciousness
are widely seen as the strongest weapons in the dualist arsenal. But dualist arguments
about correlation fail to work; moreover dualism fails to cohere well with the physics,
biology, and neuroscience constraints discussed earlier. Dramatic alterations in conscious
phenomenology and the phenomenal self can be attributed to specific regions in the brain,
the dualist owes us an explanation of how the self can be so fundamentally affected by
minor alterations in the brain and yet remain ontologically independent of it. The
question of how the conscious self evolved remains a vexed question, but researchers
assume that consciousness evolved and have offered educated guesses as to its selective
function. The dualist owes us an answer as to how these approaches are inadequate and
needs to provide a better constructive alternative. If the soul is directly created by God,
when exactly did this process occur—with australopithecines? With the appearance of the
genus homo? When indeed.
Even more pressing is the question of how dualists might account for mental
causation without violating conservation laws. Theistic substance dualists—apart from
occasionalists—also typically want to affirm causal interaction between the mental and
the physical. It seems obvious that consciousness mental occurrences have physical
effects in the world, but conservation laws and the principle of the causal closure of the
physical place great constraints on how one thinks about such causation. Interactionist
dualism was jettisoned by Descartes’ contemporaries Malebranche and Leibniz precisely
for this reason, and the most prominent defenders of dualism today also reject
interactionist dualism. Note that if a version of identity theory like the one defended in
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Chapter One is true, the problem of mental causation is saved as a species of physical
causation. Naturalism can fully account for the subjectivity of consciousness and offer
the most plausible account of mental causation.
The conclusion of all of this is that body-soul dualism is simply no longer a
compelling position, but substance dualists are fundamentally correct in noting the
significant link between dualism and theism. Dualism and theism are so intimately linked
that it would seem that the collapse of mind-body dualism has rather dire consequences
for religion, particularly with regard to claims about God as a “person without a body.”
But might it be possible to reject dualism as a doctrine about human persons while
defending a dualist doctrine of God? Such a position has in fact become increasingly
common, especially with Christian philosophers and theologians concerned with
engaging the mind sciences and analytic philosophy of mind. Those defending such a
position are placed in the awkward position of affirming a downward dependence of
human minds on brain but denying that transcendent mind is downwardly dependent too.
An awkward position, however, is not an impossible position and the next section
considers a sophisticated attempt to combine an emergentist doctrine of the human person
with a dualist doctrine of God.
Emergentism and Theism: Philip Clayton
The previous section discussed the intimate connection between dualism, theism,
and key Christian beliefs. The point of this section was to note that the demise of dualism
in the philosophy of mind has fairly significant consequences for Christian theology as
traditionally conceived. It is not just that one kind of argument for the existence of God

168
has been cut off. Rather, the more disturbing question is raised as to why dualism should
be pursued at the theological level if it makes no sense at the level of human beings. The
notion of God as a “person without a body” becomes much less intelligible when bodysoul dualism about human beings collapses, and when one can offer naturalistic accounts
of the mechanisms that lead human beings to think in dualistic terms. The Christian
theologian is faced with quite a dilemma. One can either continue to affirm body-soul
dualism and traditional afterlife beliefs at the high cost of rejecting a great deal of
scientific and philosophical evidence, or one can accept the philosophical and scientific
evidence and reject some of the most foundational truth claims in the Christian tradition.
Many theologians simply choose to ignore the philosophical challenges posed by
the mind sciences or minimize the significance of these challenges to theology. Philip
Clayton is a notable exception. Clayton has extensively engaged issues concerning
religion and the mind sciences and is well aware of the pressures that the mind sciences
put on theology. He seeks a middle ground between dualist and physicalist positions
through the notion of emergence. He then uses this emergentist account of the human
person to argue for a form of theistic dualism. This section considers Clayton’s approach
to theology and neuroscience, and then turns to Clayton’s emergentist understanding of
the human person and his arguments for theological dualism. It is argued that there are
reasons to be skeptical of Clayton’s attempt at integrating theology and the mind
sciences, based both on his notion of emergence and his attempt to move from emergence
to dualist transcendence.
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Clayton’s Account of the Relationship Between Theology and Neuroscience
Clayton senses the pressures that the physicalist assumptions of the neurosciences
put on theology; however, for Clayton, the task of theology is not to critique these
assumptions or to articulate a proposal for a soul-based neuroscience. The theological
task rather involves seeing how far one can go in embracing these assumptions without
denying factors necessary for the viability of religious belief. “[T]he guiding question in
the dialogue between theology and the neurosciences is, how far can a position go in the
direction of the physicalist assumptions that are basic to the empirical study of the brain
without denying (or implicitly rejecting) factors necessary for the viability of religious
belief?” 13 Clayton argues that certain minimal conditions of personhood are necessary if
a realist version of theism is to remain a viable option:
It includes, at least for traditional theologians, not only the existence of at
least one purely spiritual being—hence the possibility of disembodied
agency—but also the notions of will and of freedom, which come in both
finite and infinite flavors. With will, so understood, comes consciousness:
Christians conceive God as a conscious agent, an agent enough like human
agents that the predicate “person” can also be attributed, if only in an
analogous fashion, to the divine. On this view, humans and God are also
moral agents; persons exercise their agency in light of real obligations to
other persons (indeed, to the world as a whole) and to God. Finally, these
agents are social agents. Religious notions of community emphasize a
union among humans in light of the divine presence and the covenant
which makes of us “one.” 14
Clayton is forthright about the pressures that the mind sciences put on these conditions,
especially on the notion of disembodied mind or agency:
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Part of the problem is that we are no longer sure what to make of the
notions of mind or spirit. The metaphysical resources of the Western
tradition—the conceptual world of ruach, pneuma, spiritus, Geist—are
difficult to reconcile with the attitude and results of contemporary science.
One can of course still assert that ‘God is Spirit, infinite and perfect in his
being and perfections,’ as the Westminster Confession has it, one can
affirm that humans are made ‘in the image of God’ (imago dei); and one
can conclude that each human therefore possesses a God-like spirit, as the
Pope recently reaffirmed in his statement on evolution. But whereas this
view once accorded nicely with the natural science (natural philosophy) of
a previous era, it stands in deep tension with the approaches and the results
of the science of our own. 15
For Clayton, it is the notion of emergence that allows for a critical mediation between
theology and the neurosciences:
That is where the emergence argument comes in. If successful, this
argument represents a tertium quid between physicalist treatments of
mind, which leave no place for talk of spirit, and dualist treatments, which
simply assume (in my view, too easily) the continuing validity and
usefulness of such language. 16
Clayton’s Account of Emergentism
In his monograph, Mind and Emergence, Clayton defends an emergentist account
of the natural world and the human person in particular. He then uses that emergentist
account of the human person to argue for a theistic dualism. Clayton understands his
emergentist position as a via media between physicalism and dualism.
It is widely but falsely held that there are only two major ways to interpret
the world: in a physicalist or in a dualist fashion.…The evolutionary
perspective has fatally undercut both sides of the once regnant either/or:
physicalism, with its tendency to stress the sufficiency of physics, and
dualism, with its tendency to pull mind out the evolutionary account
altogether….I argue that emergence is the philosophical position—more
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accurately, the philosophical elaboration of a series of scientific results—
that best expresses the philosophical import of evolutionary theory. 17
This positioning of the issues is important to keep in mind, and Clayton’s treatment tends
to focus on three positions:
PHYSICALISM—EMERGENTISM—DUALISM
A key issue in evaluating Clayton’s work is the meaning of the notion of
“emergence” and its relationship to terms like “dualism,” “reductionism,” and
“physicalism.” In analyzing Clayton’s work, it is important to first distinguish between
three senses of emergence. 18 I will call these (1) trivial emergence, (2) weak emergence,
and (3) strong emergence. (1) Trival emergence or non-emergence is essentially the
notion of aggregativity: systems acquire new causal powers based on an aggregation of
their parts. For example, a five-pound hunk of iron has different causal powers than a
single iron atom, but the causal powers of the hunk are aggregative. (2) Weak emergence
captures the fact that certain systems are not mere aggregates of their parts;
organizational interactions allow the system to do things that the parts cannot do. Weak
emergence is essentially the notion of emergence as non-aggregativity. Weak emergence
can also refer to the fact that certain systems are so complex that their behavior cannot be
predicted in practice from what is known about the organization of its components. Weak
emergence in this sense refers to epistemological limitations. In contrast to these notions
of emergence, the notion of strong emergence or radical property emergence holds that
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systems give rise to sui generis properties that cannot be explained in terms of their
component parts plus organization.
Given these various understandings of “emergence,” I’m not convinced that
emergence represents a genuine tertium quid between physicalism and dualism. Strong
emergence is actually a form of property dualism, while weaker notions of emergence—
emergence as non-aggregativity and epistemological emergence—can be incorporated
into a physicalist, and even a reductive physicalist framework. As William Wimsatt has
observed:
An opposition between reduction and emergence forces people to take
sides along an axis missing some of the most revealing cuts of the issue.
One can be a reductionist and an emergentist too, with a proper
understanding of these notions. Misunderstandings engender opposition
to reductionism and make emergence unnecessarily mysterious. 19
I think Wimsatt is fundamentally right on this issue. It is difficult to overestimate the
amount of mischief faulty understandings of reductionism have caused in philosophy of
mind and philosophy of science. The notion of reduction that has perhaps generated the
most mischief is an understanding indebted to positivist philosophy of science where
reduction is understood as a logical relationship between theories that bottom out at a
privileged level of explanation (typically that of microphysics). Two aspects of this
understanding of reduction are especially important: (1) reliance on deductive criteria of
explanation, (2) emphasis on the notion that scientific explanations bottom out in a
privileged set of entities or causal relations. What is significant to note is that
19
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contemporary philosophers of psychology, neuroscience, and biology have jettisoned
both Deductive-Nomological models of explanation and fundamentalist 20 reductionism in
favor of mechanistic models emphasizing a plurality of levels of explanation. Advocates
of mechanistic explanation are only anti-reductionist in the sense that they repudiate the
notion of reduction as deduction and the privileging of a single level of explanation
(fundamentalist reduction). As William Wimsatt notes, under a mechanistic model of
explanation, “A reductive explanation of a behavior or property of a system is one that
shows it to be mechanistically explicable in terms of the properties of and interactions
among the parts of the system.” 21 This entire framework puts the issue of reductionism in
a very different light. As William Bechtel observes:
[M]ost neuroscience explanations do not take the form of D-N
explanations in which phenomena are derived from laws, but rather are
models of mechanisms. This casts a different light on the issue of
reduction. Models of mechanisms are inherently reductionist: each
proposed mechanism is designed to show how a phenomenon ascribed to a
system is due to its constituent parts and their interaction. On the other
hand, reduction no longer threatens the autonomy of the higher-level
science: the higher-level characterizes the interaction of processes, the
lower-level accounts for the performance of individual processes. 22
The notion of “interaction of parts” mentioned both in the quotes by Wimsatt and
Bechtel is central, for mechanisms are non-aggregates. If one understands emergence as
non-aggrativity one can embrace a kind of emergence while remaining within a
20
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physicalist and reductionist framework. One can also accept a form of epistemological
emergence. None of these weak forms of emergence removes one at all from a
physicalist—or even reductive physicalist-- framework. What is ruled out are strong
versions of property emergence. Philosopher of neuroscience Carl Craver makes these
distinctions well:
It is important to keep several different senses of the term `“emergence”
distinct. Some philosophers and scientists use the term “emergence” to
describe properties of wholes that are not simple sums of the properties of
components. Mechanisms are nonaggregates, and so they are emergent in
this weak sense. Mechanisms require the organization of components in
cooperative and inhibitory interactions that allow mechanisms to do things
that the parts themselves cannot do. Other philosophers and scientists use
the term “emergence” to mean that it is not possible to predict the
behavior of a mechanism as a whole from what is known about the
organization of its components. This is sometimes called “epistemic
emergence” Some mechanisms have so many parts and such reticulate
organization that our limited cognitive and computational powers prevent
us from making such predictions. Such mechanisms are so sensitive to
undetectable variations in input or background conditions that their
behavior is unpredictable in practice. Behaviors of mechanisms are
sometimes emergent in this epistemic sense. However, one who insists
that there is no explanation for a non-relational property of the whole in
terms of the properties of its component parts-plus-organization advocates
a spooky form of emergence….The ability of organization to elicit novel
causal powers (that is, nonaggregative behaviors and properties) is
unmysterious both in scientific common sense and common sense proper.
Appeal to strong or spooky emergence, on the other hand, justifiably
arouses suspicion 23
The kind of emergence advocated by Clayton and fellow theistic emergentists
William Hasker and Timothy O’Connor is a very robust form of strong emergence.
Clayton is right to repudiate fundamentalist versions of reductionism and physicalism,
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but his own work remains essentially crypto-dualist. Clayton clearly repudiates body-soul
or substance dualism, but the version of emergence he defends is essentially a form of
property dualism. In fact, it is a very strong form of interactionist property dualism.
Clayton tends to eschew the term “property dualism” and opts instead for terms like
“property pluralism” and “emergentist monism”; however, Clayton certainly sounds like
a property dualist when he states: “The balance that we seek conceives mind as a type of
property that emerges from the brain, which though different from remains continually
dependent on its subvenient base (hence the term emergentist supervenience).” 24
Clayton wants to argue that strong property emergence is a feature of the cosmos “from
quantum to consciousness,” and this is precisely why he prefers the term “property
pluralism” to “property dualism”:
Clearly the position defended here is not a version of substance dualism;
there has been no suggestion of mental substances intervening in the
physical order. But is it a variant of property dualism, the view that, even
if there is only one kind of substance, it has two fundamentally different
kinds of properties?
Such a criticism rests on a misunderstanding. I have not portrayed
a world divided into two distinct types of qualities, but rather a world with
a vast array of different types of properties. Though there is no
justification for the “dualism” label, the theory could fairly be called
property pluralism, since it countenances a wide range of properties
depending on their position in the complexity hierarchy. 25
Clayton cites a number of natural science examples to make his case for strong
emergence, but the question can be raised as to whether the numerous examples Clayton
cites are really examples of strong emergence or merely forms of weak emergence
24
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discussed above. There is certainly a danger of equivocation in bringing together a wide
variety of examples of “emergence” from the natural sciences. Michael Silberstein makes
this point well:
Clayton argues from enumerative induction to the conclusion of
nomological [strong] emergence. Cases from the natural sciences that he
canvasses include conductivity, chaotic hydrodynamics, Raleigh-Benard
convection, autocatalysis, self-organization of various sorts such as the
formation of snowflakes, Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions, finite cellular
automata, evolution, neural networks, ant colonies, the quantum Hall
effect, quantum decoherence, and the Pauli Exclusion Principle. The only
thing these myriad case studies have in common is that they have all been
tagged ‘emergent phenomena’ at one point or another in the literature; but
the important question is what kind of emergence they represent.
Unfortunately, none of these cases is an obvious example for nomological
or radical mereological emergence, and that is what Clayton needs to
contradict causal closure and physicalism. 26
Clayton himself recognizes this ambiguity, but in his treatment of mind he argues that
this ambiguity disappears:
In the previous chapter we found that some of the biological cases stand
on the boundary between weak and strong emergence. I argued that the
strong interpretation does better justice to biology as a whole, given that
emergent systems are not just aggregates of microphysical states but cells
and organisms—the agents that populate the biosphere and that serve as
individualized objects of study for many biologists. Still, I had that at least
some of the scientific cases could be read either way. In the case of mental
phenomena, I will now argue, the ambiguity disappears: one cannot make
sense of mental causation except from the standpoint of strong emergence.
If the strong emergence interpretation of mental causes is not correct, one
should be an epiphenomenalist about mind, that is, one should hold that
mind has no effect on the world. To the extent that one thinks that
epiphenomenalism is a conclusion to be avoided, to that extent one has
reason for endorsing strong emergence. 27
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Clayton argues that both consciousness and mental causation demand a strong
emergentist reading. Interestingly, Clayton’s discussion of consciousness and mental
causation fails to make contact with actual scientific work on consciousness and agency.
Clayton briefly cites nine examples of significant research on consciousness and agency,
but ultimately uses these examples to argue for a version of the Correlation Claim,
despite the fact that many of the scientists cited by Clayton—Francis Crick, Christoph
Koch, Gerald Edelman, Giulio Tononi, Bernard Baars, and Wolf Singer—would contest
the Correlation Claim. “Research into the neural correlates of consciousness—one of the
most fruitful areas in the study of consciousness today—can offer no more than its name
promises. At most one will be able to establish a series of correlations between brain
states and phenomenal experiences as reported by subjects.” 28 In terms of consciousness,
Clayton appeals to Frank Jackson and David Chalmers in defending his emergentist
account of the human mind.
Chalmers’s own answer to the problem of consciousness…whatever other
inadequacies it may have—does seek to explain what is different about the
experiential states that persons have. What he elsewhere calls ‘naturalistic
dualism’ is the right sort of answer to the hard problem. 29
Elsewhere, Clayton appeals to multiple realizability to argue against a type identity
understanding of mind:
The fact of multiple realizability weakens the claim that mental properties
are really of the same type as physical properties, a ‘type-identity’ theories
hold. Thus pain is a different type of property than the chemical properties
of a given neuronal synapse. 30
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Somewhat incredibly, Clayton merely cites these canonical anti-brain arguments in the
philosophy of mind and his work makes no contact with the fairly substantial critical
literature that these arguments have generated. As Chapter One already discussed,
arguments from consciousness and multiple realizability do not succeed. They are not
arguments about the current status of science; they are principled arguments against the
explanatory significance of neuroscience. Chapter One has given us every reason to be
skeptical of anti-naturalist arguments based on both consciousness and multiple
realizability.
Clayton’s account of mental causation runs into even more serious difficulties.
Clayton wants to save mental causation and avoid epiphenomenalism. He claims that his
version of strong emergence is the only alternative that avoids epiphenomenalism.
Somewhat oddly, Clayton defends the Jackson-Chalmers line on consciousness, but
Jackson and Chalmers both recognize that their positions entail or come close to a form
of epiphenomenalism. Jackson’s first article containing the Mary thought experiment is
significantly entitled “epiphenominal qualia.” Chalmers also is a dualist only about
qualia, and explicitly rejects interactionist forms of property dualism when he writes:
“Interactionist dualism requires that physics will turn out to have gaps that can be filled
by the action of a nonphysical mind. Current evidence suggests that this is unlikely.” 31
The view that only strong emergence is the only way one can account for mental
causation is surely an idiosyncratic view. Indeed, philosophers such as David Papineau
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and Jaegwon Kim have argued that given the causal closure of the physical—it is
physicalism that can account for mental causation and jettison epiphenomenalism.
Epiphenomenalism is a form of dualism not materialism. The naturalist can regard
consciousness as robustly causal—indeed it would be odd if it were not causal. As David
Papineau has observed, “If epiphenomenalism were true, then the relation between mind
and brain would be like nothing else in nature. After all, science recognizes no other
examples of ‘causal danglers,’ ontologically independent states with causes but no
effects.” 32
Clayton’s Move from Emergentism to Dualist Theism
There are thus deep problems with Clayton’s emergentist account of mind. Even
more serious difficulties occur as Clayton attempts to move from this emergentist account
of mind to a dualist version of theism. Clayton attempts to move from emergence to
transcendent dualism by arguing that there are things that even an emergenist account of
the human person cannot explain.
The theistic emergentist…argues that the thought and action of homo
sapiens (among other phenomena) confront us with certain predicates,
qualities, and beliefs that are anomalous from the standpoint of natural
law. Explaining these qualities and assessing the truth of these beliefs sets
in motion an explanatory chain that eventually leads outside of natural
science, and thus beyond the theoretical resources of emergence
theory….The theistic account concludes to a conscious intentional being
or force that preceded the evolutionary process and whose creative
intentions led, however, indirectly, to the emergence of intelligent life. 33
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What sorts of phenomena? In Mind and Emergence, Clayton highlights human
rationality, the fact that human beings can form true beliefs about the world. “As
reasoning agents we presuppose a fit between our beliefs and the external world. What
must we postulate if we are to make sense of this core presupposition of human
reason?” 34 Following a line of arguments developed by Alvin Plantinga, Clayton argues
that theism is able to account for this aspect of human experience:
Plantinga’s broader philosophical project involves an additional claim: we
do not finally have reason to trust the deliverances of our reason unless we
postulate a self-conscious, rational creator who is benevolently disposed
towards humanity, that is, one who intends for humans to form true beliefs
and who creates them and the world such that, at least in most cases, this
goal will be fulfilled. It is not enough that we postulate that we are
epistemically ‘at home in the universe,’ as Nagel writes, we must actually
be at home in the universe. And this will only be the case if the rational fit
between mind and world was intentionally created. 35
Clayton is referring to Plantinga’s “evolutionary argument against naturalism.” The point
of this argument is that evolutionary theory leads to skepticism regarding our ability to
form true beliefs and thus undercuts the doctrine of naturalism. Because evolution is
concerned with survival rather than truth, we cannot be in a position to know whether
naturalism is true. This skeptical problem does not occur, however, when evolution is
linked with theism. Plantinga, himself, presents the argument in the following manner:
Now according to traditional Christian (and Jewish and Muslim) thought,
we human beings have been created in the image of God. This means,
among other things, that God created us with the capacity for achieving
knowledge—knowledge of our environment by way of perception, of other
people by way of something like what Thomas Reid called sympathy, of
the past by memory and testimony, of mathematics and logics by reason,
34
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of morality, of our own mental life, of God himself, and much more. And
the above evolutionary account of our origins is compatible with the
theistic view that God has created us in his image. So evolutionary theory
taken by itself (without the patina of philosophical naturalism that often
accompanies expositions of it) is not as such in tension with the idea that
God has created us and our cognitive faculties in such a way that the later
are reliable, that (as the medieval liked to say), there is an adequation of
intellect to reality.
But if naturalism is true, there is no God, and hence no God (or
anyone else) overseeing our development and orchestrating the course of
our evolution. And this leads directly to the question whether it is at all
likely that our cognitive faculties, given naturalism and given their
evolutionary origin would have developed in such a way as to be reliable,
to furnish us with most true beliefs. 36
Plantinga’s argument offers a critique of naturalism on the basis of evolution and
also proposes a theistic solution to the problem. Both the critique of naturalism and the
theistic solution are not compelling. His argument fails to distinguish different kinds of
cognition generated by evolution and how they may or may not be reliable. In particular,
in order to undercut naturalism, Plantinga needs to show how scientific beliefs are
unreliable. This would require a critique of the rudimentary forms of cognition that
provide the platform for scientific beliefs as well as the actual methods and practices of
science that refine and hone such beliefs. The naturalist may well be skeptical of the truth
value of many kinds of human belief; she is committed only to the reliability of a certain
set of scientific and philosophical beliefs. Further, in terms of the relationship between
evolution and the formation of true beliefs, Plantinga overlooks the very real ways in
which survival and truth can be linked. The two notions are not necessarily at
loggerheads. After all, an organism that failed to represent its environment accurately
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would not be expected to be around for long. In discussing the relationship of survival
and truth in evolution, William Ramsey draws an analogy with camouflage:
Having a good camouflage is often a key adaptive feature that is favored
by natural selection. However, since the quality of a given camouflage
depends, in part, on the environment, a good camouflage does not
supervene on an organism’s intrinsic physical makeup. This is a fairly
common case where a non-supervening property (having a good
camouflage) enhances a creature’s reproductive fitness and, hence,
becomes a property for which there is considerable selection pressure. The
irreducibility of a good camouflage in no way undermines its central
importance to natural selection.
What all of this suggests is that there is a perfectly plausible way
for truth to be a property that, although irreducible, is nevertheless favored
by natural selection. Indeed, since some naturalists characterize beliefs as
the “maps by which we steer,” a slight modification of our earlier example
shows us exactly how this would work. Suppose we have ten creatures
competing for a scarce resource such as food, and suppose that only one of
these creatures (Bob) possesses accurate beliefs concerning the
whereabouts of the food. If all we want is an explanation of Bob’s
immediate motor behavior, then we need not appeal to the truth or
falsehood of any of his beliefs. But if we want to know why Bob’s
behavior proves successful while his cohorts die out, then it clearly does
matter that his behavior is generated by true beliefs.…Hence, truth and
reliability are exactly the sort of features for which there can indeed be
considerable selection pressure. 37
Plantinga overlooks how truth can be adaptively significant and overlooks the difference
between the claim that some of our beliefs may be unreliable and the claim that all our
beliefs—including scientific beliefs—are unreliable.
In fact, there is indeed good evidence that some of our beliefs are unreliable, but
this creates a problem for the theist and not the naturalist. 38 Claims about physical design
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provide an apt analogy. In such cases, claims about God as an intelligent designer are
undercut by obvious design flaws in nature. Evolution is a mixed bag, and our evolved
beliefs are a mixed bag as well. This mixed bag is exactly what one would expect from a
naturalistic perspective. However, the theist argues that God has designed us to acquire
true beliefs, surely the prevalence of false beliefs are an embarrassment to the theist not
to the naturalist. There is also the issue of alternative religious epistemologies. The
monotheistic solution that Plantinga offers is but one account; why assume that this
account is the accurate account? Why should one appeal to Plantinga’s Christian account
of knowledge rather than say a Hindu account or Buddhist account?
There are significant issues with Plantinga’s argument; however, even more
problems occur in Clayton’s appropriation of Plantinga’s argument. In the evolutionary
argument against naturalism, Plantinga is coy about his own beliefs about evolution and
simply assumes evolution and theism are compatible. Plantinga, in fact, rejects
evolutionary theory and also defends a robust version of substance dualism. In other
places, Plantinga makes it clear that evolution and theism make strange bedfellows.
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he faces additional challenges that Plantinga is able to avoid. If evolution does have a
tendency to produce unreliable beliefs, as Plantinga claims, how does God ensure the
production of true beliefs throughout the evolutionary process? Indeed, why would God
choose to create in this manner in the first place? Further, given Clayton’s confidence in
evolutionary-emergentist explanation, what reason do we have for thinking that such a
framework could not account for our ability to form true beliefs?
In short, Plantinga’s argument is problematic on its own, but it becomes even
more problematic given Clayton’s assumptions about evolution and emergence. Strong
emergentism understands mind as “of a piece” with the natural world, and, this move can
be understood as undercutting theism as Clayton himself acknowledges. Recall his
quotation:
[T]he case for emergent mental causation is not by itself a case for the
existence of God, divine action, an eternal soul, or life after death; it is not
directly a theological conclusion at all. Indeed, in some ways it might
seem to be an anti-theological conclusion, because it understands mental
phenomena to be “of a piece” with physical phenomena, and because the
supervenience relationship asserts a dependence of the mental life on its
physical basis—indeed a high correlation between physical causes and
mental effects—which is on the surface inconsistent with many parts of
Christian teaching. 40
Given this, the bar is certainly high for a move to theistic dualism, but, for the reasons
discussed above, Clayton’s appropriation of Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against
naturalism is simply not compelling.
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Experiential Religious Dualism: B. Alan Wallace
We have been addressing the implications of the scientific image of persons on
religion. Discussion thus far has centered on the link between dualism and theism in the
context of the Christian tradition. Christianity has figured particularly prominently in
discussions of religion and science, to the point where discussions of “Christianity and
science” are seen as synonymous with discussions of “religion and science.” Due to its
radically different ontological vision and its typically pragmatic focus, the dialogue
between Buddhism and science occurs on terms very different from those that define the
Christianity and science dialogue.
Because Christianity has largely set the terms for religion and science discussions
in the West, Buddhism has proved intriguing for some Western scientists and
philosophers given its non theistic vision, radically different understanding of the self,
methods for exploring consciousness, and ethical and transformative concerns.
Philosopher of mind Owen Flanagan captures this general enthusiasm when he writes:
But it is worth pausing to reflect on the apparent accident that Buddhism,
almost alone among the great ethical and metaphysical traditions, holds to
a picture of persons that is uniquely suited to the way science says we
ought to see ourselves and our place in the world. 41
Indeed one might get the impression from such a quotation that Buddhism
amounts to a kind of paleo-naturalism; however, as much as Christianity, Buddhism is
fueled by a comprehensive soteriological and eschatological vision and this vision
implies a certain ontology. God and soul do not figure in this ontological vision, but
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immaterial consciousness does. As the fourteenth Dalai Lama has written recently in his
book promoting “the convergence of science and spirituality”:
There is no reason to believe that the innate mind, the very essential
luminous nature of awareness has neural correlates, because it is not
physical, not contingent upon the brain…I feel that on a more subtle level
of consciousness, brain and mind are two separate entities. 42
A Buddhist programme for religion and science has been outlined in recent works
by one of the Dalai Lama’s translators, the American Buddhologist, B. Alan Wallace.
While Christian theological discussions of religion and science tend to take the doctrinal
dimension as their starting point, Wallace’s approach centers around the experiential and
ethical dimensions of religion. But the experiential and ethical dimensions of religion are
not separate from metaphysical questions about what exists in Wallace’s thought; rather,
it is precisely through experiential-ethical practices that one discovers the deepest truths
about the nature of conscious mind. In particular, a notion of immaterial consciousness is
central in Wallace’s understanding of Buddhism, and Wallace’s Buddhist approach bears
interesting affinities with classical theistic dualism in its critique of naturalism and its
conviction that the origin of the psyche cannot be found in the brain.
In classical theism, immaterial consciousness is discussed in reference to God and
the soul. Wallace’s thought, true to its Buddhist roots, focuses neither on God nor the
soul, but does argue that a notion of immaterial consciousness is central to secure key
Buddhist beliefs:
While all Buddhist schools refute the existence of an immutable, unitary,
independent self, this does not mean that there is no continuity of an
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individual stream of consciousness after death. Indeed, this seems to be
indispensible if Buddhists are to accept the theory of karma and
reincarnation taught in the Pali Canon, which also refers to the existence
of an intermediate phase of conscious experience following death and
prior to one’s next incarnation. 43
Wallace also argues that this immaterial form of consciousness—known as substrate
consciousness—is discoverable through meditative experience:
[T]he hypothesis of the substrate consciousness rejects both Cartesian
dualism…and the belief that the universe is exclusively physical.
Moreover, it may be put to the test of experience, regardless of one’s
ideological commitments and theoretical assumptions. 44
As the above quotation illustrates, there are very significant methodological differences
in the arguments of the classical theists and in the arguments of Wallace. Classical theists
tend to focus on the doctrinal aspects of religion and attempt to secure Christian doctrinal
claims by means of theological and philosophical arguments. Wallace’s approach places
much more emphasis on the role of experience. Wallace calls his approach,
“contemplative science,” and he views it as a kind of via media between doctrinal
religion and materialist science.
The human mind cannot be thoroughly comprehended only through the
scientific examination of the brain and behavior; the human soul cannot be
fathomed only on the basis of divine revelation. Science is not equipped to
explore the spiritual dimensions of existence, for its tools have been
designed to measure physical processes. Science and religion may yet
prove to be complementary, but only if adherents of both return to the
primacy of experience. 45
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A central claim in Wallace’s thought is that the West has not developed an
adequate science of consciousness largely because it views consciousness through the
cramped optics of scientific materialism:
[T]he West presently has no pure science of consciousness that reveals the
nature, origins, and potentials of this natural phenomenon, and it similarly
lacks an applied science of consciousness that reveals means for refining
and enhancing consciousness and thereby achieving eudaimonia. But this
does not necessarily imply that all other human civilizations throughout
history have been equally deficient. 46
The issue of the origin of the psyche is a central focus in Wallace’s contemplative
science project, especially the claim that the mind cannot be identified with the brain.
Wallace offers both positive and negative arguments concerning the origin of the psyche.
This section examines and critiques these arguments.
Wallace’s Negative Arguments about Naturalism and
a Naturalistic Explanation of Consciousness
Much of Wallace’s work is premised on the notion that scientific naturalism or
materialism cannot adequately account for the emergence and existence of the conscious
mind. Scientific materialism is in fact a “dogma” that obscures and prevents the
development of an authentic science of consciousness. 47 Wallace understands scientific
materialism in light of five central notions: objectivism, reductionism, the closure
principle, monism, and physicalism. 48 The principle of objectivism requires that science
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deal with empirical facts that are testable by empirical methods and verifiable by thirdperson means. The closure principle holds that the physical world is causally closed:
there are no causes other than physical causes. Monism, reductionism, and physicalism
are closely related: reality is composed of fundamental stuff—i.e., the stuff defined by
physics and macro-phenomena can be understood in light of the causal work being done
at lower levels.
However successful these principles might have been in launching modern
science, Wallace argues that they have been disastrous for the study of mind because they
entirely omit a first-person subjective perspective and lead people to believe that the
brain is the exclusive origin of the conscious mind.
Are the methods devised for the study of objective, physical phenomena
sufficient for the scientific study of subjective, mental phenomena? At this
point, all answers are expressions of faith, for it is obvious that physical
and biological sciences have not yet comprehensively explained the
origins, nature, or causal efficacy of consciousness or any other mental
phenomenon. Great advances have been made recently in discovering the
neural correlates of an increasing range of mental processes, but none of
these explains the “hard problem” of how these physical events give rise
to subjective experience. But there are compelling reasons for skepticism
about the neurobiological reduction of the mind to the brain. 49
Wallace’s negative arguments mirror anti-naturalist arguments that have been
discussed throughout the dissertation. The “compelling reasons for skepticism” amount to
an assertion of the Correlation Claim regarding the relationship between mind and brain.
In light of the arguments developed thus far in this dissertation, such skepticism is
misplaced. We should be skeptical of principled arguments against the bio-psychological
explanation of consciousness, not of the nascent science of the mind-brain. Wallace
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repeatedly claims that there is no explanation of the hard problem of consciousness, and
this is true to a point, but Wallace must establish that there cannot in principle be a
naturalistic solution to the hard problem, and surely this is an imprudent move given the
relative youth of both neuroscience and consciousness studies and given the resources
naturalism has for explaining subjectivity.
Brain-consciousness science is not a completed science. Neuroscience itself is an
incredibly young discipline. The neuron doctrine was established a mere century ago.
Serious scientific research on consciousness is less than two decades old and still in a
pre-paradigmatic phase. Given these factors it is hardly surprising that there is no solution
to the hard problem currently available. Is Wallace really ready to assert that we cannot
have a bio-psychological explanation of consciousness at this early stage of
consciousness research? There is a massive amount of evidence from the history of
science that is a very unwise choice. Chapter One spent an extensive amount of time with
the most philosophical rigorous claims that consciousness could never be explained in
terms of brain processes: they simply are not compelling. They assume that our concepts
of both consciousness and the brain are fixed; however, given the youth of neuroscience
and the infancy of scientific work on consciousness, this is not a particularly prudent
judgment.
Wallace also presents a rather monolithic analysis of naturalism and
underestimates the degree to which naturalism can accommodate subjectivity. Wallace’s
thinking is mired in the same kind of dichotomous thinking that has been critiqued
throughout this dissertation. Wallace seems to equate naturalism or materialism with the
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view that only objective physical facts exist; he opposes this with the dualist view that
there are objective physical facts and subjective nonphysical facts. However, explaining
away consciousness or placing it outside the physical world are not the only options. A
robustly naturalistic perspective can accommodate both objective physical facts and
subjective physical facts. Subjective physical facts are objective physical facts
experienced “from the inside” with the characteristics of transparency and
perspectivalness. Wallace does not discuss the range of positions open to the naturalist
nor does he consider in detail any scientific approach to consciousness or the
considerable scientific problems dualism generates.
In the position of this dissertation, the brain-consciousness problem is epistemic
and not metaphysical. Conscious mental states can be understood in terms of objective
physical facts and subjective physical facts. Subjective physical facts are not facts that
hover somehow “over and above” objective physical facts. They are epistemologically
novel, but not ontologically novel. They are objective physical facts viewed from a
transparent, first person perspective. Consciousness and the conscious self are virtual
realities created by the brain. Such a position forms the hard core of a scientific research
program and takes subjectivity seriously while cohering better with established scientific
knowledge about the world. Such a position may in fact turn out to be wrong empirically,
but it is surely too early to determine that, and principled arguments that resist the claim
that the mind can be explained in terms of the brain simply are not compelling.
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Wallace’s Case for Buddhist Religious Dualism
Wallace’s arguments about consciousness go far beyond negative property dualist
arguments about the irreducibility of conscious mental properties. He makes very robust
metaphysical claims about the nature of substrate consciousness. Wallace’s skepticism
about the scientific study of consciousness is matched by a confidence about Buddhist
claims regarding the substrate consciousness. Wallace argues that fundamental truths
about the nature and origin of consciousness can be uncovered through meditative
practice. Buddhist thought understands mental activity (Pali: javana; Sanskrit: chitta) as
grounded in a more fundamental ground state of consciousness known as the ground of
becoming (bhavanga) in early Theravada Buddhism and as substrate consciousness
(alayavijnana), in the Great Perfection (Dzogchen) school of Tibetan Buddhism. This is
the individual stream of consciousness that carries on from one lifetime to the next.
Buddhists describe its fundamental characteristics as luminosity and cognizance. Thus in
human being’s consciousness is related to brains and bodies, but it emerges from the
substrate consciousness. According to the Great Perfection tradition of Buddhism, this
ground state of consciousness is normally inaccessible, as it is manifested mainly in deep
sleep. However, with the cultivation of Buddhist meditative practice or samadhi, the
substrate consciousness can be actively experienced.
Buddhist contemplatives claim that with the achievement of a highly
advanced degree of samadhi known as samatha or meditative
quiescence, one gains experiential access to the relative ground state of
consciousness known in the Great Perfection (Dzogchen) school of
Tibetan Buddhism as the “substrate consciousness (alayavijnana). This,
they claim, is the individual stream of consciousness from which the
psyche and all the physical senses emerge. According to their findings, the
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psyche is conditioned by the body and its physical interaction with the
environment, but it emerges from the substrate consciousness. 50
This state of meditative quiescence is not simply a powerful experience, it discloses the
fundamental nature of consciousness, most importantly, the notion that “consciousness
can only come from consciousness”:
Contemplatives who have explored this immaterial dimension of reality
have discovered a principle of conservation of consciousness that
manifests in every moment of experience. No constituents of the body—in
the brain or elsewhere—transform into mental states and processes. Such
subjective experiences do not emerge from the body, but neither do they
emerge from nothing. Rather, all objective mental appearances arise from
the substrate, and all subjective mental states and processes arise from the
substrate consciousness. 51
While substrate consciousness is clearly a notion of immaterial mind, Wallace is careful
to distinguish it from the notion of soul:
While this description of the substrate consciousness may appear to be a
Buddhist version of an immaterial soul, it is important to note the
differences between this experientially based account and various
philosophical and theological speculations about the soul. Contemplatives
who have achieved samatha commonly depict this dimension of
consciousness as a stream of arising and passing moments of awareness,
so it is not a single entity persisting through time, nor is it unchanging.
Moreover, it influences the psyche and is conditioned by physical and
mental events, so it is not independent. 52
In turn, the individual stream that is substrate consciousness is grounded in yet a third
dimension of consciousness, primordial consciousness (jnana) or the Buddha-nature. As
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the psyche emerges from substrate consciousness, so all streams of substrate
consciousness originate from primordial consciousness.
This is regarded in the Mahayana Buddhist tradition as the ultimate
ground state of consciousness….The realization of this state of
consciousness is said to yield a state of well-being that represents the
culmination of the Buddhist pursuit of eudaimonic well-being, knowledge,
and virtue. With such insight, it is said that one comes to understand not
only the nature of consciousness but its relation to reality as a
whole.…The substrate consciousness can allegedly be ascertained with the
achievement of the advanced states of Samadhi, whereas primordial
consciousness can be realized only through the cultivation of
contemplative insight (vipashyana). Thus, Buddhism postulates this
dimension of awareness not as a mystical theology, but as a hypothesis
that can be put to the test of immediate experience through advanced
contemplative training open to anyone, without a leap of faith that violates
reason. 53
Thus meditative practice is seen as providing not only experiential-ethical transformation
but insight into the nature of consciousness itself. Wallace claims that this experience is
open to all who engage in meditative practice, thus it can be put to the test of experience.
He also points to cross-cultural and interreligious convergence regarding contemplativemystical experience:
There are many important differences between Buddhist and Christian
theories of consciousness, and between scientific and contemplative
theories of space. But in the midst of these doctrinal and theoretical
differences, there may be a hidden ground on which these diverse
traditions ultimately converge. If so, I believe they are converging on the
most important truth that can be known and experienced. 54
Wallace holds that different religious traditions share a mystical-contemplativeexperiential core, and that this experiential core yields insight into “the most important
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truth that can be known and experienced.” A great deal of Wallace’s thought sounds like
a version of perennial philosophy that sees all religions united around a common
mystical-contemplative core. Wallace himself makes this association at one point in his
writings:
This integrative view, asserting a common ground to some of the deepest
contemplative insights of diverse traditions despite the differences in their
institutional doctrines, has come to be known in modern times as the
perennial philosophy. Under the domination of so much postmodern
thinking in the current academic study of religion, this is presently not in
vogue, but it has been endorsed to varying degrees by many influential
religious scholars, including William James, Rudolf Otto, Aldous Huxley,
Ninian Smart, Huston Smith, and Robert Forman.
Over the centuries, Buddhism, like Christianity, has produced a
rich diversity of ways of viewing ultimate reality, the phenomenal world,
and human nature. But there may be a luminous common ground in their
deepest contemplative insights that is temporarily veiled by the biases and
obscurations of the human mind. 55
An important question for perennial philosophy is what “the most important
truth” or “luminous common ground” consists in. Perennialists typically hold that
different religious traditions share a core common experience that transcends the
doctrinal particularities of individual religious traditions. Wallace here makes somewhat
of a different claim. He affirms a “luminous common ground” shared between diverse
religious traditions, but links this common ground specifically to Buddhist claims
regarding the substrate consciousness. In other words, he offers an affirmation of
universal mystical-contemplative experience, but links this experience with highly
particular Buddhist beliefs. Wallace claims this experience of the substrate consciousness
includes the experiential verification of Buddhist beliefs regarding karmic rebirth. “Belief
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in reincarnation is prevalent in all schools of Buddhism, initially stemming from the
Buddha’s experience of enlightenment….This contemplative discovery of the existence
of past lives has allegedly been replicated by many generations of Buddhist meditators
who have developed samadhi and used it to explore the nature of origins of
consciousness.” 56 Wallace also argues that claims regarding reincarnation are amendable
to scientific research:
While Christian and materialist beliefs regarding what happens at death
remain largely unquestioned within their respective communities, theories
of reincarnation do lend themselves to experiential investigation and
rational analysis. Over the part forty years, scientists have identified and
studied several thousand cases of young children from all over the world
who have accurately reported alleged memories of their past lives. The
late Ian Stevenson, professor emeritus of psychiatry and the former
director of Personality Studies at the University of Virginia, pioneered this
line of research and wrote extensively on it….More scientifically
compelling evidence comes from the field of “near death” and “out-ofbody-experiences.” 57
Wallace’s contemplative science project contains a number of claims about
meditation and meditative experience. Indeed claims about meditative practice and
experience are at the crux of the Buddhism-mind science dialogue. A firestorm erupted
over the invitation of the Dalai Lama to speak at the 2005 meeting of the Society of
Neuroscience. Was the Dalai Lama discussing a technique with certain empirically
assessable physical and mental health benefits, or was he rather offering a tacit form of
Buddhist apologetics? These same sorts of ambiguities occur throughout the writings of
Wallace, and an analysis of the Buddhism-mind science dialogue involves sorting out and
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analyzing various claims regarding Buddhist meditation and experience. The
complexities involved in making sense of claims regarding meditation in the Buddhismmind science are described well by Donald Lopez:
The claim here is that Buddhist meditation works. However, in order to
understand the laboratory findings, such a claim requires that one first
identify what is Buddhist about this meditation, describe what the term
meditation encompasses in this case, and explain what works means,
especially in the context of the exalted goals that have traditionally been
ascribed to Buddhist practice. Although these goals are numerous and
variously articulated across the tradition, it can be said that their ultimate
aim is not self-help but a radical reorientation toward the world—and in
many articulations, a liberation from it—either for oneself or for all
beings. 58
Wallace’s writings contain a number of claims regarding meditation. Proper
analysis of Wallace’s work involves differentiating the numerous claims he makes about
meditation and meditative experience. There are at least seven different claims regarding
Buddhist meditation within Wallace’s writing: (1) Meditative techniques have physical
and mental health benefits; (2) Meditative techniques have moral benefits; (3) Meditative
techniques can be used by all regardless of their cultural and religious background; (4)
Contemplative/meditative experiences have interreligious and cross-cultural similarities;
(5) Meditation shows that consciousness is nonphysical; (6) Meditative practice and
experience is the best way to bridge the concepts of religion and science; (7) Meditation
shows that the claims of Tibetan Buddhism concerning the substrate consciousness are
true.
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There is nothing, in principle that a naturalist would object to in the first four
claims, significant objections can be raised about the last three claims, however.
One very important claim that Wallace makes with regard to philosophy of mind is the
claim that that meditative experience reveals consciousness to be immaterial.
Certainly, the prior arguments of this dissertation would caution against a premature
move from the introspective experience of consciousness to metaphysical claims about
the nonphysical nature of consciousness. Conscious experience may certainly seem to be
nonphysical, but that doesn’t mean that it is nonphysical, and there are good scientific
and philosophical reasons for thinking that consciousness is physical. Dualism does not
cohere well with the findings of physics, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience, and
positive arguments for dualism fail.
Moreover, as Chapter Two argued, the sense that consciousness does not seem to
be physical can be accounted for in completely naturalistic terms. There are a number of
neurological and psychological factors that bias human beings toward dualistic thinking.
Neurologically, we do not see brain activity when we are thinking, nor do we sense the
brain. Further, the brain does not appear in our conscious thought; all of our experience is
“out-of-brain” experience, but that does not mean that it is literally out of the brain. If the
claims of Antti Revonsuo, Thomas Metzinger, and Olaf Blanke are correct, the virtual
experience of being “outside our brains” and even “outside our bodies” is entirely
amenable to scientific study. Earlier sections in Chapter Two explored how psychological
factors also contribute to a dualist bias. We have two separate psychological systems for
navigating the physical world and social world. One by-product of these evolutionary
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adaptations is that they predispose us to think of the world in terms of body and soul.
Death also places impossible constraints on our theory of mind: we cannot know what it
is “like” to be dead, i.e., consciously simulate a permanent state of unconsciousness.
This coupled with the fact that some mental states are easier to imagine the absence of
than others, dispose us to strongly dualist afterlife beliefs and to represent dead agents’
minds in certain ways. The notion of minds enjoying an intermediate state between
rebirths would seem to fit nicely into this framework.
Contemporary scientific research tells us that we have a predisposition to dualist
thought. A separate strand of psychological research pioneered by Richard Nesbitt,
Timothy Wilson, and Daniel Wegner points to the fallibility of a number of our common
sense introspective judgments. Given this research, plus the enormous philosophical and
scientific problems associated with dualism, claims that consciousness introspection
resolve the mind-body problem in favor of dualism should be greeted with a certain
amount of suspicion. Such research cautions against a slide from folk phenomenology
and folk psychology to metaphysical claims about dualism. If this is true of ordinary
states of consciousness, it certainly should be true of altered states of consciousness,
however profound.
Wallace also makes a number of thick claims regarding contemplative-meditative
experience. In his writing on contemplative and meditative practices, Wallace links four
important claims: (1) that the experiential dimension and the mystical-contemplative
strands of the world’s religious traditions represent these traditions at their most
authentic; (2) that mystical-contemplative experiences provide a common ground
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between different religious traditions; (3) that these experiences are metaphysically
significant in that they are disclosive of a transcendent immaterial reality; and (4) that this
reality is in fact the substrate consciousness described in Tibetan Buddhism.
One very common conception of religion in the West today locates the essence of
religion in an experiential core and sees this experiential core as something shared across
diverse religious traditions. This view is frequently referred to as the Perennial
Philosophy, following Aldous Huxley’s book by that name. The claims of Perennial
Philosophy can be understood both descriptively and normatively. The descriptive claim
is that (some) religions locate the essence of religion in experience. The normative claim
is the claim that an experiential focus provides the most adequate approach to the study
of religion (or religion and science). There are reasons to be skeptical of both the
descriptive and normative claims of Perennial Philosophy.
History provides one reason for skepticism regarding the descriptive claims of
Perennial Philosophy. A cursory glance at the history of Christianity provides an
example. While there is a very significant strand of neo-platonic mysticism in
Christianity, the tradition also contains a long-standing suspicion of religious and
mystical experience that stretches from Paul to Martin Luther to the twentieth century
Protestant theologian Karl Barth and his followers. Even where the mystical-experiential
element of religion is affirmed (e.g., in Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism) it is
typically regarded as a divine gift limited to a select few. Further, such traditions have
constantly stressed the content (i.e., the Christocentric nature) of even the most apophatic
forms of Christian mysticism.
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Recent historical analyses of religious experience by Wayne Proudfoot, Robert
Sharf and others argue that it is in the context of modernity that claims about religious
experience become elevated. 59 Experience rises to prominence as a result of modern
scientific, historical, and cultural challenges to theology and the study of religion more
generally. By locating the essence of religion in experience—as opposed to scripture or
doctrine—theologians could evade the corrosive effects of modern historical and
scientific inquiry:
By emphasizing the experiential dimension of religion—a dimension
inaccessible to strictly objective modes of inquiry—the theologian could
forestall scientific critique. Religious truth claims were not understood as
pertaining to the objective or material world, which was the proper domain
of science, but to the inner spiritual world, for which the scientific method
was deemed inappropriate… 60
The notion that all religions shared a common experiential core also provided an apt
solution to an increasing awareness of cultural pluralism:
By the twentieth century it had become difficult for Christian theologians
to simply ignore the existence of non-Christian traditions, much less to
smugly assert Christian superiority. But to take other traditions seriously
entailed the risk of rendering Christianity merely one of several competing
systems of belief. In privileging religious experience, theologians could
argue that all religious traditions emerged from, and were attempts to give
expression to, an apprehension of the divine or the ultimate. Differences in
doctrine and forms of worship are to be expected due to vast differences in
linguistic, social, and cultural conditions. What is key, however, is that as
a response to a fundamentally human (and thus pancultural and
ahistorical) sense of the transcendent, all religions could lay some claim to
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truth. This allowed Christian theologians to affirm the validity of Christian
revelation without necessarily impugning their non-Christian rivals. 61
The historical, social, and natural sciences presented a challenge not only to
Christian theology, but to the academic study of religion more generally. If religion was
something that could be studied historically, socially, psychologically, and biologically,
why was there a need for a separate discipline of “religious studies”? Many scholars of
religion justified the existence of their discipline precisely through appeal to the sui
generis character of religious experience. As Sharf notes, “By construing religion as
pertaining to a distinct mode of ‘experience,’ the scholar of religion could argue that it
ultimately eludes the grasp of more empirically oriented disciplines.” 62
This genealogy of the notion of religious experience does not rule out that claim
that experience may be a fruitful approach to the study of religion in the present, but it
does caution against an anachronistic reading of premodern religious traditions. Here one
might raise the objection that while the “turn to experience” may be relatively recent in
the West, meditative-contemplative experience looms much larger in Eastern traditions
like Hinduism and Buddhism. Indeed, these are precisely the claims that Wallace seems
to be making with regard to Buddhism. In light of this, it is certainly significant that a
number of Buddhologists caution against such a reading of premodern Eastern traditions.
Referring specifically to the issue of meditation, Donald Lopez notes:
It is useful to recall that the vast majority of Buddhists over the course of
Asian history have not practiced meditation. It has traditionally been
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regarded as something that monks do, indeed that only some monks do;
the monastic codes make repeated reference to the needs of meditating
monks, suggesting that they represented a group of specialists within the
monastic order….In the Theravada cultures of Sri Lanka and Southeast
Asia, there has been a long tradition of dividing monastic practice into two
categories: the vocation of texts and the vocation of meditation. In
commentaries dating from as early as the fifth century, a preference was
expressed for the former….And there are major forms of Buddhism, most
notably the Pure Land traditions, in which the practice of meditation does
not play a central role at any state of the path… 63
In a series of provocative articles, Robert Sharf has argued that this focus on
experience in the modern West greatly influenced the reading of Eastern religious
traditions as grounded in experience from their inception. He cautions against reading
premodern Buddhist texts as exalting personal experience.
The notion that Asian religions are more experientially rooted than their
Western counterparts is one of those truisms so widely and
unquestioningly held that corroboration of any kind is deemed
superfluous. But when we turn to premodern Asian sources, the evidence
is ambiguous at best. Take, for example, the many important Buddhist
exegetical works that delineate the Buddhist marga or “path to
liberation”…These texts are frequently construed as descriptive accounts
of meditative states based on the personal experiences of accomplished
adepts. Yet rarely if ever do the authors of these compendiums claim to
base their expositions on their own experience. On the contrary, the
authority of exegetes such as Kamalasila, Buddhaghosa, and Chih-i lay not
in their access to exalted spiritual states but in their mastery of, and
rigorous adherence to, sacred scripture. 64
Sharf also cautions against too close a link between meditation and personal experience:
The notion that meditation is central to Asian religious praxis might seem
to support the thesis that Asian traditions exalt personal experience. But
here too we must be cautious: contemporary accounts of Asian meditation
typically presume that they are oriented toward meditative experience, and
thus such accounts must be used with considerable caution. Besides, while
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meditation may have been esteemed in theory, it did not occupy the
dominant role in monastic and ascetic life that is sometimes supposed.
(This point is often overlooked by scholars who fail to distinguish between
prescriptive and descriptive accounts.) Even when practiced, it is by no
means obvious that traditional forms of meditation were oriented toward
the attainment of “extraordinary states of consciousness.” Meditation was
first and foremost a means of eliminating defilement, accumulating merit
and supernatural power, invoking apotropaic deities, and so forth. This is
not to deny that religious practitioners had experiences in the course of
their training, just that such experiences were not considered the goal of
practice, were not deemed doctrinally authoritative, and did not serve as
the reference points for their understanding of the path. 65
The elevation of personal experience in fact happens through Eastern scholars thoroughly
immersed in Western thought:
The valorization of experience in Asian thought can be traced to a handful
of twentieth-century Asian religious leaders and apologists, all of whom
were in sustained dialogue with their intellectual counterparts in the West.
For example, the notion that personal experience constitutes the heart of
the Hindu tradition originated with the prolific philosopher and statesman
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. Like his European and American predecessors,
Radhakrishnan argued that “if philosophy of religion is to become
scientific, it must become empirical and found itself on religious
experience” and “it is not true religion unless it eases to be a traditional
view and becomes personal experience. 66
There are philosophical as well as historical issues with the modern turn to
religious experience. The modern turn to experience typically involves claims that
religious traditions share experiential “luminous common ground” despite their
significant doctrinal and cultural differences. In the twentieth century, this view came to
be known as the perennial philosophy. The rendering of experience in perennial
philosophy is deeply problematic and has come under much fire as the result of
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developments in twentieth century thought. As Sharf and other have noted, the rendering
of experience in perennial philosophy rests upon patently Cartesian assumptions:
The notion that the referent of the term “experience” is self-evident
betrays a set of specifically Cartesian assumptions, according to which
experience is held to be immediately present to consciousness….The
rhetoric of religious experience, predicated as it is on Cartesian dualism,
allowed scholars to distinguish the universal experiential ground of
religion on the one hand, and its diverse culturally bound manifestations
on the other, created an opposition that recapitulates the classical
Cartesian bifurcation of mind and matter. 67
Twentieth century thought called attention to the cultural-linguistic mediation of
thought and experience, and scholars advocating constructivist positions in both religious
studies and theology have offered extensive critique of perennial philosophy and the
notion of universal unmediated experience. 68 Constructivists provide a trenchant critique
of the perennial philosophy and its Cartesian assumptions, but constructivism itself risks
falling into a sort of dualism in construing human beings as socially constructed blank
slates operating independently of brain and body. The problem with constructivism is not
its stress on cultural-linguistic mediation; it is that it fails to link this mediation with the
brain and body. Constructivist positions go wrong not in taking mediation seriously, but
rather by not taking mediation seriously enough. This is not the place to develop a
constructive account of religious experiences, but surely such an account needs to attend
to what might call the “double mediation” of brain and body, on the one hand, and culture
and language on the other. Such a double mediation involves a complex and reciprocal
relationship between brain and body and culture and language. What is significant is that
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such an account places one in a position to posit potential cross cultural similarities in
religious experience without resorting to the metaphysics of the perennial philosophy.
Commonalities in experiences deemed religious may be due to the much more mundane
fact that human beings share a common biology. Whatever the case, contemporary
historical, philosophical, and scientific analysis of the notion of religious experience
gives one ample cause for skepticism regarding Wallace’s claim that religion and science
are best bridged by a return to the primacy of experience. An adequate account of
religious experience surely needs to attend more to the cultural-linguistic and biological
mediation of religious experience.
Wallace’s experiential focus is closely linked with a commendable concern to
address issues of religious diversity, and Wallace frequently points to experiential
“common ground” between Buddhism and Christianity in particular. However, there is a
deep ambiguity in Wallace’s treatment of experience and religious diversity. Wallace
affirms a universal experiential common ground between religious traditions but links
that experiential common ground to very particular Buddhist claims regarding the
substrate consciousness and karmic rebirth. Many who advocate forms of the perennial
philosophy do so as a response to the challenge of religious diversity. Such perennialists
also tend to be pluralists with regard to religious epistemology, claiming that no one
particular religious tradition has a privileged explanatory purchase on religious truth or
experience. It is important to see the difference between this pluralist stance and
Wallace’s position. Wallace’s stance is not pluralism but a version of what has been
called inclusivism. The inclusivist argues that there may well be a common experience
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that links religious traditions, but that one tradition enjoys a privileged explanatory
purchase with regard to those experiences. Wallace seems to assign Buddhism such a
privileged rule and does not seem to regard Christianity and Buddhism as two equally
valid paths, as other perennialists are apt to do. What is difficult to see is why one
religious tradition should enjoy such an explanatory privilege.
It is hardly surprising that Buddhist cultures would generate powerful
experiences of the substrate consciousness, including experiences involving the notions
of karma and rebirth. What is much more dubious is the claim that Christian, Jewish, and
Muslim mystics are also experiencing the substrate consciousness in spite of what they
themselves claim to be experiencing. Wallace’s linking of universal religious experience
with the Buddhist notion of the substrate consciousness raises perplexing issues with
regard to religious diversity and interreligious dialogue. The claim that one religious
tradition is positioned to explain more adequately the religious experiences of another
tradition strikes many today as both imperialistic and arrogant, as do claims that one
religious tradition has a unique grasp of the truth. An awareness of cultural diversity
contributes to this impression, but, the rise of modern science also contributes to
skepticism regarding religious claims. Science has not only problematized religious
claims about the world; it has also been able to develop a method for adjudicating
differences and transcending cultural particularities in a way that religion simply has not
been able to do. There are good reasons for accepting evolution over intelligent design
theory, and for accepting the heliocentric versus the geocentric theory. While the theory
of evolution and the heliocentric theory were developed in highly particular cultural
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contexts they involve empirical claims about the world and are articulated in a manner
that is publically accessible and verifiable. Religious claims to truth typically lack this
empirical and public status.
Religious believers themselves recognize the epistemic status of science, and
frequently appeal to science as part of an apologetic defense of their particular religious
tradition. Wallace, for example, seems to suggest that science can potentially provide a
verification of Buddhist beliefs. This specifically occurs with reference to belief in
reincarnation/rebirth. It is also not surprising the Hindu-Buddhist cultures saturated in
beliefs about reincarnation/rebirth would produce individuals claiming to have
experienced or lived an earlier life. What is dubious is the claim that the truth of
reincarnation is the best explanation of these experiences. Wallace points to the work of
University of Virginia psychiatrist, Ian Stevenson, to add empirical support to his
reincarnation claims. Wallace simply asserts that the scientific community fails to take
this work seriously, and fails to engage any of the massive critical commentary that has
accumulated around Stevenson’s work. 69 The same is true for Wallace’s appeal to out-ofbody experiences (OBE) and near-death experience (NDE). These are interesting altered
states of consciousness, and they are fully amenable to empirical study and research.
None of this research however indicates that such experiences are direct evidence of the
existence of an immaterial soul or an immaterial substrate consciousness. In fact, the ease
at which bodily self-representation can be manipulated neurologically and
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psychologically, would seem to support a naturalistic, bio-psychological explanation of
such phenomena.
The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the implications of the demise of
mind-body dualism for religious thought. Sophisticated attempts to retain forms of
religious dualism, such as those of Philip Clayton and B. Alan Wallace, are simply not
compelling. The implications of the demise of dualism for dialogue between religion is
science is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR
SHIFTING THE RELIGION AND SCIENCE CONVERSATION:
BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF MORALITY AND ITS IMPACT UPON
METAETHICS AND RELIGON
Recap of the Dissertation Argument
There is currently a wild diversity of positions on the relationship between
religion and science. This dissertation seeks to make some sense of that wild diversity by
looking at a particular kind of science: the science of the mind-brain. One of its guiding
insights is that the mind sciences surface in a particularly acute way one of the most
foundational issues at stake in discussions of the relationship between religion and
science: the issue of the nature of mind and the debate between dualism and naturalism.
Resolving the debate between dualism and naturalism establishes important constraints
for thinking about the relationship between religion and science and for a constructive
approach to religion more generally.
Chapters One, Two, and Three focused on various aspects of the debate between
dualism and naturalism. In Chapter One, I made the case that dualism is a fundamental
aspect of religious traditions like Christianity and Buddhism and continues to be present
in much contemporary religious and theological literature that seeks a harmonious
integration of religion and science. Many religious traditions understand certain aspects
of reality as literally spiritual, i.e., not part of the physical world described by the natural
210
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sciences, and many academic theologians interested in religion and science are prepared
to defend these dualist beliefs as metaphysical claims about the nature of the human
person and the nature of the cosmos. I called this stance “religious dualism.” Religious
dualism includes forms of classical theistic supernaturalism, but it extends far beyond
this. Many theologians engaged in the religion and science dialogue repudiate
supernaturalist theism while retaining a theistic dualism. Religious dualists all hold
versions of the thesis that consciousness can exist without neural correlates or any
physical substrate at all.
Having established the foundational role of dualism within much religious
thought, I turned to the evaluation of these dualist claims on the basis of the
contemporary philosophy and science of the mind-brain. My concern in Chapters One
and Two was to assess the notion of dualism as a doctrine about human persons. In those
chapters, I attempted to assess what light the contemporary mind sciences could shed on
the traditional mind-body or consciousness-brain problem. Chapter One presented the
debate between naturalism and dualism as a debate about the adequacy of a biopsychological explanation of consciousness and argued that principled dualist, mysterian,
functionalist/autonomy of psychology objections to a vertically integrated biopsychological approach to consciousness are simply not compelling. Such claims are
typically rooted in inadequate deductive criteria of explanation and reduction and as such
fail to appreciate the resources a naturalistic, bio-psychological approach has for taking
subjectivity seriously. The mind-body or brain-consciousness problem was resolved in
favor of a neurophilosophical, inflationist form of naturalism.
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Chapter Two then argued that the contemporary mind sciences not only call
dualism into question; they also help explain the genesis of robust dualist intuitions in
human thought. Such an explanation is part of the burden of proof for naturalists.
Naturalists not only have to show that dualism is false; they also have to provide a
compelling naturalistic explanation of dualism. The cognitive neuroscience of the self
and the cognitive science of religion both figured prominently in this task. Insights from
cognitive neuroscience of the self and the cognitive science of religion were drawn upon
to explain everyday “out-of-brain” experiences and more extraordinary “out-of-body”
experiences. Such experiences are real and vivid enough, but can be explained in entirely
naturalistic terms in light of the notions of a transparent phenomenal self model, the
notion of the self as a “virtual reality,” and the notion of bodily self representation and
multi-sensory integration.
In terms of cognitive science, it was shown that dualism emerges as an
evolutionary by-product of other directly adaptive inference systems: folk physics, folk
biology, and folk psychology. Dualism emerges as a consequence of the fact that we have
two different inference systems for reasoning about social reality (folk psychology) and
reasoning about physical reality (folk physics), and from the fact that our mind reading
abilities tend to overshoot as a result of the fact that much of our social reasoning occurs
offline and that some mental states are easier to imagine being without than other mental
states. It was argued that the fact that mind-body dualism comes so naturally to human
beings contributes to the genesis of other supernatural concepts like god-concepts. Here
dualism couples with another by-product of human cognition: the tendency to over-
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attribute agency and design. The promiscuous nature of agency detection and theory of
mind leads us to see “faces in the clouds,” to see the biological and non-biological world
as designed for a purpose, and to see natural events as symbolic communications.
Chapter Three then turned to address the religious-theological implications of the
demise of dualism. I addressed two attempts to integrate religious dualism with the mind
sciences. It was argued that Philip Clayton’s attempt to retain a theological dualism while
jettisoning dualism as a doctrine about human persons was unsuccessful as was B. Alan
Wallace’s more experientially focused defense of religious dualism from a Buddhist
perspective.
The Implications of the Naturalistic Conclusions of this
Dissertation for the Religion and Science Dialogue
Having recapped the major moves of the dissertation, it is time to take stock of the
conclusions thus far and their bearing on issues concerning religion and science.
Literature on religion and science tends almost inevitably to understand the relationship
between the two in terms of conflict, independence, or integration. In light of this
taxonomy, the conclusions of this dissertation seem to be a straightforward example of
the conflict model, and indeed they are. However, what is seldom recognized by those
who adhere to these various models is that questions concerning the relationship between
religion and science are domain specific. This dissertation has argued that claims about
metaphysical dualism are an important part of many religious traditions, and if its
conclusions thus far are correct, these claims conflict with what contemporary philosophy
and science tells us about the nature of mind. The contemporary philosophy and science
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of the mind brain supports naturalist or physicalist rather than dualist conclusions.
Dualist claims, however, are simply one aspect or dimension of religion, and issues
concerning metaphysics and the mind-body problem are merely one point of intersection
between the claims of religion and the claims of science. No claims have been made that
metaphysical dualism forms the “essence” of religion or that religion collapses tout court
with the demise of dualism.
The mind sciences and a naturalism informed by the mind sciences have much
more to contribute to the study of religion than a debunking of dualism. Accepting
metaphysical naturalism hardly means that there can be no interesting points of
intersection between religion and science. The realm of factual and metaphysical
claims—such as those involved in the mind-body problem—is an important point of
intersection between religion and science, and a point of intersection that is conflictual
and not favorable to religion. But the debate concerning metaphysical questions like the
mind-body problem is hardly exhaustive of the potential points of intersection between
religion and science, and the mind sciences can illuminate religion in a much more
significant manner than simply telling us that the dualist claims embedded within
religious traditions are likely false. In particular, there are questions about morality and
value that religious traditions are deeply concerned with, and that the mind sciences have
increasingly shed light on. In this chapter, I turn from metaphysics and the mind-body
problem to morality as a point of intersection between religion and science.
Note that this proposal is nearly the exact opposite of the “independence”
approach to religion and science advocated by Stephen Jay Gould and others. The issue
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of metaphysical truth claims has dominated discussions of religion and science, and
Gould was one of the first to recognize the limits of approaches to religion and science
framed in terms of total conflict (e.g., New Atheism/Intelligent Design/Creationism) or
comprehensive integration (e.g., Christian theologies of science):
…[W]hen we must make sense of the relationship between two disparate
subjects (science and religion in this case)—especially when both seem to
raise similar questions at the core of our most vital concerns about life and
meaning— we assume that one of two extreme solutions must apply:
either science and religion must battle to the death, with one victorious
and the other defeated; or else they must represent the same quest and can
therefore be fully and smoothly integrated into one grand synthesis. But
both extreme scenarios work by elimination—either the destruction of one
by another, or the merger of both into a large and pliant “whole ball of
wax” without sharp edges or incisive points. 1
Gould aptly diagnoses the problems and limits of the conflict and integration
approaches, but his own cure is deeply problematic. Gould famously (or notoriously)
proposes that religion and science be understood as “non-overlapping magisteria”
(NOMA). “The net, or magisterium, of science covers the empirical realm: what is the
universe made of (fact) and why does it work that way (theory). The magisterium of
religion extends over questions of ultimate meaning and moral value.” 2 Where conflict
and integration strategies tend to view all of religion and science exclusively in terms of
one domain—metaphysical truth claims—the NOMA strategy recognizes multiple
domains but goes on to assign science and religion exclusive rights to each domain:
science gets the domain of facts while religion gets the domain of values. Gould’s
recognition of multiple domains is laudable; his approach goes wrong in his parsing of
1
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issues in terms of non-overlapping magisteria. There is no reason to think that religion
cannot make factual claims (whether the claims are true is another matter), further, there
is no reason to think that religion is the sole repository of morality and values or that
science might not shed interesting light on issues of morality and meaning. I have argued
that religious traditions like Buddhism and Christianity have made and continue to make
claims about the nature of the human person and the nature of the world, and that these
claims intersect in interesting ways with the claims of modern science. I have also argued
that there are good reasons to be skeptical of these claims in light of modern science;
however, this point of conflict does not exhaust areas of intersection between religion and
science, and I suggest that it is precisely in the realm of ethics and morality where a more
fruitful exchange might occur.
Points of Intersection between Religion and Science:
Metaphysics and Morals
The approach to religion and science advocated in this dissertation sees both the
metaphysical and moral approaches as essential. Claims about metaphysics and morality
are intimately related; however, it is important to recognize that fundamentally different
questions are at stake when pursuing religion and science from the perspective of
metaphysics and when pursuing it from the perspective of morality.
I first want to make some points about the metaphysical intersection and the
conclusions that have been reached about it thus far in this dissertation. I have argued that
issues concerning metaphysics will inevitably create a conflict between religion and
science. The dualist vision found in religious traditions like Buddhism and Christianity
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simply does not cohere well with the contemporary philosophy and science of the mindbrain. Many recoil from the conflict stance because it seems inherently dogmatic and
polemical, but there is no reason why the honest registering of intellectual disagreement
has to occur in a dogmatic and polemical manner.
Does naturalism commit one to a position that is dogmatic, polemical, and antireligious? It is hard to see why this should necessarily be the case. The worry about
dogmatism can be assuaged by recognizing that the form of naturalism defended in this
dissertation is a fallibilist form of naturalism. Chapters One, Two, and Three have argued
that a modest, fallibilist form of naturalism is the most adequate stance to adopt at this
point in time concerning claims about the nature of mind. These are provisional
conclusions that could all change on empirical grounds. Empirical evidence and
philosophical arguments might develop that lead in dualist rather than naturalist
directions. At this point in time, however, this is unlikely.
There is nothing dogmatic about this at all; it is simply following the evidence
wherever it leads. As noted above, a more dogmatic kind of naturalism is actually
implicit in the seemingly irenic independence/NOMA stance. This stance does
dogmatically assert that religious claims have/should have no ability to make factual
claims about the nature of the world and the nature of the human person. The naturalism
defended here in no way entails the claim that religion does not or should not make
metaphysical claims; it is simply skeptical about the truth value of such dualist claims.
That is to say it advocates a certain intellectual stance, but this is far from implying any
disrespect for those who hold dualist and supernaturalist positions. Far from dogmatic
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table thumping that marks the end of dialogue, the direct naming of conflict provides the
basis for a more robust religion and science dialogue.
There is no reason why conflict has to preclude dialogue and even friendship
between those holding wildly divergent positions. A model for what I have in mind is
suggested by David Hume in his Dialogues on Natural Religion. It is significant that
Hume uses the genre of dialogue to probe central issues concerning religion. It is
particularly significant to note that the deep philosophical and religious differences
between Philo and Cleanthes occur in the context of mutual respect and deep and abiding
friendship. In his commentary on the Dialogues, William Lad Sessions remarks:
[T]hey deeply trust and respect and like each other. They do not merely
understand each other’s subterfuges and strategies; they have no fear of
divulging their deepest hopes and views to one another, even though they
do not see things from a single point of view…Theirs is not an
arrangement of convenience or domination; it is, to borrow George Fox’s
great phrase, a society of friends. This society, I believe…is intended to
model for Pamphilus an enticing form of life, one that can explore the
great issues of religion without erupting into superstition or enthusiasm—a
form of life that can enfold deep difference and honest debate within its
respect for persons. 3
Frank acknowledgement of conflict can in fact contribute to a more robust
religion and science dialogue, but I want to suggest that naturalism has a broader
significance for religion, theology, and spirituality. Naturalism has a relevance for
religion that goes far beyond providing supernaturalists with a friendly sparring partner.
One sees this when the point of intersection between religion and science is shifted from
metaphysics to morality.
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Shifting to the issue of morality is not punting on metaphysics, but rather a
pragmatic recognition that such discussions only get one so far. The shift allows for
collaboration between very different groups around an issue that is of common concern to
all—the moral life. Questions of morality are simply of concern to everyone regardless of
their religious commitments or lack thereof. Questions about morality thus typically
engage a broader audience than issues of religious metaphysics. The shift to morality
occurs naturally when one recognizes that dualist metaphysics is no longer tenable. But
one does not have to accept metaphysical naturalism in order to appreciate ways in which
scientific work in moral psychology might impact issues of morality and religion. In fact,
such work may be an important resource for religious traditions. First, religious ethical
claims are premised on certain claims regarding the human person and moral psychology.
Many of these traditional philosophical-theological claims regarding the human person
and moral psychology have been called into question by research in scientific moral
psychology. Further, there are massive moral conflicts within religious traditions, and the
traditional categories of philosophical and theological analysis have done little to either
explain or assuage these points of conflict.
I examine the intersection of mind science, morality, and religion in three
sections. As the last three chapters examined the implications of the mind sciences for
the metaphysical claims embedded in many religious traditions, the remainder of this
chapter examines the implications of the mind sciences—especially scientific moral
psychology—for metaethical claims concerning the nature and origin of moral judgment
that are imbedded in many religious traditions.
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The first section is concerned with questions about the origins of morality,
specifically the claim that religion lies at the origin of morality. The issue of the
relationship between morality and religion (or morality and God(s)) is ancient and dates
back at least to Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue. Such issues are far from being simply
interesting, if esoteric, metaethical questions. Indeed, they cut to the core of the so-called
“culture wars” in the United States. At least in the American context, moral pluralism and
conflict is linked closely with questions of religious belief. The notion is widespread that
religion is the source of morality and that one cannot be moral without a belief in God.
Even some who are themselves atheists or agnostics believe that belief in God is essential
to keeping the masses moral. On the other hand, certain parts of the “New Atheist”
literature suggest not only that religion is false, but that it is very, very bad. Religion is a
“delusion” or “spell” that “poisons everything.” Such literature gives the suggestion that
belief in God may be inherently morally corrupting.
In the past twenty years, a significant research program has been launched by
psychologists studying morality that investigates people’s ability to distinguish between
moral and conventional violations. As it turns out, research on the moral/conventional
distinction sheds light on the relationship between religion and morality and the origin of
morality. It is argued that such research casts doubt on the claim that religion—especially
in the form of divine commands—is the origin of morality and that such research points
to an emotional origin of morality. If religion is not the source of morality, how do
religion and morality come to link up in the minds of so many people? It is argued that a

221
commonsense belief in the objectivity of morals provides an important link between
morality and religion.
The next section addresses the question of how emotion relates to reason in moral
judgments and how both biology and culture contribute to the genesis of moral intuitions.
These questions are explored in light of Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model of
moral judgment. It is argued that this model sheds a great deal of light on issues
concerning moral pluralism and conflict. Finally, the implications of this work for
normative ethics and religious practices are addressed.
Mind Science, Metaethics, and Religion I:
Divine Command Theory and the Origins of Moral Judgment
Religion and Morality
Today, nearly two centuries after the Enlightenment and its emphasis on the
autonomy of ethics, the opinion is still widespread in the United States that religion is the
essential origin of morality. It is not difficult to find statements supporting this viewpoint.
The nation’s presidents seem particularly fond of asserting this link between religion and
morality. In a speech to an ecumenical prayer breakfast during the 1984 Republican
National Convention, Ronald Reagan would remark: “The truth is, politics and morality
are inseparable. And as morality’s foundation is religion, religion and politics are
necessarily related.” 4 Even those who are not particularly religious seem to share the
view that while religion may not be true, it is essential to morality. An important
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corollary of this view is that naturalism has devastating consequences for morality and
skepticism about whether atheists can, in fact, be moral people. This skepticism about the
moral credentials of atheists has been well documented in sociological surveys 5 and is
captured in the following interview with Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush
(arguably the least religious president in the past thirty years).
Q: Surely you recognize the equal citizenship and patriotism of Americans
who are atheists?
A: No, I don’t know that atheists should be considered as citizens, nor
should they be considered patriots. This is one nation under God. 6
The comments of Reagan and Bush echo a popular sentiment that religion—
especially divine commands—are the sine qua non of ethics. This understanding of the
origins of morality not only creates antipathy between nonbelievers and believers, it
creates antipathy between religious believers who disagree about certain moral issues;
both sides ground their moral convictions in the objective will of God. Much then might
be gained by empirical investigation into the origins of morality and the relationship
between religion and morality. There are, of course, many avenues by which questions
concerning the relationship of religion and morality and the origins of morality might be
fruitfully studied. Here I investigate these issues drawing upon a fruitful research
trajectory developed in scientific moral psychology over the past twenty years that
documents people’s ability to distinguish between moral and conventional violations.
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I first introduce the moral/conventional distinction as defined and developed by
Eliot Turiel and others. I then turn to Turiel and Larry Nucci’s application of the
moral/conventional distinction to religious contexts, arguing that this work sheds much
light on vexed question of the relationship between religion and morality. Specifically, it
casts doubt on the claim that religion (especially in the form of divine commands) is the
source of morality. If religion is not the source of morality what is? Next, drawing on R.
James Blair’s work on psychopaths and work by Jonathan Haidt and Shaun Nichols on
disgust, I argue for an affective basis for the moral/conventional distinction. Drawing in
particular on the work of Shaun Nichols, I show how this affective base of morality also
generates the belief in the objectivity of morals; following the work of Pascal Boyer and
others, I argue that it is primarily though moral objectivity that religion and morality
come to be linked. The implications of these findings are then discussed.
Religion, Morality, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction
In the past twenty years, Eliot Turiel and his collaborators have launched an
important research program documenting the ability of children to distinguish between
morality and social convention. Conventions here are understood as agreed upon
behavioral uniformities determined by a particular social system. “Conventions are part
of constitutive systems and are shared behaviors (uniformities, rules) whose meanings are
defined by the constituted system in which they are embedded.” 7 Moral considerations,
on the other hand, “stem from factors intrinsic to actions: consequences such as harm to
7
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others, violations of rights, effects on the general welfare.” 8 A number of important
findings have been documented in empirical studies concerning the moral/conventional
distinction in secular contexts:
-

-

-

-

Moral transgressions are viewed as wrong irrespective of the presence
of governing rules, while conventional acts are viewed as wrong only
if they are in violation of an existing rule or standard.
Individuals view conventional standards as culturally relative and
alterable, while moral prescriptions are viewed as universal and
unchangeable.
The forms of social interaction in the context of moral events differ
qualitatively from interactions in the context of conventions.
Specifically, it was found that children’s and adults’ responses to
events in the moral domain focus on features intrinsic to the acts (e.g.
harm, justice), while responses in the context of conventions focus on
aspects of the social order (e.g. rules, regulations, normative
expectations).
Individuals view moral transgressions as more serious than violations
of convention.
Prosocial moral acts are viewed as better or more positive than
adherence to conventions. 9

Larry Nucci extended Turiel’s work on the moral/conventional distinction into the
religious sphere. As Nucci and Turiel note, the religious sphere raises interesting issues
concerning the moral/conventional distinction not present in secular contexts:
Religious frameworks provide a useful context for further research into
children’s moral and social concepts. In the first place, some rules specific
to particular religions, which by the criteria used in the domain model
would be classified as nonmoral, are usually treated as important and
binding on their members. Secondly, “moral” rules are often closely
linked to religious authority. It may be, therefore, that religious people do
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not distinguish between moral and non-moral religious rules. That is, they
may view both types of rules as prescriptive and universally binding. 10
Nucci and Turiel were concerned to see whether classic moral violations would be
distinguished from other religious behaviors, and, most important for our purposes here,
whether moral judgments would be made in a manner contingent upon religious
considerations (e.g., God’s Word as revealed in the Bible, etc.).
In one study, sixty-four Amish-Mennonite children were asked various questions
about various moral (e.g., stealing, hitting, slander, damaging property) and non-moral
issues (e.g. day of worship, work on Sabbath, baptism, head coverings, interfaith
marriage, and premarital sex). 11 The Amish-Mennonite children were asked three sets of
questions. The question sets concerned rule alterability, act generalizability, and “God’s
word contingency”:
(1) Rule Alterability: “Suppose all of the members of the congregation
and the ministers agreed to alter/eliminate the rule about [the act],
would it be wrong or all right for them to do that? Why/why not?” 12
(2) Act Generalizability: “Suppose that in another religion they don’t have
a rule about [the act], would it be wrong or all right for them to
[engage in the act] in that case? Why/why not?” 13
(3) “God’s Word Contingency”: Suppose there was nothing in the Bible
about [the act], God hadn’t said anything about [the act], would it be
wrong or all right for a Christian to [engage in the act] in that case?
Why/why not?” 14
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Nucci and Turiel found strong distinctions between the moral and non-moral
domains in all three question sets. With regard to alterability, the great majority of Amish
subjects judged that it would be wrong for religious leaders to alter rules concerning
stealing/hitting/slander/property damage [59/60/59/61 (N = 64)]. 15 This was the only set
of moral questions where subjects most commonly made appeal to God’s law as a
justification for their responses. God’s law justifications were cited most frequently (.58),
followed by justifications that appealed to intrinsic features of the act (harm/
fairness/obligation) (.38), social system (.01), and other justifications (.03). 16 While
judgments regarding the alterability of non-moral religious rules were significantly lower
in certain cases (e.g., only 27 subjects regarded the rule prohibiting interfaith marriage as
unalterable by religious authorities), other non-moral rules were regarded as
unalterable. 17 Fifty-nine respondents regarded work on the Sabbath as unalterable by
religious authorities. Here again, God’s law was the most commonly cited justification
(.57), followed by social system (.34) and other (.11) justifications. 18
Turiel and Nucci’s findings become more interesting with regard to
generalizability and the God’s word contingency questions. Numbers were close to
ceiling regarding the question of whether it would be wrong for members of another
religion to steal/hit/slander/damage property even if that religion did not have a rule
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about that action [64/58/62/57 (N = 64)]. 19 In terms of the non-moral religious rules,
despite their appeal to God’s law as a justification for the inalterability of these rules by
religious authorities, numbers were quite low regarding the generalizability of non-moral
religious rules. What is particularly interesting is the shift in frequencies of justifications.
In the moral domain with regard to generalization, intrinsic features justifications were by
far the most common (.77) with God’s law justifications accounting for a small
proportion of justifications (.13). 20 In the non-moral domain regarding generalizability,
justifications were primarily based on social system (.64), followed by appeal to God’s
law (.23) and other justifications (.09). 21 With regard to the God’s word contingency
question, the great majority of subjects regarding stealing/hitting/slander/property
damage as wrong even if God had not made a rule about them [54/56/54/58 (N = 64)]. 22
Here justification overwhelmingly focused on intrinsic features (.94) versus God’s law
(.03) and other (.03) justifications. 23 In short, the great majority of Amish subjects
regarded moral violations not to be contingent upon God’s will. As Nucci and Turiel
comment, “Nearly all subjects judged that actions in the moral domain constitute
transgressions even in the absence of a command from God opposing the act because of
the intrinsic consequences these acts have upon others.” 24 On the other hand, non-moral
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religious violations were regarded as strongly contingent upon God’s will. No subjects
regarded rules concerning day of worship, work on Sabbath, baptism, women’s head
coverings, and interfaith marriage to be wrong in absence of a specific divine
command. 25
The relationship between God’s word and morality was probed further by Turiel
and Nucci in an experiment with Dutch Calvinist children. Sixty-four Dutch Calvinist
children were asked the following question based on the Euthyphro Dilemma:
(4) “Open Question”: Suppose God had commanded [written in the Bible]
that Christians should steal. Would it then be right for a Christian to
steal?” “Do you think God would make a commandment saying that
Christians should steal?” 26
Most children maintained that God’s command to steal would not make it right to
steal (11 of 16 at 10 and 12 years; 13 of 16 at 14 and 16 years). 27 Nucci has replicated
these findings across a number of religious traditions. 28 Even children from very religious
backgrounds do not see morality exclusively in terms of their religious commitments. As
Nucci and Turiel write:
The results from Study 1 provide evidence that Amish-Mennonite
children’s conceptions of morality are not reducible to their knowledge of
or adherence to religious rules. Consonant with prior research on Catholic
subjects (Nucci 1982), the Amish-Mennonite and Dutch Reform Calvinist
children evaluated moral issues in terms of justice and welfare
considerations rather than precepts of the Bible or positions taken by
religious authorities. As did the Catholics, the Amish-Mennonite children
25
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generalized moral issues, and viewed moral rules as unalterable by
religious authorities. They also viewed the status of moral transgressions
as noncontingent on God’s word. Furthermore, most of the Dutch
Reformed Calvinist children responded that God’s command would not
make stealing right. These findings indicate that children from these
groups maintain a distinct moral position based on justice and welfare
criteria from which they apprehend the moral aspects of the Christian
God.” 29
The Origin of the Moral/Conventional Distinction
The moral/conventional distinction is interesting because it shows that moral
judgments are arrived at independently of authority including religious authority and
even God’s authority. If morality does not come from religion, where does it come from?
Alongside theological and religious conceptions of morality and intimately related to
them are conceptions of morality that understand moral judgment to be rooted in reason.
Rationalism has exerted a massive influence on Western thought from philosophers like
Plato, Aquinas, and Kant to moral psychologists like Piaget and Kohlberg. This model
has been called into question by research in both neuroscience and psychology. This
research suggests that it is affect rather than reason that drives many moral judgments and
actions.
The Affective Origins of Morality:
Psychopaths and the Moral/Conventional Distinction
The moral/conventional distinction has been studied in a number of interesting
contexts. Some of the most interesting findings concerning the moral/conventional
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distinction come from R. James Blair’s work with psychopaths and autistics. 30 Blair’s
research has documented that criminal psychopaths and children with psychopathic
tendencies fail to treat moral violations and conventional violations as significantly
different. Blair’s studies show that psychopathic adults and children fail to draw an
adequate moral/conventional distinction and also tended to ignore considerations about
the welfare of victims when justifying their responses. 31 Children with psychopathic
tendencies tended to regard moral violations as authority dependent. 32 Psychopathic
individuals seem to have a sense of right and wrong, but fail to distinguish between
different kinds of wrongs or violations. 33 Significantly, psychopaths do not seem to suffer
from any rational defects. They do not differ from others on measures of intelligence.
Perhaps psychopaths suffer from the loss of a critical faculty essential for moral
reasoning. For example, perspective taking and theory of mind suggests itself. Such
perspective-taking abilities have been an important focus in rationalist accounts of moral
psychology. Testing this hypothesis, Blair found that psychopaths scored slightly better
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than a control group on measures of perspective taking and theory of mind. 34 Further,
autistic individuals are known to have seriously impaired theory of mind and perspective
taking abilities. Significantly however they do not manifest the difficulties that
psychopaths do in drawing the moral/conventional distinction.35 In short, psychopaths
seem to suffer from no rational deficit at all; however, psychopaths do show significant
differences in emotion and affect. Blair and his colleagues have tested emotional
response by showing psychopaths and a wide number of control groups pictures of both
threatening and distressed faces. 36 All of the control groups showed significantly
heightened physiological responses to both the threatening and distressed faces; however,
the psychopaths showed response to only the threatening faces. A number of other
significant affective and emotional deficits have been documented in psychopathy. 37 This
research suggests that moral concepts are essentially emotion-involving concepts. Jesse
Prinz makes this point well:
If moral properties were not essentially emotion-involving, then there
should be a way of drawing the moral/conventional distinction without
appeal to emotions. Psychopaths should be able to learn the difference.
After all, psychopaths generally have intelligence quotients within the
normal range. Some are extremely bright. They are often articulate and
cunning. They have a great interest in learning to distinguish right from
34

R. Blair, C. Sellars, I. Strickland, F. Clark, A. Williams, M. Smith, and L. Jones, "Theory of
Mind in the Psychopath," Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 7, no. 1 (1996).
35

R. Blair, "Brief Report: Morality in the Autistic Child," Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders 26, no. 5 (1996).
36

R. Blair, "Responsiveness to Distress Cues in the Child with Psychopathic Tendencies,"
Personality and Individual Differences 27, no. 1 (1999).
37

See, for examples, the articles on psychopathy in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral
Psychology: Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).

232
wrong. Most psychopaths have long histories of misconduct….These
histories put them into contact with people who take special care in
helping them grasp morality. They often encounter concerned parents,
teachers, lawyers, and law enforcers. Given this combination of exposure
and motivation to learn, psychopaths should be more likely than others to
develop ways of reliably identifying moral properties. The fact that they
fail to master the moral/conventional distinction suggests that there may
be no way to draw that distinction without adverting to or experiencing
emotional responses. The distinction may be emotional to the core. Right
and wrongness may be constituted by emotional reactions in us. Subtract
these reactions and the distinction becomes as invisible as the color
spectrum is to the blind. Psychopaths can carefully monitor the moral
judgments of healthy individuals. They can sort familiar examples of good
conduct into one bin and bad conduct into another, but they lack insight
into the very essence of this division.38
The Affective Origins of Morality: The Moral Psychology of Disgust
Studies of disgust also shed significant light on the moral/conventional distinction
and the role of emotion in moral judgment. Jonathan Haidt has done particularly
interesting cross cultural work on people’s reactions to harmless taboo violations. Are
such actions subject to moral condemnation, and if so, why? Haidt’s subjects varied in
nationality, socioeconomic status (SES), and age. Subjects were presented with a number
of harmless taboo violations: a family eats its pet dog after it was hit by a car, a women
cuts up a national flag and uses the strips to clean her toilet, a man uses a chicken carcass
for masturbation and afterwards cooks and eats the carcass. 39 Haidt and his colleagues
found that a significant number of groups condemned these actions morally. Haidt was
particularly concerned with the issue of why these actions were condemned. Perhaps the
actions were understood to have harmful consequences even though they really did not.
38

Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

39

Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller, and Maria G. Dias, "Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It
Wrong to Eat Your Dog?," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65, no. 4 (1993).

233
Or perhaps they were morally condemned because one was bothered by seeing such an
action. The study found that among the groups that morally condemned these actions, the
bother probe was a better predictor of negative judgment than the harm probe. Such a
finding fits well with an understanding of moral judgments driven by emotional
intuitions. Differences between the “moralizing” and “permissive” groups also supports
the thesis that emotional judgment is the cognitive default that sometimes can be
overridden by more explicitly cognitive processes. 40 High SES groups—college
students—in both the United States and Brazil tended not to judge the actions as moral.
People from less Westernized cities tended to be more condemning, and children in both
the United States and Brazil were more condemning than adults. 41 As Joshua Greene
reflects:
These three findings make sense in light of the model of moral judgment
we have been developing, according to which intuitive emotional
responses drive prepotent moral intuitions while “cognitive” control
processes sometimes rein them in. Education is to a large extent the
development of one’s “cognitive” capacities, learning to think in ways that
are abstract, effortful, and often either nonintuitive or counterintuitive.
The westernization factor is closely related. While westerners may not be
any more “cognitively” developed” than members of others cultures, the
western tradition takes what is, from an anthropological perspective, a
peculiarly “cognitive” approach to morality. Westerners are more likely
than members of other cultures to argue for and justify their moral beliefs
and values in abstract terms….Moreover, western culture tends to be more
pluralistic than other cultures, explicitly valuing multiple perspectives and
an intellectual awareness that alternative perspectives exist. Finally, the
capacity for “cognitive control” continues to develop through
40
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adolescence….Children like adults, are very good at feeling emotions such
as anger, sympathy, and disgust, but unlike adults they are not very good
at controlling their behavior when experiencing such feeling. 42
Haidt and his colleagues have also manipulated disgust through hypnotic
suggestion and the alternation of environmental factors in order to assess the effect of
such manipulations on moral judgment. 43 In one set of experiments, half of a group of
highly-hyponotizable subjects was given the post-hypnotic suggestion to feel disgust
upon reading the word take. The other half was given the suggestion to feel disgust upon
reading the word often. The “take” group received three moral violation vignettes
containing the work “take,” three neutral buffer stories that contained neither the word
“take” or a moral violation, and three moral violation stories containing the word
“often.” 44 Likewise the “often” group received three moral violation vignettes containing
the word “often,” three neutral buffer stories, and three moral violation stories containing
the word “take.” 45 The moral violations included accounts of a sexual relationship
between second cousins, a man eating his already dead dog, a congressman taking bribes,
an ambulance-chasing lawyer, a shoplifter, and a student stealing library books. 46
Participants evaluated both “how disgusting” and “how morally wrong” the behavior in
the vignette by picking slash makers on a line ranging from not at all disgusting/
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extremely disgusting and not at all morally wrong/extremely morally wrong. Wheatley
and Haidt found that moral transgressions were viewed as more disgusting when their
hypnotic disgust word was embedded in the vignette than when it was absent. 47 Further,
they sound that the presence of the disgust word increased the severity of moral
judgment. 48
In one of the studies conducted, a story was included where there was no violation
at all: “Dan is a student council representative at his school. This semester he is in charge
of scheduling discussions of academic issues. He [tries to take up] [often picks] topics
that appeal to both professors and students in order to stimulate discussion.” 49 Haidt and
his colleagues predicted that with no violations of any kind subjects would have to
override their feelings of disgust and most did. However, one third of all subjects who
encountered their disgust word in the story still rated Dan’s actions as somewhat morally
wrong. In another set of experiments, Haidt and colleagues manipulated disgust
environmentally. 50 Subjects were asked to make moral judgments at either a clean desk
or a dirty desk filled with fast food wrappers and dirty tissues. Those at the dirty desk
made moral judgments more severe for individuals scoring in the upper half of a scale
measuring “private body consciousness.” 51
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Haidt’s studies of disgust provide further evidence for the emotional origins of
morality. They also provide evidence that the scope of morality is much broader than the
harm/justice based norms that figure so centrally in modern Western conceptions of
morality. Shaun Nichols has also done interesting experimental work on disgust,
particularly in relation to the moral/conventional distinction. In Nichols’s “sentimental
rules” explanation of the moral/conventional distinction, the basis for the moral/
conventional distinction lies in the fact that moral norms are backed by affect while
conventional norms are not. Norms backed by affect will be regarded as more serious and
less authority contingent than norms that are not affectively backed. Importantly, like
Haidt and in contrast to Blair, Nichols understands affect-backed norms as broader in
scope than harm-based norms. Nichols tested his sentimental rules account of the
morality by replacing the moral/conventional distinction with a disgusting/conventional
distinction. Subjects were presented with moral violations, disgusting violations, and
conventional violations. Nichols found that subjects tended to treat disgusting violations
as less permissible, more serious, and less authority contingent than the affect-neutral
conventional violations. 52 Nichols also tested the disgusting/conventional distinction in a
manner analogous to Blair’s application of the moral/conventional distinction to
psychopaths. There an affective defect impedes psychopath’s abilities to distinguish
between moral and conventional violations. Nichols wanted to see if different sensitivity
to disgust would produce different judgments concerning the seriousness and authority
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contingency of a disgusting violation. Nichols found that while there was no statistically
significant difference between low and high disgust subjects on the permissibility
question, the low disgust group regarding the disgusting violation as much less serious
and also as more authority contingent. 53
Commonsense Moral Objectivism and the Relationship
Between Religion and Morality
As a philosopher, Nichols has been particularly concerned to address the
implications of the findings of scientific moral psychology about the centrality of
emotion in moral judgment to issues about moral objectivity. “Moral objectivity” is a
notoriously multivalent term. Epistemic moral objectivity is related to the notion of
impartiality and freedom from bias. This is not the notion of objectivity under discussion
here. Here we are discussing metaphysical or ontological moral objectivity: roughly, the
notion that certain actions are right or wrong, good or bad in and of themselves. Nichols,
along with a number of other contemporary moral psychologists and moral philosophers,
argues that these experimental findings support Humean non-objectivism.
The basic thesis of moral objectivism…is that the moral status of an action
is constituted by the action “as it is in itself” and accordingly, true moral
judgments are nonrelativistically true. Humean sentimentalism is often
regarded as directly opposed to moral objectivity in this sense….
According to Humean sentimentalism, morality hangs entirely on the
particular emotional repertoire of humans. Here is one place where Hume
seems to be making this point: “If we can depend upon any principle,
which we learn from philosophy, this, I think, may be considered as
certain and undoubted, that there is nothing, in itself, valuable or
despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these
attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human
sentiment and affection” (1742 [1987], 162). Norman Kemp Smith
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paraphrases Hume’s view using much the same language: “Moral
judgments, in marking out the good and the evil, have their source not in
the eternal nature of any independent reality, but solely in the particular
fabric and constitution of the human species”…In brief, moral judgment
depends on certain emotions, and these emotions themselves are rationally
arbitrary, so moral judgment, as we know it, is not objective. No action is
wrong simpliciter. At best, an action is wrong relative to a population –
the population of individuals that share a certain emotional repertoire. A
more careful way to frame the Humean conclusion here is that the
commonsense commitment to objectivity is unwarranted. Given the
emotional basis of moral judgment, we are not justified in our belief that
morality is objective. 54
Nichols argues objectivist ontology of morals is philosophically suspect but also
has done initial empirical research that indicates that a belief in moral objectivity may be
the default stance of commonsense metaethics. Experiments on the moral/conventional
distinction provide evidence for a certain kind of objectivity. We can call this kind of
objectivity non-conventional objectivity. Indeed, some of the literature on the moral/
conventional distinction seems to regard evidence for non-conventional objectivity as
evidence for objectivity simpliciter. However, as Nichols notes, non-conventional
objectivity does not exhaust the kinds of metaphysical objectivity. A key philosophical
notion of metaphysical objectivity turns on the notion of response-dependence. A
commitment to moral objectivity is seen as a commitment to the view that moral
properties are not response dependent.
Nichols conducted an experiment to test for a commitment to moral objectivity in
this broader sense. Nichols and Trisha Fold-Bennett prepared vignettes concerning
gustatory (“yummy”), moral (“good”), and aesthetic (“beautiful”) properties and then
asked children questions about generalizability and preference dependence.
54

Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, 184.

239
GENERALIZABILITY
Now, think about a long time ago, before there were any people. There
were still Grapes, just like the grapes now. Way back then, before there
were people, were grapes yummy?
PREFERENCE DEPENDENCE
You know, I think grapes are yummy too. Some people don’t like grapes.
They don’t think grapes are yummy. Would you say that grapes are
yummy. Would you say that grapes are yummy for some people or that
they’re yummy for real?
GENERALIZABILITY
Now, think about a long time ago, before there were any people. There
were monkeys back then too. Way back then, before there were people,
when one monkey helped another monkey that got hurt, was that good?
PREFERENCE DEPENDENCE
You know, I think it was good for the monkey to help the other monkey.
Some people don’t like it when monkeys help each other when they’re
hurt. They don’t think it’s good when monkeys do that. Would you say
that when one monkey helps a hurt monkey that is good for some people
or that it’s good for real?
GENERALIZABILITY
Now, think about a time long ago, before there were any people. There
were roses back then too. Way back then, before there were people, were
roses beautiful?
PREFERENCE DEPENDENCE
You know, I think roses are beautiful too. Some people don’t like roses.
They don’t think roses are beautiful. Would you say that roses are
beautiful for some people or that they’re beautiful for real? 55
Significantly, Nichols found that while children regarded properties like
“yummy” and “fun” as response dependent, children tended not to regard moral and
aesthetic properties as response dependent. There is thus initial experimental evidence
that objectivism is the default stance of folk metaethics. The commitment to an
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objectivist metaphysics of morals may be similar to the commitment to metaphysical
dualism: a false position that is nonetheless the cognitive default.
What is interesting is that this evidence about people’s understanding of moral
objectivity gives us a plausible point of contact between religion and morality. Religious
subjects regarded moral violations as non-contingent upon God’s will. Thus, following
Nucci’s experimental evidence across a variety of religious traditions, it is unlikely that
religion (i.e., divine commands) is the origin of the belief in moral objectivity. The origin
of the belief in moral objectivity plausibly lies in the affectively charged nature of our
moral beliefs. The cognitive mechanisms giving rise to religion and morality are likely
separate, but they become linked in important ways. One important link is moral
objectivity. On the one hand, moral objectivity makes religious beliefs more salient. On
the other hand, a religious/theological context helps to sustain commitment to moral
objectivity. The notion that religious beliefs are in some ways parasitic on moral beliefs
and that morality makes religious representations more salient has been underscored by
Pascal Boyer.
Moral intuitions are part of our mental dispositions for social interaction.
But why are they connected to gods and spirits and ancestors? To
understand how such beings fit with moral understandings, consider two
facts that I mentioned earlier. First, our moral intuitions suggest to us,
from the youngest age, that behaviors are right or wrong by themselves,
not depending on who considers them, or from what point of view.
Second, gods and spirits and ancestors are generally considered interested
parties in moral choices and moral judgments, rather than providers of
codes or rules. These two facts are just two aspects of the same mental
processes….
So concepts of gods and spirits are made more relevant by the
organization of our moral understandings, which by themselves do not
especially require any gods or spirits. What I mean by relevant is that the
concepts, once put in this moral context, are easy to represent and that
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they generate many new inferences. For instance, most people feel some
guilt when acting in a way that they suspect is immoral. That is, whatever
their self-serving justifications, they may have the intuition that an agent
with full description of the situation would still classify it as wrong. Now
thinking of this intuition as “what the ancestors think of what I did” or
“how God feels about what I did” provides an easy way of representing
what is otherwise extremely vague. That is, most of our moral intuitions
are clear but their origin escapes us, because it lies in mental processes
that we cannot consciously access. Seeing these intuitions as someone’s
viewpoint is a simpler way of understanding why we have these intuitions.
But this requires the concept of an agent with full access to strategic
information….
To sum up, then: Our evolution as a species of cooperators is
sufficient to explain the actual psychology of moral reasoning, the way
children and adults represent moral dimensions of action. But then this
requires no special concept of religious agent, no special code, no models
to follow. However, once you have concepts of supernatural agents with
strategic information, these are made more salient and relevant by the fact
that you can easily insert them in moral reasoning that would be there in
any case. To some extent religious concepts are parasitic upon moral
intuitions.56
Moral intuitions help make religious beliefs more relevant and salient. While not
the source or origin of commitment to moral objectivity, it may also be that this
religious/theological context helps to preserve a commitment to moral objectivity. Shaun
Nichols explores this idea:
Although religious considerations do not seem to explain the acquisition
of the belief in objectivity, religious beliefs might play an important role
in shoring up the belief in objectivity. The relationship between religion
and morality is complicated, of course. Perhaps most importantly, most
people regard voluntarism (or Divine Command Theory) as implausible—
that is, at least many adults think that right and wrong are not decided by
God, and Nucci’s evidence suggests that even Amish teenagers share this
view. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly part of the doctrine surrounding
many religions, including those in the Abrahamic tradition, that morality is
objective. The moral truths, if not created by God, are certainly known by
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God. This would provide an important preservative role for the belief in
objectivity. 57
The previous several sections have reached some tentative conclusions regarding
the origins of morality and the relationship of religion to morality: (1) Religion,
especially in the form of divine commands, is not the likely origin of morality; (2)
Morality likely has its origins in human emotions; (3) As such, moral properties are
response-dependent properties; (4) Morality is non-objective but morality is commonly
regarded as objective; (5) Moral objectivity is one possible way in which religion and
morality link up.
These findings cast interesting light on recent debates between atheists and
theists, particularly on issues concerning divine command ethics and theological accounts
of moral objectivity. While there are many ways to formulate a religious or theological
ethics, divine command theory enjoys widespread popularity, and atheist critics of
religion typically make divine command theory the object of their attack. But it may be
that both theists and atheists have exaggerated the importance and significance of divine
command ethics.
Recall that in Turiel and Nucci’s research, even very religious children regarded
canonical moral violations to be wrong in the absence of a specific command from God,
and even very religious children thought that a divine command could not render a moral
transgression right. There is thus initial empirical evidence that even very religious
children tend to reach moral judgments in a manner that is largely autonomous from
religion. This has important descriptive and normative implications. Descriptively, it
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indicates that one must look elsewhere for an account of the origins of morality and the
sources of our morality judgments. From a more normative standpoint, it casts doubt on a
naïve equation of belief in God with moral goodness and the absence of such a belief
with moral badness. If divine commands play such a negligible role in the moral
judgments of very religious children, one could hardly see them as the sine qua non of
morality. If divine command ethics has such little empirical traction with regard to the
moral judgments of members of religious communities, it can hardly be regarded as
essential to ethics or as a prescription for societal health. There hardly seems to be a
justification for regarding those who approach ethics in a manner autonomous from
divine commands as morally suspect, unless one is prepared to regard Amish and Dutch
Calvinist children as morally suspect or at least deeply mistaken in the way they go about
making moral judgments. It may be that divine command ethics is a form of theological
correctness. A religious belief explicitly endorsed by members of certain religious
communities that actually plays a negligible role in actual concrete moral judgments.
Interestingly, this research cuts both ways. Atheists also tend to place a great deal
of emphasis on divine command ethics, focusing on its negative aspects; but moral
judgments based on divine commands may be less common than atheists think, even in
traditions (e.g., Dutch Calvinism) that emphasize theological voluntarism. Indeed atheists
and secularists might be heartened by the fact that most Dutch Calvinist children thought
that stealing would still be wrong even if God had commanded/written in the Bible that
they should steal. Atheists and theists may, in fact, share more in common in terms of
their moral judgments than either side would initially think. There is some initial
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evidence pointing in this direction. In the Harvard Moral Sense Test, Marc Hauser and
his colleagues have analyzed the responses of two hundred thousand people representing
diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. Subjects were presented with a contrast
between a harmful action and a significant benefit in terms of lives saved. Responses to
the dilemmas are remarkably similar across cultural and religious differences. As Hauser
notes, “More specifically, in dozens of dilemmas, and with thousands of subjects, the
pattern of moral judgments delivered by subjects from a religious background do not
differ from those who are atheists.” 58 Religion no doubt interacts with and shapes
morality in interesting ways, but it is doubtful that religion is the origin of morality. The
traditional worry that “if God is dead, then everything is permitted” seems unfounded.
Interestingly, there may be a group for whom “all is permitted,” but what appears to be
absent in this group is not belief in God or even intelligence or a crucial cognitive
capacity but rather the absence of a crucial emotional repertoire. Work on psychopaths
and disgust underscores the centrality of emotion in moral judgment. This makes moral
truths anthropocentric truths and moral properties response dependent properties.
However, human beings tend to be objectivists about morality, and this commonsense
belief in moral objectivity may provide a plausible point of contact between religion and
morality. Moral objectivism is a false but extremely common metaethical thesis that links
up with religion in important ways. Religious belief and commitment to moral objectivity
seem to go hand in hand. Goodness or rather “The Good” is located entirely outside the
human person in a transcendental realm which human beings can access. There are many
58
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who believe that a theologically grounded moral objectivism is essential for normative
ethics. Thus Linda Zagzebski writes:
Isn’t the theist as much faced with the problem of moral pluralism as is the
non-theist? In response, it seems to me that it is certainly true that the
theist is faced with a certain amount of skepticism about his own particular
moral judgments. Theism does not guarantee the possession of moral truth
to the believer. However, the theist has a better way of dealing with the
problem of moral pluralism in two ways. First, the theist has another
source of moral knowledge in divine revelation and the teachings of the
Church….This is not to suggest that the theist has no problems with doubt
about the interpretation of God’s will. Such a suggestion would be naïve.
But again, the Christian concept of providence provides confidence that
these problems are resolvable. 59
Theological objectivism seems to provide a neat solution to the problem of moral
pluralism. However, there exist multiple religious communities and even within religious
communities— say the Anglican Communion or the Roman Catholic Church—there is
robust disagreement on moral issues. These moral disagreements simply mirror those of
secular society. Contrary to Zagzebski’s claim that the theist has a better way of dealing
with the challenge of moral pluralism, appeal to a transcendent source of moral
objectivity seems to make moral disagreement even more intractable, as claims about the
transcendent have proved difficult if not impossible to adjudicate. Peter Byrne aptly
describes these difficulties:
There is more than one claim to be the source of true revelation and the
true Church. Where there is agreement on these things, we can find
disagreement over how they should be interpreted. The fact of moral
diversity itself encourages disagreements on what is religious authority
and how it is to be interpreted. Finally, if Zagzebski is right, we should
expect to find that those in receipt of the true revelation on moral matters
59

Linda Zagzebski, "Does Ethics Need God?," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers 4, no. 3 (1987), 302.

246
and those possessing the teachings of the true Church in this area should
stand out as having greater moral knowledge than those less fortunate.
These folk should stand out as the ones able to rise above disagreements
and settle them. Their views are not subject to the relativities and
uncertainties others are enmired in. Is there such a group of moral agents?
Who are its members? 60
There have yet to be any compelling answers to the questions raised by Byrne. There are
thus numerous problems with a theological account of moral objectivity. In terms of
metaphysics, theological objectivism assumes the truth of theism, and as noted in the
previous chapters of this dissertation, there are many reasons to be skeptical about the
truth of theism. Secondly, there is a massive amount of empirical evidence implicating
the emotions in moral judgment. This research calls into question the plausibility of
moral properties like “good” and “bad” “right” and “wrong” existing independently of
homo sapiens. In terms of epistemology, there is no sort of consensus on the moral issues
the way there is with other objective properties (e.g., the roundness of the Earth). As
Byrne’s quote illustrates, this lack of consensus exists both between even within religious
communities. Transcendental claims about moral objectivity are problematic on both
metaphysical and epistemological grounds, but such claims also might be problematic
from a moral standpoint. Moral objectivism contributes to the intractability of moral
disputes, especially when couched in theological terms. It may enhance a cognitive bias
that has been termed “direct realism”: the well-documented psychological tendency to
regard oneself or one’s group as right and others as biased. Jonathan Haidt highlights the
ethical dangers of such a stance:
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If I could nominate one candidate for ‘biggest obstacle to world peace and
social harmony,’ it would be naïve realism because it is so easily ratcheted
up from the individual to the group level: My group is right because they
see things as they are. Those who disagree are obviously biased by their
religion, their ideology, or their self-interest. 61
One might be well advised to abandon or at least bracket claims about moral
objectivity and to analyze more deeply the sources of moral pluralism and conflict. The
next sections will provide such an analysis focusing on the relationship of reason and
emotion and biology and culture in morality.
Mind Science, Metaethics, and Religion II: Jonathan Haidt and
Joshua Greene on the Relationship of Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgment
Work on the centrality of emotion in morality fits nicely with evidence from
contemporary psychology concerning the centrality of automatic intuition in human
thought.
Intuitions are the judgments, solutions, and ideas that pop into
consciousness without our being aware of the mental processes that led to
them…Moral intuitions are a subclass of intuitions, in which feelings of
approval and disapproval pop into awareness as we see and hear about
something someone did or as we consider choices for ourselves. 62
Work on the intuitions and automatic processing has led to a rediscovery of the
unconscious in contemporary scientific, experimental psychology. This is not the
psychoanalytic unconscious of Freud and his followers but rather an adaptive
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unconscious with roots in the evolutionary past of human beings. 63 Psychologists are apt
to understand human beings in light of dual process models: many cognitive processes
occur fast and automatically and outside of conscious awareness; however, human beings
can also deliberate about things in a more explicit and conscious manner. The notion of
dual processing systems and the fact that many moral judgments seem to be driven by
emotion-laden intuitions raises important questions about how reason functions in moral
judgment. Jonathan Haidt has developed a social intuitionist account of moral judgment
that seeks to account for the complex interplay between reason and the passions in moral
judgment. Haidt offers his social intuitionist model as an explicit alternative to rationalist
models of moral psychology; however, reason does not disappear in this account. It
simply is given a more complex role. Haidt proposes a six-step model of moral judgment.
The model is offered here not as a definitive guide to moral judgment but as a helpful
heuristic tool for thinking about emotion, reason and their respective roles in moral
judgment. Haidt proposes six links in moral judgment:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Intuitive Judgment Link
Post-hoc Reasoning Link
Reasoned Persuasion Link
Social Persuasion Link
Reasoned Judgment Link
Private Reflection Link 64

The evidence reviewed above concerning the primacy of emotion in moral judgment
supports the claim that moral judgments are primarily driven by affect-laden intuitions.
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The primacy of the Intuitive Judgment Link stands in contrast to traditional models of
rationalist moral psychology which understand moral judgments to be caused exclusively
by reasoned judgment and private reflection. Haidt rejects the rationalist model on the
basis of evidence for the primacy of emotion in moral judgment, such as that reviewed
above; however, he also rejects this model on the basis of evidence concerning the nature
of reasoning. Rationalist models cannot account for the dual-process nature of human
cognition, and the post-hoc biased nature that much of our reasoning takes. Haidt’s model
does not deny a causal role to reason in moral judgment, but offers a more complex
account of how that causality occurs. Haidt’s model also does not deny the role of
reasoned judgment or private reflection, but simply points to their rarity.
Emotion, Post-Hoc Reasoning, and Morality:
Joshua Greene’s Critique of Rationalist Deontology
The notion of dual-processing systems and the fact that many moral judgments
seem to be driven by affect-laden intuitions raise important questions about how reason
functions in moral judgment. One striking discovery in contemporary cognitive science
and neuroscience is that when a causal explanation of a behavior is hidden from
conscious introspection, human beings will generate a rational explanation for the
behavior in question. Evidence for this post-hoc, confabulatory reason comes from both
neuroscience and social psychology. Perhaps the most dramatic example of post-hoc
confabulatory reason comes from studies of so-called “split brain” patients. These
patients had their corpus collusums severed surgically to prevent severe epileptic
seizures. Roger Sperry, Joseph Bogen, and Michael Gazzaniga did ground breaking work
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on such patients. 65 Some of the most important findings were discovered in presenting
images to the two separated hemispheres of the brain. For instance, an image of a hat
presented to subjects’ right visual field is processed by their left hemisphere, the
hemisphere that also controls the speech centers of the brain. Thus if an image of a hat is
flashed to the left hemisphere, when asked to respond, the person would say “hat;”
however, if an image was flashed to the right hemisphere—which does not control
speech—when asked to respond, the patient—responding from the verbal left hemisphere
would say nothing. When asked to point with their left hand to the image, the subject
would point to the image of a hat. 66 Some of the most interesting experimental results
occurred when Gazzaniga flashed images simultaneously to the right and left
hemispheres. A picture of a chicken claw would be flashed to the left hemisphere while a
picture of a snowy scene would be flashed to the right. When asked to point to what they
had just seen, the person would point to a chicken with his right hand and to a shovel
with his left hand. When the patient was asked to explain his two responses, the patient,
responding from the verbal left hemisphere, remarked: “Oh that’s easy. The chicken claw
goes with the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed.” 67
Importantly, Gazzaniga argues that the confabulatory/interpretive role of the linguistic
centers of the left hemisphere is not unique to split-brain patients. Gazzaniga refers to the
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linguistic centers on the left side of the brain as the “interpreter module;” its job is to
“interpret” behaviors even though it has no access to the real causes of such behaviors. 68
A great deal of social psychological research has uncovered a similar pattern of
using reason to construct a plausible explanation for a behavior whose actual causal
source is hidden from consciousness. In an early experiment of this sort, Richard Nisbett
and Timothy Wilson set up a display of five identical pairs of panty hose in a row in a
store and asked shoppers to select a pair of the pantyhose. Subjects tended to pick from
the right side of the display, but when asked as to why they picked the pair that they did,
they offered responses emphasizing the superiority of their selection—knit, sheerness,
etc.—however, the actual choice had nothing to do with these factors because the items
were in fact identical. 69
Joshua Greene has recently applied evidence concerning both the emotional
nature of moral judgments and the post-hoc confabulatory character of much of our
reasoning to philosophical theories of morality. Greene is particularly interested in
contrasting deontological and consequentialist patterns of moral judgment. Deontology
and consequentialism are both rationalist theories of morality. Typically using the
language of rights and duties, deontology holds that certain actions are right or wrong
irrespective in and of themselves and irrespective of consequences. The criteria that one
uses to reach deontological judgments are rational criteria. Consequentialist or
teleological accounts of morality assess the moral value of an action solely on the basis of
68
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its consequences. Formally articulated forms of deontology and consequentialism have
been around for around 200 years; however, an evolutionary perspective views human
morality within a much broader scope. In light of this evolutionary perspective, Greene
proposes that there may be more to deontology and consequentialism than meets the eye.
…I propose…that the terms “deontology” and “consequentialism” refer to
psychological natural kinds. I believe that consequentialist and
deontological views of philosophy are not so much philosophical
inventions as they are philosophical manifestations of two dissociable
psychological patterns, two different ways of moral thinking, that have
been part of the human repertoire for thousands of years. According to this
view the moral philosophies of Kant, Mill, and others are just the explicit
tip of large, mostly implicit psychological icebergs. If that is correct, then
philosophers may not really know what they’re dealing with when they
trade in consequentialist and deontological moral theories, and we may
have to do some science to find out. 70
Greene, in particular, points out that scientific data raises significant questions
about the purported rational credentials of deontological moral philosophy. Recall that
deontology holds that certain actions are right or wrong irrespective of their
consequences, and that reason provides the basis for such moral judgments. Greene
presents evidence from a number of sources that show a correlation between
deontological judgments and alarm-like emotional responses. Greene proposes that
deontological judgments are in fact driven by emotion rather than reason and that
deontological reasoning/philosophy serves as a post-hoc justification of an affectively
valenced moral intuition. Evidence of correlation between emotion and deontological
moral judgments comes from neuroimaging studies of moral dilemmas, studies
evaluating attitudes toward punishment, and studies concerning the moral condemnation
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of harmless actions. Greene’s own empirical research centers on the neuroimaging of
people engaging various moral dilemmas, such as the “trolley” and “footbridge” problem.
In the trolley dilemma, a runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be
killed if it continues on its present course. 71 The only way to save the five people is to hit
a switch that will move the trolley to a side track where it will kill one person instead of
five. In the footbridge dilemma, a runaway trolley also threatens to kill five people—only
in this instance you are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge, and the only way
to save the five is by pushing the stranger onto the tracks. 72 These two moral dilemmas
generate quite different conclusions. The consensus in the trolley dilemma is that it is
more acceptable to save five lives at the expense of one; however, the consensus with
regard to the footbridge dilemma is that one cannot save five lives at the expense of one.
In short, people tend to show a consequentialist response to the trolley dilemma and a
deontological response to the footbridge dilemma. Why? This question has vexed
philosophers. Some have sought to offer a normative justification for distinguishing
between the two cases. Thus the trolley dilemma is an example of the principle of doubleeffect where someone is harmed as a side effect of an action, whereas footbridge involves
using someone as a means. However, responses remain the same in the “loop” version of
the trolley dilemma. The trolley is headed toward five people, a side track branches off
but in this case loops around and would kill the 5 people if the person was not on the
sidetrack. As in the trolley case, people judge that turning the trolley is morally
71
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acceptable in order to save five lives, but here, as in the footbridge case, the person is
used directly as a means. 73
Thus in both dilemmas there is a strong intuition that the moral dilemmas are
importantly different and yet people have a hard time explaining exactly what the
difference is. “How is it that nearly everyone manages to conclude that it is acceptable to
sacrifice one life for five in the trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma, in
spite of the fact that a satisfying justification for distinguishing between these cases is
extremely hard to find?”74 Greene and his colleagues proposed a purely descriptive
approach to these issues. Greene’s group hypothesized that the difference between the
dilemmas was to be made on emotional rather than rational grounds. The hypothesis was
that “up-close and personal” moral situations like the footbridge case are much more
emotionally salient than the impersonal situation found in the trolley case. It is an
emotional judgment that drives the judgment of the impermissibility of the act. The basis
of drawing this personal/impersonal distinction was largely evolutionary:
The rationale for distinguishing between personal and impersonal forms
of harm is largely evolutionary. “Up close and personal” violence has been
around for a very long time, reaching far back into our primate
lineage….Given that personal violence is evolutionarily ancient, predating
our recently evolved capacities for complex abstract reasoning, it should
come as no surprise if we have innate responses to personal violence that
are powerful but rather primitive. That is, we might expect humans to have
negative emotional responses to certain basic forms of interpersonal
violence, where these responses evolved as a means of regulating the
behavior of creatures who are capable of intentionally harming one
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another, but whose survival depends on cooperation and individual
restraint. 75
This prediction was exactly what was observed. Responding to personal moral dilemmas,
as compared with impersonal and nonmoral dilemmas produced increased activity in
areas associated with social and emotional processing including the posterior cingulate
cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, and the superior temporal sulcus. 76 By
contrast, both impersonal and non-moral dilemmas produced activity in areas associated
with “higher cognition”: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobe. 77
Greene also tested reaction times regarding the impermissibility/permissibility of actions
in the personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. Personal violations involve a strong
emotional inclination not to perform the act. Thus ‘no’ responses regarding the
permissibility of a personal moral dilemma should be quick while ‘yes’ responses should
take longer because one has to overcome initial emotional resistance. 78 This is exactly
what was observed, with no differences in reaction times in the impersonal or non-moral
conditions. 79 The tendency toward consequentialism or deontology can be explained as a
function of emotion: There is a tendency toward consequentialism when the emotional
response is low and toward deontology when the emotional response is high.
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This same framework can be applied to other dilemmas. Peter Singer, for
example, famously raised the question of why people experience a strict obligation to
wade into a pond to save a nearby drowning child but no corresponding obligation to
donate to organizations helping sick starving children across the globe. Both situations
involve a substantial benefit with negligible cost to the person performing the action. This
pattern of response is exactly what one would expect under Greene’s hypothesis where
characteristically deontological responses are elicited in personal contexts evoking an
emotional response.
…[P]eople tend to believe, in a characteristically deontological way, that
they are within their moral rights in spending their money on luxuries for
themselves, despite the fact that their money could be used to dramatically
improve the lives of other people. This is exactly what one would expect if
(1) the deontological sense of obligation is driven primarily by emotion,
and (2) when it comes to obligations to aid, emotions are only sufficiently
engaged when those to whom we might owe something are encountered
(or conceived of) in a personal way. 80
A similar pattern can be observed in attitudes toward punishment.
Consequentialist theories of punishment focus solely on the positive consequences of the
punishment. Deontological theories focus on retribution, on giving wrongdoers what they
deserve. Experimental evidence has shown that people tend to be retributivists and that
this retributivism seems to be emotionally driven, and people punish in proportion to the
extent that transgressions make them angry. 81 Greene cites Haidt’s studies of the moral
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condemnation of harmless actions as further evidence of the correlation between emotion
and deontology. Many people understood a classic deontological violation (failing to
keep one’s promise to visit one’s mother’s grave) as morally wrong, and recall that the
bother probe was a better predictor of moral condemnation than the harm probe. 82
Greene presents in a number of examples where deontological judgments
correlate closely with emotion. Someone who defends rationalist deontology has to
explain the correlation and as rationalists they cannot say that emotions cause the
deontological judgment.
Thus, in light of these data, there are a series of coincidences for which
various rationalist deontologists must account. For example, according to
Judith Jarvis Thomson…and Frances Kamm…, there is a complicated,
highly abstract theory of rights that explains why it is okay to sacrifice one
life for five in the trolley case but not in the footbridge case, and it just so
happens, that we have a strong negative emotional response to the latter
case to not to the former. Likewise, according to Colin McGinn and
Frances Kamm, there is a theory of duty that explains why we have an
obligation to help Singer’s drowning child but not comparable obligation
to save starving children on the other side of the world, and it just so
happens that we have strong emotional responses to the former individuals
but not the latter. According to Kant and many other legal theorists…,
there is a complicated abstract theory of punishment that explains why we
ought to punish people regardless of whether there are social benefits to be
gained in doing so, and it just so happens that we have emotional
responses that incline us to do exactly that. The categorical imperative
prohibits masturbation because it involves using oneself as a means, and it
just so happens that the categorical imperative’s chief proponent finds
masturbation really, really disgusting. 83
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For Greene, the correlation is best explained by regarding deontological moral
philosophy as a post-hoc rationalization of an emotionally driven moral intuition.
Deontology, then, is a kind of moral confabulation. We have strong
feelings that tell us in clear and uncertain terms that some things simply
cannot be done and that other things simply must be done. But it is not
obvious how to make sense of these feelings, and so we, with the help of
some especially creative philosophers, make up a rationally appealing
story….Deontology, I believe, is a natural “cognitive” expression of our
deepest moral emotions. 84
The conclusions drawn thus far are the following: much of moral judgment is driven by
emotional intuitions and that reason often functions as a post-hoc justification for
intuitions.
Emotion and Reason in Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist
Model of Moral Judgment
The notion that moral judgment is driven by emotional intuitions and that reason
often functions in a post-hoc manner does not rule out a causal role for reason to play in
moral judgments. The relationship between reason and emotion in the Social Intuitionism
is complex, and Haidt’s model allows for reason to play a causal role in several ways.
Recall that Haidt’s model is a six-step approach to moral judgment:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Intuitive Judgment Link
Post-hoc Reasoning Link
Reasoned Persuasion Link
Social Persuasion Link
Reasoned Judgment Link
Private Reflection Link 85
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We have discussed the first two links in Haidt’s model: (1) Intuitive Judgment
Link, (2) Post-Hoc Reasoning Link. These links emphasize the intuitive aspects of the
Social Intuitionist Model. Importantly, Haidt’s model does not deny that reason may play
an important role in moral judgment. His model includes a role for both (5) Reasoned
Judgment and (6) Private Reflection, aspects of moral judgment emphasized in much
traditional philosophy and in rationalist moral psychology. While these more private
forms of moral reasoning may play a causal role in moral judgment, Haidt argues that
these links are utilized relatively infrequently. Haidt argues that reason tends to exercise a
causal role primarily within a social context. The role of social aspects of the Social
Intuitionist Model are captured in the (3) Reasoned Persuasion Link and (4) Social
Persuasion Link. This sensitivity to others and to group norms should not come as a
surprise given the ultra social nature of homo sapiens.
Only human beings cooperate widely and intensely with nonkin, and we
do it in part through a set of social psychological adaptations that make us
extremely sensitive to and influenceable by what other people think and
feel. We have an intense need to belong and fit in, and our moral
judgments are strongly shaped by what others in our ‘parish’ believe, even
when they don’t give us any reason for this belief. 86
Given this context, the moral intuitions of others can influence one’s own moral
intuitions, even if no explicit reasoning is used. This dynamic is captured in what Haidt
calls Social Persuasion. The social intuitionist model also allows reason to play a causal
role in moral judgment. He proposes that the reasoning used to justify one’s moral
judgment can exert a causal effect on the moral intuitions of others. This is the Reasoned
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Persuasion Link. Haidt argues that because of the strongly affective nature of morality,
reasoned persuasion will work more by triggering affectively valanced intuitions in the
listener than by providing logically compelling arguments. As noted above, the social
intuitionist model also allows for more private forms of reasoning—cases where people
reason their way to a conclusion to override an initial intuition. One can see this for
example in Greene’s discussion of response latencies in personal, emotion-involving
moral dilemmas. However, “such reasoning is hypothesized to be rare, occurring
primarily in cases where the initial intuition is weak and the processing capacity is
high.” 87 The Private Reflection Link allows for the spontaneous activation of new
intuitions and role taking with regard to these new intuitions. Thus, a person comes to see
an issue or dilemma from more than one side and thereby experiences conflicting
intuitions. Thus while highlighting the centrality of emotional intuitions in moral
judgment, three of the six links in Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model allow for reasoning to
play a causal role: (3) Reasoned Persuasion, (5) Reasoned Judgment, (6) Private
Judgment.
The Biological and Cultural Origins of Moral Intuitions
Where do such moral intuitions and the judgments and virtues that they generate
come from? An appealing aspect of the social intuitionist model is that it overcomes
dichotomies between nativism and empiricism in thinking about the origins of morality.
Haidt understands intuitions as having their origin in biology and evolution but also as
profoundly shaped by immersion in various culture complexes. As such intuitions serve
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as a bridging concept between higher level social science and lower level biology. What
sorts of moral intuitions would human beings be prone to develop? Haidt and Joseph
surveyed five major contemporary analyses of cross cultural universals and tallied the
most frequently mentioned social situations where people were prone to respond either
positively or negatively. The winners were suffering/compassion, reciprocity/fairness,
hierarchy/respect, and purity/disgust. It is not hard to see the adaptive functions that each
of these modules could perform.
Reflecting on suffering, hierarchy, and reciprocity Haidt and Joseph write:
…[T]he prolonged dependence characteristic of primates, especially
humans, made it necessary, or at least beneficial, for mothers to detect
signs of suffering and distress in their offspring.…Psychological
preparation for hierarchy evolved to help animals living in social groups
make the most of their relative abilities to dominate others.…Similarly, a
readiness for reciprocity evolved to help animals, particularly primates,
reap the benefits of cooperating with non-kin. 88
Human morality is thus not infinitely malleable but neither is it set in stone.
There are several reasons for this variability. First, drawing upon Dan Sperber’s
distinction between proper domain and actual domain—the proper domain is the original
adaptive trigger; the actual domain is anything that triggers the module—the four moral
modules can extend well beyond their original adaptive triggers. For example, disgust,
can be extended beyond contaminants and waste products to whole social groups.
Secondly, different cultures make relative use of the four modules, and it is not possible
for any one culture to emphasize all of the intuitions. Haidt sees the acquisition of
morality as similar to the acquisition of phonology. Just as no one language can use all
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the clicks, labials, and glottal stops, “a culture that emphasized all of the moral intuitions
would risk paralysis as every action triggered multiple conflicting intuitions.” Thus
cultures tend to emphasize the different modules to varying degrees
Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment offers a robust account of
moral pluralism, conflict, and diversity to augment the account developed in the earlier
sections of this chapter. There we saw that people tend to see divine commands as
essential to moral judgment, when in fact they are not, even in very religious
communities. Likewise, people tend to see moral properties as part of the objective
furniture of the universe, when in fact they are most likely response-dependent properties
that depend on certain emotions. The Social Intuitionist Model shows how reason as well
as religion can provide a potent source of moral conflict. We think of moral judgments as
caused by reason when in fact reasoning may come in after the judgment has been made.
As Jonathan Haidt has noted we are prone to two profound illusions with regard to the
moral life. First, we tend to believe that our moral reasoning (tail) drives moral judgment
(dog) (wag-the-dog illusion). Secondly, we tend to believe that successful rebuttal of
arguments will change other’s moral opinions (wag the other dog’s tail illusion).
The bitterness, futility, and self-righteousness of most moral arguments
can now be explicated…[In a debate about morality] both sides believe
that their positions are based on reasoning about the facts and issues
involved (wag-the-dog illusion). Both sides present what they take to be
excellent arguments in support of their positions. Both sides expect the
other side to be responsive to such reasons (the wag-the-other-dog’s-tailillusion). When the other side fails to be affected by such good reasons,
each side concludes that the other side must be closed minded or insincere.
In this way, the culture wars over issues such as homosexuality and
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abortion can generate morally motivated players on both sides who believe
that their opponents are not morally motivated. 89
Moral intuitions and virtues are shaped by culture and differ profoundly cross
culturally, according to the degree to which the various intuitive building blocks of
morality—suffering, reciprocity, hierarchy, purity—are emphasized. Knowledge of these
factors alone is not sufficient to resolve issues, but they create an awareness of the
complexities involved in moral matters and rule out simplistic solutions.
Mind Science, Metaethics, and Religion III: Implications of Scientific Moral
Psychology for Normative Morality and Religious Practices
We have ruled out an approach that sees morality as flowing from religion,
specifically from divine commands. Contemporary natural and social science calls into
question such claims concerning moral rationalism. Moral judgments are driven by
emotion-laden intuitions and profoundly shaped by social and cultural interaction. Where
does this leave issues of normative morality and religion? It is argued that the findings of
scientific moral psychology support a virtue ethics as the best approach to normative
morality. Worries about the normative implications of both the Social Intuitionist Model
of moral judgment and virtue theory are then addressed. Finally, it is argued that the
focus on emotion and virtue may open the door to a positive valuation of certain religious
practices and a fruitful point of contact between religion and science. This claim is
investigated in light of Richard Davidson’s work on Buddhist mindfulness meditation.
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Scientific Moral Psychology, Virtue Ethics, and
Issues of Normative Moral Evaluation
In terms of the issue of normative implications, a number of naturalistic moral
philosophers and scientific moral psychologists have argued that a virtue based
understanding of morality is most adequate in light of our scientific understanding of the
human person. Jonathan Haidt endorses the turn to virtue theory in several places.
We believe that virtue theories are the most psychologically sound
approach to morality.…Such theories fit more neatly with what we know
about moral development, judgment, and behavior than do theories that
focus on moral reasoning or the acceptance of higher level moral
principles such as justice. 90
In another location Haidt writes:
I believe that this turn from character to quandary was a profound mistake
for two reasons. First, it weakens morality and limits its scope. Where the
ancients saw virtue and character at work in everything a person does, our
modern conception confines morality to a set of situations that arise for
each person only a few times in a given week” tradeoffs between selfinterest and the interests of others. In our thin and restricted modern
conception, a moral person is one who gives to charity, helps others, plays
by the rules, and in general does not put her own self-interest too far ahead
of others….
The second problem with the turn to moral reasoning is that it
relies on bad psychology. Many moral education efforts since the 1970’s
take the rider off the elephant and train him to solve problems on his own.
After being exposed to hours of case studies, classroom discussions about
moral dilemmas, and videos about people who faced dilemmas and made
the right choices, the child learns how (not what) to think. Then class
ends, the rider gets back on the elephant, and nothing changes at recess. 91
The philosopher and moral psychologist William Casebeer makes a similar point.
“Ultimately, the correct situation makes the moral psychology that is required by virtue
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theory the most neurobiologically plausible, although this is a tentative, defeasible
conclusion, and more work is needed to confirm it.” 92
The task of normatively evaluating theories grounded in moral emotions and
virtue becomes more difficult but not an impossibility. What is lost is simply the false
clarity that theological and rationalist approaches aspire to. Theological and rationalist
approaches have dominated Western approaches to ethics, and frequently these two
approaches are knit together. Both of these approaches involve commitment to strong
forms of moral objectivity. One consequence of this is when such views collapse, people
tend to think that the only alternative left is subjective relativism. Descriptive accounts of
morality, such as Haidt’s social intuitionist model, raise a number of worries for
normative morality. In Haidt’s account, virtues are the products of biologically based
intuitions shaped by culture. Both the social and the intuitionist aspects of morality raise
concerns. The worry about intuitionism is that there is no way to check and transform
intuitions and no role for reasoning to play in moral judgment. The worry about social is
that virtues are culturally specific and that there is no way of evaluating cross cultural
claims.
Owen Flanagan has done important work on naturalistic ethics that dovetails with
many of the findings discussed above. The worry about the relativity of virtue to social
context Flanagan refers to as the “internalist” objection. “The only measure of what
constitutes flourishing, excellence, enlightenment is in fact what norms are avowed,
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practiced, considered best from inside the culture.” 93 However, this state of affairs does
not preclude cross-cultural comparison and evaluation; it simply represents honestly the
epistemic situation human beings find themselves in. What is precluded is not crosscultural comparison and evaluation; what is precluded is doing such an analysis from an
impossible transcendental standpoint. As Flanagan notes:
We are always because it is the nature of the human condition, in some
kind of internalist predicament. But normative assessment, moral
improvement, and so on, must come from the dialectical space of our own
norms, the norms of those who live differently, and in the space of metanorms for resolving disagreements or deciding to live tolerantly without
agreement. This means that the internalist predicament admits of degrees
and that to the degree that we reflect widely, from a perspective that
includes other moral conceptions, we are going external in some
meaningful sense of the term ‘external’ 94
In light of this, Flanagan proposes meta-norms for addressing and evaluating moral issues
from a vantage point broader than one’s own culture. What Flanagan calls his key metanorm involves engaging in a process of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) when a key
issue is at stake in terms of norms, virtues, etc.
WRE is a normative test that says we ought to test our ideas about life by
bringing them into the widest space of reasons possible. The test, in order
to be psychologically realizable, involves taking as genuine all credible
contending options available in the space of meaning. Or, perhaps more
credible and judicious, it requires reflecting widely when there are
misgiving about norms, values, and virtues and when internal scrutiny
does not yield a satisfactory solution. 95
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Another norm Flanagan suggests addresses the worry about the intuitive nature of many
of our moral judgments. Flanagan calls this an “intuition-checking meta-norm (ICMN):
If nature has gifted us with a moral system that operates mostly intuitively
and if intuitions are not always reliable, then we positioned to propose
another meta-norm that instructs us to check and double check intuitions
and gut reactions: Pay close attention to your intuitive moral responses
and to the confidence you experience about the validity of your norms and
values. Consider alternatives. Let us call this the intuition checking metanorm. 96
This foregoing analysis has called into question many of the metaethical
commitments found within religious traditions, but an emphasis on moral emotions and
virtue may provide a fruitful point of contact between religion and science. Indeed, much
of the Buddhism-mind science dialogue has taken this direction. The final section of this
chapter examines this approach, focusing especially on the work of Richard Davidson.
A Fruitful Approach to Religion and Science: The Buddhism-Mind
Science Dialogue on Meditation, Affective Style, and Emotion
Contrary to the impression of some Westerners, Buddhism is not a kind of paleonaturalistic philosophy. At least in its Tibetan versions, it involves what—at least to
Western eyes—amount to strong dualist (or idealist) claims. These claims have already
been illustrated in the writings of the Dalai Lama and B. Alan Wallace. This dissertation
argued that these claims are as problematic as the dualist claims advanced within Western
monotheistic traditions. Interestingly, however, there has been a substantial engagement
between contemporary mind science and Buddhism where these ontological claims about
the nature of mind do not figure prominently at all. Where the dialogue between
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Christianity and the mind science has focused almost exclusively on metaphysical issues,
the Buddhist-dialogue centers not so much on the metaphysical and doctrinal aspects of
religion as its moral and experiential dimensions. 97 Meditation rather than metaphysics
tends to mediate the Buddhism-mind science dialogue.
As was illustrated in the previous chapter, claims about Buddhist meditation are
complex, and in many cases there are strong metaphysical claims embedded in the notion
of meditation. For instance, Chapter Three analyzed B. Alan Wallace’s claims that
meditation shows consciousness to be non-physical and that meditation shows that the
claims of Tibetan Buddhism are true. However, in much of the Buddhism-mind science
dialogue these metaphysical claims are bracketed in favor of a focus on the physical,
mental, and moral benefits of mindfulness meditation. This stems from the awareness that
there are certain aspects of Buddhist meditation that are amenable to scientific study and
certain aspects that are not. Christian dialogue tends to focus on the integration of
metaphysical beliefs with the claims of science. Buddhist dialogue focuses on practices
and brackets metaphysical issues in the dialogue itself, focusing on issues that are
publically accessible and empirically tractable. Here the dialogue sets up a scientific
research program to study religious practices. Thus, much of the Buddhism-mind science
dialogue itself occurs on naturalistic terms. Chapter Four has already made a case for not
just bracketing but for suspicion regarding the metaphysical claims of religious dualism,
but here the important point is that scientific and religious parties agree to a
methodological bracketing of these claims in creating a scientific research program.
97
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Dialogue takes the form of a scientific research program rather than a discussion of the
implications of science of Buddhist metaphysics.
The neuroscientist Richard Davidson has developed a scientific research program
for the study of mediation to perhaps the greatest extent. In a discussion of the study of
meditation from a scientific perspective, Davidson and his colleagues Antoine Lutz and
John Dunne point to the need to tease apart: (1) close descriptions of meditative
techniques and states, (2) the metaphysical or soteriological requirements that must be
met by these states as expressed in authoritative textual sources. 98 They use the Tibetan
Buddhist practice of “Open Presence” as an example. On the one hand, discussion of this
practice includes descriptions of techniques and the phenomenal experiences that should
follow. “For example, discursive techniques for de-emphasizing the objectification of
sensory content… and the consequent loss of a sense of subject-object duality.” 99
According to Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson: “these parts of the traditional account lend
themselves to investigation inasmuch as they describe techniques and results for which
neural correlates may be plausibly postulated and tested.” 100 However, additional
metaphysical or ontological claims are often made about such states:
Buddhist philosophical concerns also demand that the state of open
presence reflects the ontological foundation of all reality, and Buddhist
notions of nirvana also require that the realization of that state will lead
the adept to attain inconceivable physical and mental powers….From a
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neuroscientific perspective, however, these claims do not lend themselves
readily to analysis or description. Thus, from the vantage point of the
researcher who stands outside the tradition, it is crucial to separate the
highly detailed and verifiable aspects of traditional knowledge about
meditation from the transcendental claims that form the metaphysical or
theological context of that knowledge. 101
Interestingly, this approach is endorsed not only by Western scientists but by
figures within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Reflecting on a dialogue between Tibetan
Buddhists and Western scientists on the topic of “transforming destructive emotions,” the
Dalai Lama expresses a willingness to separate the practice of meditation from its
embedding within a Buddhist context:
A central claim of Buddhist practice is to reduce the power of destructive
emotions in our lives. With that aim in mind, Buddhism offers a wide
range of theoretical insights and practical methods. If any of these
methods can be shown through scientific tests to be of benefit, then there
is every reason to find ways to make them available to everyone, whether
or not they are interested in Buddhism itself. 102
Richard Davidson is concerned to take up questions about well-being, happiness,
and flourishing in an empirically tractable manner and also to see how certain practices—
specifically mindfulness meditation—can lead to changes in the regions of the brain
implicated in affective style and moral judgment. An important discovery in recent
affective neuroscience and psychology is that an individual’s happiness is constrained in
important ways by a happiness set point or their affective style, the “consistent
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differences in individuals with regard to emotional reactivity and regulation.” 103
Certainly, the broad notion of affect style is nothing new: Hippocrates and Galen offer
interesting discussions of affective personality differences. However, until quite recently,
the study of affective style has been based almost exclusively on phenomenological selfreports. This extends to the taxonomy of psychiatric disorders as listed in the DSM-IV.
Much of the work of Davidson’s lab is concerned with penetrating below the
phenomenological level.
Many of the parameters of affective style, such as the threshold to
respond, magnitude of response, latency to peak response, and recovery
function, are features that are often opaque to conscious report, though
they may influence the subjective experience of emotion. These
parameters of responding can be measured in many different response
systems including both the central and peripheral systems….In previous
work, we have argued that variations in some of these parameters in
particular response systems are especially relevant to vulnerability to
mood, anxiety, and other disorders and also to resilience….One of the
important developments in emotion research in general, and in affective
neuroscience, in particular, is the capacity to objectively measure these
parameters of responding. 104
Davidson and his colleagues have been particularly concerned to identify the
neural correlates of affective style and to raise the question of the degree to which
affective style might be adjusted. Davidson’s group links affective style with the ratio of
left-to-right activation in the frontal/anterior regions of the brain, especially the prefrontal cortex (PFC). In short, greater leftward activation is associated with a more
positive affective style while greater rightward activity is associated with a more negative
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affective style. 105 Evidence for the relationship between left-to-right PRC activation and
affective style comes from lesion studies and EEG and fMRI studies of normal brains.
Depressive symptoms tend to be manifested in patients with LPFC damage. The common
interpretation of this is that the LPFC is responsible for certain aspects of positive
emotion and capacity for positive emotion is impaired with damage to this brain region.
Studies with normal subjects have found that LPFC-RPFC can be shifted in lawful ways
by inducing negative or positive affect. 106 Further, extreme LPFC and RPFC activity
predicts one’s dispositional affect as measured in scales like the PANAS and BIS/BAS.
PFC activity also predicts one’s reaction to certain emotional situations (emotional
reactivity). Subjects with strong LPFC activity experienced positive film clips more
positively and subjects with strong RPFC activity experienced negative movie clips more
negatively. 107
Davidson’s group is also interested in the question of the degree to which PFC
activity can be altered—its neuroplasticity. Tentative indications of the neuroplasticity of
emotional circuitry can already be found in studies of animals and humans. Such research
on the plasticity of the brain’s emotional circuits is still in its infancy. “Whether repeated
practice in techniques of emotion regulation lead to more enduring patterns of brain
activation is a question that has not been answered.” 108
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Davidson and his colleagues tested the effects of an 8-week course on a group of
novice meditators from a biotechnology firm in Madison, Wisconsin versus a control
group placed on a waiting list. 109 The training consisted of a class that met weekly for
two point five hours, home practice, and one seven-hour retreat given during the sixth
week of the program. Brain electrical activity was measured by EEG before,
immediately after, and four months after the training period. Subjects in the meditative
group showed both a significant difference in trait negative affect and showed
significantly larger increases in left sided anterior activation. 110 There was also a
significant difference in immune response in relationship to the leftward shift. Subjects
received an influenza vaccine after completing the program. Influenza antibody titers
were significantly higher in the meditators than in the control group. Subjects with the
largest lefthand shift in the brain in fact showed the largest increase in antibody titers. 111
In another study, Davidson and his colleagues examined plasticity in some of the
neural circuitry associated with empathy and compassion. This study builds on research
linking the insula and anterior cingulate gyrus with empathic response. Davidson and
colleagues were concerned to investigate the effects of meditation on these areas of the
brain.
To cultivate [compassion] practitioners in a number of traditions have
developed meditative practices, which are thought to be essential to
109
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counteract self-centered tendencies. Techniques included concentration
exercises that train attention, behavioral training such as the practice of
generosity, cognitive strategies including reflection on the fleeting nature
of the self and empathic strategies such as shifting perspectives from selforiented to other-oriented, or the visualization of the suffering of others.
Traditionally, such mental training comprises years of scholastic study and
meditative practice. The long-term goal of meditators undergoing such
training is to weaken egocentric traits so that altruistic behaviors might
arise more frequently and spontaneously. 112
Davidson and his colleagues scanned the brains of novice and expert meditators while
meditating and while at rest and when exposed to negative, positive, and neutral sounds.
Davidson and his colleagues predicted and found a group by state by valence interaction.
Expert meditators while in the state of meditation showed more activation in the insula
and anterior cingulate cortices, especially in response to negative sounds than novice
meditators. As Davidson summarizes the tentative conclusions:
Because novices and experts differ in many respects other than simply the
extent of meditative training (such as culture of origin and first language),
longitudinal research that follows individuals over time in response to
compassion training will be needed to further substantiate our findings. It
will also be essential to assess the impact of such emotional training on
behavioral tasks involving altruism, and more generally, emotional
reactivity and regulation. The long-term question is to evaluate whether
repeated practice in such techniques could result in enduring changes in
affective and social style. The fact that large and systematic changes in
brain function were observed in response to auditory emotional stimuli
presented during the meditative practice of compassion, and the fact that
robust differences were observed between experts and novices suggests
that the next steps to evaluate the behavioral impact of this training and to
longitudinally assess its effects are warranted. 113
While empirical studies of meditation are still in their infancy, they show that
there are empirically tractable ways to explore issues of religion and science, whatever
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the results. An approach to religion and science that focuses on the cultivation of
empathy and compassion may prove more significant than approaches focusing on the
defense of problematic metaphysical positions like mind-body dualism. A naturalistic
perspective in no way rules out a positive valuation of religious practices.
Conclusion
This chapter began with a discussion of the conclusions reached in the first three
chapters of this dissertation and their bearing on issues of religion and science. Having
focused largely on the impact of the mind sciences on issues of mind-body dualism and
its impact on religion, this chapter shifted from metaphysics to morals, specifically
metaethical questions concerning the nature and origin of moral judgment. As the
previous chapters had used contemporary mind science to shed light on metaphysical
issues concerning mind-body dualism and its impact on religion, this chapter examined
the implications of the mind sciences for metaethical questions concerning the nature and
origin of moral judgment and its impact on religion. A major point of this exercise was to
shed light upon the issues of moral pluralism and moral conflict between religious
believers and secular naturalists and between religious believers themselves.
Because divine command ethics figures so prominently in discussions of morality
and religion, this issue was treated first in light of contemporary work in moral
psychology concerning the moral/conventional distinction. Contrary to popular
impressions, it was argued that divine commands are not a likely source of moral
judgment, as even very religious children reach moral judgments in a manner that is
largely autonomous from divine commands. If this is the case, non-religious citizens can
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hardly be faulted for explicitly seeking moral wisdom in a manner that is autonomous
from religion. At the same time, secular fears regarding divine command ethics may also
be misplaced.
Drawing on work on psychopaths and the moral psychology of disgust, it was
then argued that emotion likely drives much moral judgment. The emotional origins of
morality make moral properties response dependent properties; however, there is initial
evidence that people tend to be objectivists about morality. It was proposed that religion
and morality may link up over such issues. It was argued that belief in the objectivity of
morality, while often seen as essential to morality, may actually be problematic and
contribute to the intractability of moral disputes.
The issues of moral pluralism and the nature of moral conflict were further probed
in light of Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist account of moral judgment and Joshua
Greene’s analysis of deontological moral philosophy as a post-hoc rationalization of
emotional intuitions. A prime source of moral conflict lies in that fact that moral
judgments are driven by culturally shaped intuitions with reason playing a post-hoc role.
However, that causality is usually interpreted backwards. We think reason drives our
moral judgments and that we can change the opinions of others simply through rational
argument. When this strategy fails, we conclude that the other side is not morally
motivated.
Finally, the implications of scientific moral psychology for normative morality
and for religion were discussed. Contemporary moral psychology leads to a focus on
virtue ethics. This focus on virtue ethics makes the task of normative evaluation much
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more challenging. A model for addressing these issues was discussed through the work of
Owen Flanagan. In terms of religion, this chapter has primarily concentrated on how
science can shed light on the metaethical claims embedded in many religious traditions.
Claims that morality is rooted in divine commands or even objectively grounded in a
transcendent realm accessed through reason were viewed with suspicion, but this does
not rule out a positive valuation of religious practices. Indeed, this may be one of the
most fruitful avenues of religion-science dialogue and illustrated in Richard Davidson’s
research on Buddhist mindfulness practices

CONCLUSION
Questions about human nature, the existence of God and the soul, and the nature
and origin of morality have been central questions in both the Western philosophical and
theological traditions. In this sense, the questions that this dissertation addresses are quite
traditional; however, the answers that the dissertation proposes break strongly with both
inherited theology and a great deal of philosophy. The reason for this break comes from
the explosion of natural scientific knowledge in the past three centuries and especially the
explosion of knowledge concerning the mind-brain in the past hundred years.
Theologians have sought various ways to respond to the challenges of the
sciences. Perhaps the most common approach has simply been to ignore the problem or
to fail to recognize that there even is a problem. For all of its intellectual sophistication,
one can read a great deal of theology today and never realize that there was a scientific
revolution, a theory of evolution, a neuroscientific revolution, or that the majority of the
world’s population is not Christian. Sometimes the lack of scientific knowledge is
simply due to disciplinary specialization. Other times, the ignorance is principled.
Like other humanists, theologians are apt to make strong Geisteswissenschaften/
naturwissenschaften distinctions like those discussed in Chapter Two. Others retreat to a
faith commitment that insulates itself from critique from “the world.” Still others
passionate about the pursuit of social justice see questions about the impact of science
upon religion as distractions from the task of liberation. But surely an authentic faith
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must be intellectually credible and speak to an audience beyond one’s particular
confessional community. Just as surely, a passion for justice must be informed by the best
scientific data and theories concerning society, the human person, and the world. From
this standpoint, it is sobering to note that the intellectual beliefs of theologians are at odds
with many of their academic colleagues.
Theologians and religious studies scholars interested in ‘religion and science’
laudably engage the sciences in often sophisticated and profound ways. These
theologians do have a sense of the challenges the science and naturalistic philosophy pose
for religions today, but there is a line that most will not cross: rejecting a commitment to
some form of metaphysical dualism (especially in the case of God). In a sense,
theologians have stopped short in their analysis of science. They have attempted to
address the challenges of the sciences without addressing the challenge of naturalism.
The analysis of this dissertation has shown that naturalism is not a dogma that many
scientists and philosophers are mired in. The analysis of this dissertation has shown that
claims about metaphysical dualism and metaethical objectivism cannot be sustained.
Rather than a negative verdict on theology, this dissertation has provided constraints
within which a credible theology might operate. In this understanding, the task is not to
preserve traditional dualist beliefs at all costs but to develop theology, religion, and
spirituality in ways that are intellectually credible.
Aside from calling dualism into question, this dissertation has also been
concerned to spell out what explanation in naturalist terms amounts to. Here a crucial
concern was to overcome the dichotomy of autonomy versus reduction. This dissertation
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called into question versions of the autonomy thesis premised upon metaphysical
dualism, the notion that consciousness cannot be explained in bio-psychological terms
because consciousness just is not physical. It has also questioned claims about the
autonomy of psychology based upon the doctrine of multiple realizability and claims
about the autonomy of the humanities based on a principled Geisteswissenschaften/
Naturwissenschaften distinction. At the same time, it has called into question strong
versions of reductionism and eliminativism that fail to take phenomenal consciousness
and higher level disciplines seriously.
The dissertation has also sought to spell out fruitful approaches to the religion and
science dialogue beyond the conversation stopping approaches so common today. One of
its central points in this regard is that religion and science do conflict over issues of
metaphysical dualism; however, this conflict need not be a conversation stopper. Conflict
does not preclude respectful arguments over issues like dualism, and, in fact,
disagreement is essential to move such arguments forward. To this end, this dissertation
spells out the kinds of arguments and considerations dualists would have to address in
order to defend their position. Despite its skepticism about dualist commitments, this
does not mean that there might not be other interesting conversations about religion and
science. In Chapter Four, it was proposed that a conversation about morality might take
place on different terms than a conversation about metaphysics. This approach was
pursued by looking at the implications of scientific moral psychology for metaethical
claims about the origins of morality and moral judgment. The point was not to argue a
specific stance on a moral issue or to argue that religious believers or naturalists are more
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ethical than the other but to challenge the metaethical assumptions that typically frame
such debates. This dissertation has barely scratched the surface on issues concerning
religion and science, mind and brain, and their mutual relationship, but it has established
a naturalistic framework—at once metaphysical, explanatory, and methodological—in
which these questions can be further pursued.
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